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ABSTRACT




Engineering systems that involve physical elements, such as automobiles, aircraft,
or electric power pants, that are controlled by a computational infrastructure that
consists of several computers that communicate through a communication network,
are called Cyber-Physical Systems. Ever-increasing demands for safety, security,
performance, and certification of these critical systems put stringent constraints on
their design and necessitate the use of formal model-based approaches to synthesize
provably-correct feedback controllers. This dissertation aims to tackle these challenges
by developing a novel methodology for synthesis of control and sensing strategies for
Discrete Event Systems (DES), an important class of cyber-physical systems. First,
we develop a uniform approach for synthesizing property enforcing supervisors for
a wide class of properties called information-state-based (IS-based) properties. We
then consider the enforcement of non-blockingness in addition to IS-based properties.
We develop a finite structure called the All Enforcement Structure (AES) that em-
beds all valid supervisors. Furthermore, we propose novel and general approaches to
solve the sensor activation problem for partially-observed DES. We extend our results
for the sensor activation problem from the centralized case to the decentralized case.
x
The methodology in the dissertation has the following novel features: (i) it explicitly
considers and handles imperfect state information, due to sensor noise, and limit-
ed controllability, due to unexpected environmental disturbances; (ii) it is a uniform
information-state-based approach that can be applied to a variety of user-specified re-
quirements; (iii) it is a formal model-based approach, which results in provably correct
solutions; and (iv) the methodology and associated theoretical foundations developed
are generic and applicable to many types of networked cyber-physical systems with
safety-critical requirements, in particular networked systems such as aircraft electric




Engineering systems that involve physical elements, such as automobiles, aircraft,
or electric power pants, that are controlled by a computational infrastructure that
consists of several computers that communicate through a communication network,
are called Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). In the study of CPS, verification and syn-
thesis are two important research issues. In large complex automated systems, we are
first interested in verifying whether or not the given system satisfies a certain proper-
ty of interest. When the answer is negative, we wish to synthesize some strategy that
provably enforces the property by a certain enforcement mechanism. Ever-increasing
demands for safety, security, performance, and certification of these critical systems
put stringent constraints on their design and necessitate the use of formal model-based
approaches to synthesize provably-correct feedback controllers. Safety-criticality of
these systems and often times the need for certification make it essential to employ
methodologies that lead to provably-correct solutions. Fast and principled ways of
synthesizing controllers with correctness guarantees for these systems will directly
benefit the industries developing such systems as one can significantly reduce the
system integration, verification and validation cycle (and therefore time-to-market).
Unfortunately, today’s design tools to handle these requirements are inadequate.
Ad hoc approaches are currently employed by software teams to implement case-by-
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case solutions, which do not have safety guarantees. These solutions consist more
or less of large lists of “if-then-else” rules whose overall outcome as a system is in
general impossible to decipher. Such ad hoc solutions are especially error-prone due
to the fact that it is not possible to exhaustively enumerate all possible combinations
of variables for all different accident scenarios.
This dissertation aims to tackle these design challenges by developing a nov-
el methodology for synthesis of provably correct control and sensing strategies for
Discrete Event Systems (DES), an important class of cyber-physical systems. DES
models are widely used in the study of complex automated systems where the behavior
is inherently event-driven, as well as in the study of discrete abstractions of contin-
uous, hybrid, and/or cyber-physical systems. In particular, abstraction techniques
that lift system dynamics from the underlying continuous-state and continuous-time
domain to the domain of a discrete-state and event-driven (labeled) transition sys-
tem have recently proven to be highly effective in solving control problems where the
requirements take the form of a set of safety and liveness properties, expressed either
in some kind of temporal logic or as regular language constraints over the higher-level
event set. We therefore can capture the high level design requirements of the cyber-
physical system at the level of the abstracted discrete transition system, as a set of
logical constraints imposed on the discrete transition system.
In the context of DES, many properties have been studied. In the standard su-
pervisory control problem [64], the properties under consideration are safety and
non-blockingness: safety requires that the system should only execute legal behaviors
(modeled in terms of a regular language); non-blockingness requires that the system
should always be able to eventually achieve one in a set of desired behaviors. Di-
agnosability is related to the problem of fault diagnosis and isolation in automated
systems and it requires that any type of fault event be diagnosed unambiguously with-
in a bounded delay [77, 133]. In [10, 36, 70, 71, 73, 74, 107, 119, 124], a confidentiality
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property for partially-observed DES called opacity is studied. Opacity captures the
plausible deniability of the system’s “secret” in the presence of an outside observer
that is potentially malicious. Anonymity is a type of opacity that is of interest in the
study of privacy. Several other properties have been considered in the DES literature
to capture different requirements on the behavior of the system; among them we men-
tion predictability [29, 47, 126], detectability [88, 89], and attractability [9, 60, 78]. In
the computer science literature on verification and reactive synthesis, linear temporal
logic or branching time logic are also used to describe desired properties of systems;
see, e.g., [21].
In many applications, the system of interest is partially observed due to the lim-
ited sensing capabilities. In this dissertation, we are concerned with the problem
of enforcing a certain property on its set of behaviors for a partially-observed DES.
Specifically, we investigate two different enforcement mechanisms: supervisory control
and dynamic sensor activation. If the property is related to the actual behavior of the
system, one of the most commonly-used enforcement mechanisms is to restrict the
system behavior by supervisory control. The theory of supervisory control for DES
was initiated by Ramadge and Wonham [64]; for this reason, it is often referred to as
the Ramadge-Wonham Framework. In this framework, a supervisor disables/enables
events of the system dynamically based its observations in order to restrict the system
such that the closed-loop behavior satisfies some given property. In some situations,
restricting the system’s behavior via control may be infeasible. However, if the prop-
erty is specifically related to the observed behavior of the system, i.e., to the strings
of events output by the system, then an alternative approach is to change this output
information by activating/deactivating sensors; this is the sensor activation problem.
The principal objective of dissertation is the development of novel approaches for




1.1.1 Property Enforcement via Supervisory Control
In the standard supervisory control problem, the properties to be enforced are
safety and non-blockingness. This problem was solved in [64] in the case of full ob-
servation (e.g., no unobservable events). In the partial observation setting, different
solutions methodologies have been proposed; see, e.g., the following original refer-
ences and books [12, 20, 35, 42, 52, 83, 106]. In particular, in [20, 52], the necessary
and sufficient conditions for exactly achieving a specification language were given.
These are the well-known controllability, observability, and Lm(G)-closure condition-
s. When the given specification language cannot be exactly achieved, one is interested
in synthesizing solutions that are not only safe and non-blocking, but also maximally
permissive in the sense that there does not exist another solution that is strictly larger
and is still safe and non-blocking; in other words, such solutions are locally maximal.
Since observability may not be preserved under union, no supremal solution exists in
general, unless additional assumptions are made.
Many approaches have been considered in the literature for synthesizing safe and
non-blocking supervisors for partially observed DES; see, e.g., [1,8,11,18,19,34,43,93].
One approach is to find the supremal controllable normal and closed sub-language,
as initially defined in [20, 52]; see also, e.g., [8, 18, 41] for computational algorithms.
However, since normality is stronger than observability, such a solution may be too
restrictive, even empty in some cases. In [11, 93], solutions that are provably larger
than the supremal controllable normal sub-language are provided. In [93], the authors
identified a class of observable sub-languages that is invariant under the specifically
defined “strict subautomaton union” operation. In [11], the authors identified a new
language property, called relative observability, that is stronger than observability,
weaker than normality, and preserved under the standard union of languages. The
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authors also provided an algorithm to compute the supremal controllable and relative
observable sub-language. The solutions obtained by the techniques of [93] and [11] are
incomparable and neither of them is maximal in general. Moreover, both techniques
may return empty solutions even when non-empty solutions exist. The decidability of
the problem of synthesizing a non-empty solution, i.e., a solution that is both safe and
non-blocking, was established in [34]. If the decidability condition holds, in [132], the
authors provided an algorithm that always returns a non-empty solution; however,
the solution obtained is not maximal in general.
On-line and off-line approaches have been developed to compute maximal con-
trollable and observable solutions when the non-blockingness requirement is relaxed,
i.e., when the specification is given by a prefix-closed language; see, e.g., [4, 27, 31].
However, these approaches cannot be applied to the case where the specification is de-
scribed by a non-prefix-closed language, since the resulting solutions may be blocking.
In [44, 68], the computation of the infimal prefix-closed controllable and observable
super-language of a given lower bound specification language was provided. Besides
these, some other approaches have also been considered in the literature. In [34, 43],
the use of nondeterministic supervisors was advocated. The problem of supervisor
(or controller) synthesis under partial observation has also been investigated in other
frameworks; see, e.g., [1, 17, 48, 61, 96]. To the best of our knowledge, the synthesis
of non-blocking and safe deterministic supervisors that are maximally permissive for
partially observed DES has remained an open problem. Also, how to synthesize a
maximal safe supervisor that contains a given lower bound behavior is open.
Besides the standard supervisory control problem under partial observation, many
different approaches have also been proposed to synthesize supervisors for different
properties under partial observation. In [76], an integrated approach to control and
diagnosis was studied. Specifically, the authors presented an approach for designing
a maximally permissive supervisor that enforces diagnosability. This problem is al-
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so referred to as the active diagnosis problem. Several approaches have also been
proposed in the literature for enforcing opacity of a given system that is not opaque
at the outset; see, e.g., [2, 5, 23, 26, 72, 92]. In this context, the control problem is
to synthesize a partial-observation supervisor that prevents behaviors that reveal the
secret from occurring in the controlled system. In other words, the objective for the
opacity-enforcing supervisor is to hide the system’s secret in the presence of the ex-
ternal intruder. In [87], the author studied the problem of synthesizing a supervisor
that enforces detectability. The enforcement of attractability was studied in [9, 60]
for the fully-observed case and more recently in [78] under the partial observation
assumption. The controller synthesis problem for non-interference was studied in [6].
While there is a wide literature on the enforcement of properties of DES using su-
pervisory control, several open problems remain. First, except for the standard super-
visor control problem under partial observation, all other works assume that Σc ⊆ Σo,
where Σc and Σo are the sets of events that can be controlled and observed by the
supervisor, respectively. In other words, the solutions to these property enforcement
problems are only available under the assumption that all controllable events are ob-
servable. Second, all of the existing literature deals with different property-enforcing
problems separately, i.e., each enforcement technique developed is only applicable to
a specific property. Moreover, the enforcement of some properties, such as anonymity,
has not yet been addressed in the literature.
1.1.2 Property Enforcement via Sensor Activation
The problem of sensor optimization in DES was initially studied in [25,30,37,129];
the goal in these works was to find an optimal set of observable events that is fixed
for the entire execution of the system and enforces a given DES-theoretic property.
This problem is referred to as optimal sensor selection for static observations. In
the context of dynamic observations, where sensors can be turned on/off dynamical-
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ly, the corresponding problem of optimal sensor activation has also received a lot of
attention in the literature; see, e.g., [14–16, 22, 79, 80, 85, 86, 97, 101, 103, 104] for a
sample of this work and the recent survey paper [82] for an extensive bibliography.
In [16,97], the problem of dynamic sensor activation for the purpose of fault diagnosis
was studied; the optimal synthesis problems considered therein were solved according
to numerical cost criteria. In [101, 104], both centralized and decentralized sensor
activation problems for the purposes of control and diagnosis, respectively, were s-
tudied. The features of these works are: (i) the properties of interest to be enforced
are (co)observability or (co)diagnosability; (ii) the optimality criterion is logical; and
(iii) the solutions are only sub-optimal in the sense that by enlarging the solution
space (by refining the state space of the system), better solutions could be obtained
in principle. In [103] and [85], online approaches were proposed for two different prop-
erties, observability and detectability, respectively. The complexity of synthesizing
a minimal sensor activation policy for diagnosability was studied in [14]. In [16], a
structure called the Most Permissive Observer (MPO) was proposed for solving the
problem of dynamic sensor activation for the purpose of fault diagnosis. The MPO is
a finite structure that embeds all valid sensor activation policies, i.e., all policies that
enforce the property of K-diagnosability. Therefore, the MPO can serve as a basis for
finding one optimal solution with respect to some cost criterion. This approach was
extended to timed systems in [13] and to the problem of opacity in [15]. Recently, an
information-state-based characterization of the MPO structure was proposed in [22];
this work shows that the size complexity of the MPO could be reduced, as compared
with the original MPO from [16], by appropriately defining the notion of information
state in the context of the enforcement of K-diagnosability.
In many large scale systems, the information structure is decentralized due to the
distributed nature of the sensors. In the decentralized diagnosis problem considered
in [24], the system is monitored by a set of local agents that work as a team in
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order to diagnose every occurrence of fault events. In [101], the problem of dynamic
sensor activation for decentralized diagnosis is studied. Specifically, a “window-based
partition” approach is proposed in order to obtain a solution. However, a drawback of
this approach is that the solution obtained is only optimal w.r.t. a finite (restricted)
solution space and may not be language-based optimal in general. In other words, by
enlarging the solution space by refining the state space of the system model, better
solutions could be obtained in principle. In [104], the problem of dynamic sensor
activation for decentralized control is also studied, where the solution obtained is
again optimal w.r.t. a finite solution space. To the best of our knowledge, the problems
of language-based sensor optimization for decentralized diagnosis and decentralized
control have remained open problems, as is mentioned in the recent survey [82].
1.2 Organization and Main Contributions
The main contributions and the organization of this dissertation are summarized
as follows.
Chapter II: A Uniform Approach for Property Enforcement via Supervi-
sory Control ([109,114,121])
In this chapter, we propose a uniform approach that is applicable to the enforcement,
by supervisory control, of a large class of properties that can be expressed in terms
of suitably-defined information states. We refer to such properties as information-
state-based (or IS-based) properties. Roughly speaking, an IS-based property is a
property that only depends on the current local information of the system, as avail-
able to the supervisor, and does not explicitly depend on the future behavior of the
system. Specifically, our approach is based on the construction of a finite information
structure called the All Enforcement Structure (AES). By construction, the AES
embeds in its structure all property-enforcing supervisors. Therefore, it can serve as
8
the basis for solving the synthesis problem.
Chapter III: Synthesis of Non-Blocking Supervisors for IS-Based Proper-
ties ([110,120])
In this chapter, we tackle the supervisor synthesis problem for non-blockingness in ad-
dition to the enforcement of an IS-based property. We define another finite bipartite
transition system that we call the Non-blocking All Enforcement Structure (NB-AES).
We then provide a synthesis algorithm, based on the NB-AES, that constructs a non-
blocking and maximally permissive supervisor that enforces an IS-based property, if
one exists. This is the first algorithm with such properties and it answers a long
standing open problem that was unsolved for more than 25 years.
Chapter IV: The Range Control Problem ([117,118,125])
In this chapter, we study a generalized supervisor synthesis problem called the Maxi-
mally Permissive Range Control Problem. In this problem, we not only want to find a
locally maximal supervisor, but we also require that the synthesized maximal supervi-
sor contain a given behavior. We only restrict our attention to the safety requirement
and not do consider the issue of blockingness. More specifically, we consider two
specification languages: the safety specification language K, which is also referred
to as the upper bound language, and a prefix-closed lower bound language R ⊆ K,
which models the required behavior that the closed-loop system must achieve. To
solve the range control problem, we present a new synthesis algorithm based on the
two notions of AES and Control Simulation Relation (CSR). Although we only con-
sider prefix-closed languages, i.e., nonblockingness is not considered, to the best of
our knowledge, the maximally-permissive range control problem we solve herein was
an open problem even in this case.
Chapter V: A Uniform Approach for Centralized Sensor Activation ([112,
116])
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In this chapter, we consider the problem of dynamic sensor activation in centralized
and partially-observed DES. The objective in this problem is to synthesize a sensor
activation policy that dynamically turns sensors on/off online in order to achieve a
given objective, e.g., to control the system or to diagnose faults. This problem is im-
portant since in many applications turning more sensors on implies that more energy
or bandwidth is consumed. Therefore, it is of interest to synthesize a sensor activa-
tion policy that is optimal with respect to some criterion, subject to the constraints
of the problem. To solve this problem, we define a generalized version of the Most
Permissive Observer (MPO). This generalized MPO embeds all valid solutions to the
enforcement of an IS-based property in its finite structure. Based on the MPO, we
present an algorithm for the synthesis of optimal sensor activation policies under a
logical performance objective.
Chapter VI: Sensor Activation in Decentralized Decision-Making ( [113,
123])
In this chapter, we investigate the problem of decentralized decision-making in DES
that operate under dynamic observations. In this context, the system is monitored
by a set of agents that act as a team to make a global decision. The sensors of each
agent can be turned on/off online dynamically according to a sensor activation policy.
We define a general decentralized decision-making problem called the decentralized
state disambiguation problem, which covers the decentralized control problem, the
decentralized fault diagnosis problem, and the decentralized fault prognosis problem.
The goal is to find a language-based minimal sensor activation policy for each agent
such that the agents can always make a correct global decision as a team. A novel
approach to solve this problem is proposed. We adopt a person-by-person approach to
decompose this decentralized minimization problem into two centralized constrained
minimization problems. Each centralized constrained minimization problem is then
reduced to the centralized sensor activation problem that we solve in Chapter V.
10
We prove that the solution obtained by our procedure is minimal w.r.t. the system
language, in contrast to the works in the literature where minimality was with respect
to a finite solution space.
Chapter VII: Conclusion and Future Work
We conclude the dissertation and discuss several potential future directions.
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CHAPTER II
A Uniform Approach for Property Enforcement
via Supervisory Control
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a uniform approach that is applicable to the en-
forcement, by supervisory control, of a large class of properties that can be ex-
pressed in terms of suitably-defined information states. We refer to such properties as
information-state-based (IS-based) properties. Roughly speaking, an IS-based prop-
erty is a property that only depends on the current local information of the system,
as available to the supervisor, and does not explicitly depend on the future behavior
of the system. The approach that we develop to tackle this problem is significantly
different from the previous approaches in the literature, which are also concerned with
property enforcement by supervisory control. Specifically, our approach is based on
the construction of a finite information structure called the All Enforcement Structure
and abbreviated as AES. The AES is a game structure between the supervisor and
the “environment” (aka system). By construction, the AES embeds in its structure
all property-enforcing supervisors. Therefore, it can serve as the basis for solving the
synthesis problem.
The single uniform solution methodology is applicable not only to safety and opac-
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ity, but to any property that can be expressed as an IS-based property. This includes,
but is not restricted to, safety, diagnosability, opacity, detectability, anonymity and
attractability. There are properties that cannot be formulated as IS-based properties;
the prime example is non-blockingness, which will be addressed in the next chapter.
In Table 2.1, we compare our proposed approach with previous work. To the best of
our knowledge, the problem of synthesizing a maximally permissive supervisor that
enforces anonymity has not yet been considered in the literature; this property can
be enforced by our general methodology. Moreover, we relax the assumption made
by previous works that all controllable events should be observable. We show that,
in this more general setting, uniqueness of a maximally permissive solution is lost.
Hence, our focus is on the synthesis of solutions that are provably (locally) maximally
permissive.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present the mod-
el of the system to be analyzed. In Section 2.3, we formulate the information-state-
based property enforcement problem that we solve in this chapter. In Section 2.4, we
define a class of bipartite transition systems that is used for solving the property en-
forcement problem. In Section 2.5, we define the structure called AES, the key notion
for the approach investigated in this chapter. We then present a general-purpose syn-
thesis algorithm that returns a maximally-permissive partial-observation supervisor
based on the AES in Section 2.6. In Section 2.7, we show how the proposed uniform
approach can be applied to enforce different specific properties. Finally, we conclude
this chapter in Section 2.8.
2.2 Preliminary
In this section, we review some basic concepts and notations that will be used in
this chapter. Let Σ be a finite set of events and denote by Σ∗ the set of all finite










































































































































































































































































































































The prefix closure of language L is the set L = {t ∈ Σ∗ : ∃u ∈ Σ∗ s.t. tu ∈ L}. We
say that a language is prefix-closed if L = L. Given language L and string s ∈ L,
we denote the active (event) set at s in L by ∆L(s) = {σ ∈ Σ : sσ ∈ L} and use
L/s = {t ∈ Σ∗ : st ∈ L} to denote the set of continuations of s in L. For any string
s ∈ Σ∗, we denote by |s| the length of s with |ε| = 0. For any σ ∈ Σ, s ∈ Σ∗, we use
σ ∈ s to denote that σ occurs at least once in s.
The DES of interest is modeled as a deterministic finite-state automaton
G = (X,Σ, δ, x0, Xm), (2.1)
where X is the finite set of states, Σ is the finite set of events, δ : X × Σ → X is
the partial transition function, where δ(x, σ) = y means that there is a transition
labeled by event σ from state x to state y, x0 ∈ X is the initial state and Xm is the
set of marked states. The transition function δ is extended to X ×Σ∗ recursively by:
δ(x, sσ) = δ(δ(x, s), σ), where x ∈ X, s ∈ Σ∗ and σ ∈ Σ. For brevity, we also write
δ(x0, s) as δ(s). The language generated by G is described by L(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗ :
δ(x0, s)!}, where ! means “is defined”; the marked language is Lm(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗ :
δ(x0, s) ∈ Xm}.
Given two automata A = (XA,Σ, δA, xA,0) and B = (XB,Σ, δB, xB,0), we say that
A is a sub-automaton of B, denoted by A v B, if δA(xA,0, s) = δB(xB,0, s) for all
s ∈ L(A). We say that A is a strict sub-automaton 1 of B, denoted by A @ B, if
(i) A v B; and (ii) ∀x, y ∈ XA,∀s ∈ Σ∗ : δB(x, s) = y⇒ δA(x, s) = y. Note that, for
any two automata A and B such that L(A) ⊆ L(B), we can always refine the state
spaces of A and B and obtain two new automata A′ and B′ such that L(A′)=L(A),
L(B′)=L(B) and A′ @ B′.
In the framework of supervisory control [64], the system G is controlled by a
1The definition of strict sub-automaton used in this dissertation is slightly stronger than the
definition used in [18].
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supervisor that dynamically enables/disables events of the system such that some
specification is provably achieved. The event set Σ is partitioned into two disjoint
subsets: Σ = Σc∪̇Σuc, where Σc is the set of controllable events and Σuc is the set
of uncontrollable events. We say that a control decision γ ∈ 2Σ is admissible if
Σuc ⊆ γ, namely, uncontrollable events can never be disabled. We define Γ = {γ ∈
2Σ : Σuc ⊆ γ} as the set of admissible control decisions. When the system is partially
observed [20, 52], Σ is also partitioned into two disjoint sets: Σ = Σo∪̇Σuo, where Σo
is the set of observable events and Σuo is the set of unobservable events. The natural
projection P : Σ∗ → Σ∗o is defined by
P (ε) = ε and P (sσ) =
 P (s)σ if σ ∈ ΣoP (s) if σ ∈ Σuo (2.2)
P is extended to P : 2Σ
∗ → 2Σ∗o by P (L) = {t ∈ Σ∗o : ∃s ∈ L s.t. P (s) = t}, where
L ⊆ Σ∗. The inverse projection P−1 : Σ∗o → 2Σ
∗
is defined by P−1(t) := {s ∈ Σ∗ :
P (s) = t}; P−1 is also extended to P−1 : 2Σ∗o → 2Σ∗ by P−1(s) = {s ∈ Σ∗ : ∃t ∈
L s.t. P (s) = t}, where L ⊆ Σ∗o. Since a supervisor can only make decisions based on
its observations, a partial-observation supervisor is a function S : P (L(G))→ Γ. We
use the notation S/G to represent the controlled system and the language generated
by S/G, denoted by L(S/G), is defined recursively as follows:
i) ε ∈ L(S/G); and
ii) [s ∈ L(S/G) ∧ sσ ∈ L(G) ∧ σ ∈ S(s)]⇔ [sσ ∈ L(S/G)].
We also define Lm(S/G) = L(S/G) ∩ Lm(G).
Given a prefix-closed language K = K, we say that K is controllable (w.r.t. L(G)
and Σc) if (∀s ∈ K, σ ∈ Σuc)(sσ ∈ L(G) ⇒ sσ ∈ K); we say that K is observable
(w.r.t. L(G), Σc and Σo) if (∀s, s′ ∈ K, σ ∈ Σc)(P (s) = P (s′)∧sσ ∈ K∧s′σ ∈ L(G)⇒
s′σ ∈ K); we say that K is normal (w.r.t. L(G) and Σo) if K = P−1[P (K)]∩L(G). It
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is well known that there exists a supervisor S such that L(S/G) = K if and only if K
is controllable and observable [20,52]. In general, observability is not preserved under
union, unless additional assumptions are made. For instance, it was shown in [54] that
if Σc ⊆ Σo, then controllability and observability together imply normality, which is
preserved under union. However, this assumption is not required here.
We define several operators that will be used later. The set of all possible states
in G reachable from the initial state x0 via some string in sublanguage L ⊆ L(G)
with the same projection as s ∈ L, is given by
RG(s, L) := {x ∈ X : ∃t ∈ L s.t. P (t)=P (s) ∧ x = δ(x0, t)} (2.3)
The unobservable reach of the subset of states S ⊆ X under the subset of events
γ ⊆ Σ is given by
URγ(S) := {x ∈ X : ∃u ∈ S,∃σ ∈ (Σuo ∩ γ)∗ s.t. x = δ(u, σ)}. (2.4)
The observable reach of the subset of states S ⊆ X under observable event σ ∈ Σo is
given by
Nextσ(S) := {x ∈ X : ∃u ∈ S s.t. x = δ(u, σ)}. (2.5)
2.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we define the class of information-state-based properties and for-
mulate the Property Enforcement Problem that we solve in this chapter.
In many applications, we are interested in enforcing some properties on the system
behavior via supervisory control. In general, a property on a language (or a language-
based property) is a function ϕ : 2Σ
∗ → {0, 1}, where for any language L, ϕ(L) = 1
means that L satisfies property ϕ. We write that L |= ϕ if ϕ is a language-based
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property and ϕ(L) = 1. For example, safety is a typical property of interest. Let
K ∈ 2Σ∗ be a specification language. Then the safety property ϕ : 2Σ∗ → {0, 1}
can be defined by: for any L ∈ 2Σ∗ , ϕ(L) = 1 ⇔ L ⊆ K. To enforce a given
property on the system, we need to synthesize a supervisor that restricts the system
behavior to a sublanguage that satisfies the property; moreover, it is desired that
this sublanguage be as large as possible w.r.t. set inclusion. In other words, the
supervisor should only disable an event if it is necessary to do so. By considering
a general property instead of only safety, the standard supervisory control problem
under partial observation [20,52] is generalized to the Maximally Permissive Property
Enforcement Problem defined as follows.
Problem 1. (Maximally Permissive Property Enforcement Problem). Given system
G and language-based property ϕ : 2Σ
∗ → {0, 1}, synthesize a partial observation
supervisor S : P (L(G))→ Γ, such that
1. L(S/G) |= ϕ;
2. For any S ′ satisfying 1) and 2), we have that L(S/G) 6⊂ L(S ′/G).
In the formulation of the above problem, the property of interest is defined over
languages; hence, it may not be possible to bound a priori the memory needed for
its verification. To simplify our problem, hereafter, we will investigate a particular
class of properties called Information-State-based (IS-based) properties. Since we are
dealing with partially observed systems, we define the notion of an information state
as a subset IS ⊆ X of states of G and denote by I = 2X the set of all information
states. IS-based properties are defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.1. (IS-Based Property). Given an automaton G, an IS-based property
ϕ w.r.t. G is a function ϕ : I → {0, 1}, where ∀i ∈ 2X , ϕ(i) = 1 means that i
satisfies this property. We say that sublanguage L ⊆ L(G) satisfies ϕ w.r.t. G, which
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(c) Solution G2
Figure 2.1: For G: Σc = {a, b, c},Σo = {o1, o2}, and XS = {5}
We will show later in Section 2.7 that by some proper state space refinements,
many important properties in the DES literature, e.g., safety, diagnosability, opacity,
detectability and attractability, can be formulated as IS-based properties.
Example 2.3.1. Let us consider the system G in Figure 2.1(a), where the set of
observable events is Σo = {o1, o2}. Consider the subset of states XS = {5}. We
define the IS-based property ϕ : I → {0, 1} by
ϕ(i) = 0⇔ i ⊆ XS (2.6)
∀i ∈ I. We will show later in Section 2.7 that the IS-based property defined above
essentially captures a security property called current-state opacity. One may inter-
pret XS as the set of secret states that the system wants to hide from a potentially
malicious external observer, referred to as the intruder. We say that property ϕ holds
if the intruder can never determine unambiguously that the secret has occurred based
on its observation capabilities. If the intruder’s observable set is Σo = {o1, o2}, then
the system language L(G) does not satisfy ϕ, since RG(bao2,L(G)) = {5} ⊆ XS, i.e.,
upon the occurrence of string bao2, the secret state 5 will be revealed to the intruder.
Similarly to the property enforcement problem, we formulate the Maximally Per-
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missive IS-Based Property Enforcement Problem (MPIEP) as follows.
Problem 2. (Maximally Permissive IS-Based Property Enforcement Problem). Giv-
en system G and IS-based property ϕ : 2X → {0, 1} w.r.t. G, synthesize a partial
observation supervisor S : P (L(G))→ Γ, such that
1. L(S/G) |=G ϕ;
2. For any S ′ satisfying 1) and 2), we have that L(S/G) 6⊂ L(S ′/G).
We will show in Section 2.6 that under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo, there always
exists a unique supremal solution to MPIEP. However, this is not true in general, as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.3.2. Consider again the system G in Figure 2.1(a). Let the set of con-
trollable events be Σc = {a, b, c}, which is incomparable with Σo. To enforce property
ϕ defined in Example 2.3.1, we need to find a controllable, observable, and live sublan-
guage of L(G) that satisfies ϕ. It is easy to verify that solutions L(G1) and L(G2),
shown in Figure 2.1(b) and Figure 2.1(c), respectively, are two maximal controllable
and observable solutions satisfying ϕ. However, the union of these two solutions is
not a valid solution, since the system needs to enable event a at state 1 and to disable
event a at state 3; but states 1 and 3 are indistinguishable in L(G1) ∪ L(G2). This
violates the property of observability.
2.4 Bipartite Transition System
In this section, we define the general notion of Bipartite Transition System (BTS).
Definition 2.4.1. A bipartite transition system T w.r.t. G is a 7-tuple




Y Z , h
T
ZY ,Σ,Γ, y0) (2.7)
where
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• QTY ⊆ I is the set of Y -states;
• QTZ ⊆ I × Γ is the set of Z-states and I(z) and Γ(z) denote, respectively, the
information state and the control decision components of a Z-state z, so that
z = (I(z),Γ(z));
• hTY Z : QTY ×Γ→ QTZ is the partial transition function from Y -states to Z-states,
which satisfies the following constraint: for any y ∈ QTY , z ∈ QTZ and γ ∈ Γ, we
have
hTY Z(y, γ) = z ⇒ [I(z)=URγ(y)] ∧ [Γ(z) = γ] (2.8)
• hTZY : QTZ×Σ→ QTY is the partial transition function from Z-states to Y -states,
which satisfies the following constraint: for any y ∈ QTY , z ∈ QTZ and σ ∈ Σ, we
have
hTZY (z, σ) = y ⇔ [σ ∈ Γ(z) ∩ Σo] ∧ [y = Nextσ(I(z))] (2.9)
• Σ is the set of events of G;
• Γ is the set of admissible control decisions of G;
• y0 ∈ QTY is the initial Y -state where y0 = {x0}.
The purpose of defining the notion of BTS is to describe, in a general manner
that will be specialized later, the “game” between the “supervisor/controller” and
the “system/environment” (G). To capture this game, we need a bipartite structure,
with two types of nodes (states). A Y -state is an information state, from which the
supervisor issues control decisions. A Z-state is an information state augmented with
control decisions, from which the system “selects” observable events to occur within
the set of enabled events. A transition from a Z-state to a Y -state represents the
observable reach, i.e, y in the above definition is the set of states reachable from
some state of the information state component of the preceding Z-state through the
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single observed event just executed by G. A transition from a Y -state to a Z-state
represents the unobservable reach and “remembers” the set of enabled events from
the Y -state that leads to it. This means that I(z) is the set of states reachable
from some state in the preceding Y -state through some enabled unobservable event
string, and that Γ(z) is the control decision made in the preceding Y -state. Since the
supervisor cannot choose which event will occur once it has made a control decision,
all enabled and feasible observable events should be defined at a Z-state; this is
why we put “⇔” in Equation (2.9). Finally, we say that a Z-state z is terminal if
(∀x ∈ I(z))(∀σ ∈ Σo ∈ Γ(z))[δ(x, σ)¬!].
Example 2.4.1. Consider again the system G in Figure 2.1(a). As an example of
a BTS, the reader is referred directly to Figure 2.2(b), which is a particular type of
BTS that we will discuss later in this chapter. From the initial Y -state y0 = {0},
by making control decision γ = {a, c, o1, o2} (the uncontrollable events o1 and o2 are
omitted in the figure), we will reach Z-state z = hTY Z(y0, γ) = ({0, 3, 4}, {a, c, o1, o2}).
From z, only one observable event, o1, can happen, and it leads to the next Y -state
y1 = h
T
ZY (z, o1) = {5, 6}. This BTS includes another control decision at y0 = {0},
γ = {b, o1, o2}, from which no observation will occur. Finally, at Y -state {5, 6},
this BTS includes a single control decision, where only the uncontrollable events are
included.
Given two BTSs T1 and T2, we say that T1 is a subsystem of T2, denoted by






Z , and for any y ∈ Q
T1
Y , z ∈ Q
T1
Z , γ ∈ Γ, and σ ∈ Σ,
we have that
1) hT1Y Z(y, γ) = z ⇒ h
T2
Y Z(y, γ) = z; and
2) hT1ZY (z, σ) = y ⇒ h
T2
ZY (z, σ) = y.
For example, we see that the BTS in Figure 2.2(b) is a subsystem of the BTS in












Z ; and for any y ∈ Q
T1∪T2
Y , z ∈ Q
T1∪T2
Z , γ ∈ Γ
and σ ∈ Σ, we have that
1) hT1∪T2Y Z (y, γ) = z ⇔ ∃i ∈ {1, 2} : h
Ti
Y Z(y, γ) = z; and
2) hT1∪T2ZY (z, σ) = y ⇔ ∃i ∈ {1, 2} : h
Ti
ZY (z, σ) = y.
In general, the control decision defined at a Y -state may not be unique. Therefore,
given a BTS T , we define CT (y) := {γ ∈ Γ : hTY Z(y, γ)!} to be the set of control
decisions defined at y ∈ QTY . For simplicity, we also write y
γ−→T z if z = hTY Z(y, γ) and
z
σ−→T y if z = hTZY (z, σ). Note that, for two BTSs T1 and T2, we have that h
T1
Y Z(y, γ) =
hT2Y Z(y, γ) whenever they are defined. Therefore, we will drop the superscript in
hTY Z(y, γ) and write it as hY Z(y, γ) and y
γ−→ z if it is defined for some T ; the same
holds for hZY and z
σ−→ y. We call γ0σ1γ1σ2 . . . σnγn, where γi ∈ Γ, σi ∈ Σo, a run. A




γ1−→ . . . γn−1−−−→ zn−1
σn−→ yn
γn−→ zn
We say that a run is generated by T if its induced sequence is defined in T .
We say that a BTS T is
• complete, if ∀y ∈ QTY : CT (y) 6= ∅; and
• deterministic, if ∀y ∈ QTY : |CT (y)| = 1.
If T is deterministic, then we also use notation cT (y) to denote the unique control
decision defined at y ∈ QTY , i.e., CT (y) = {cT (y)}. The completeness condition says
that for any Y -state, we need to be able to pick at least one control decision; the
determinism condition says that such a control decision is unique at each Y -state.
Let S : P (L(G)) → Γ be a partial observation supervisor. It works as follows.
Initially, it makes control decision S(ε). Then new control decision S(σ) is made upon
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the occurrence of (enabled) observable event σ, and so forth. Let s = σ1 . . . σn ∈





S(σ1)−−−→ . . . σn−→ yn
S(σ1...σn)−−−−−→ zn
We denote by ISYS (s) and IS
Z
S (s), the last Y -state and Z-state in y0z0y1z2 . . . zn−1ynzn,
respectively, i.e., ISYS (s) = yn and IS
Z
S (s) = zn. That is, IS
Y
S (s) and IS
Z
S (s) are the
Y -state and the Z-state that result from the occurrence of string s under supervisor
S, respectively.
The next result states that given a supervisor S and a string s ∈ L(S/G), the
Z-state defined above is, in fact, equivalent to the set of all possible states the system
can be in after observing P (s).
Lemma 2.4.1. Given a system G and a supervisor S, for any string s ∈ L(S/G),
we have
I(ISZS (P (s))) = RG(s,L(S/G)). (2.10)
Proof. We prove by induction on the length of P (s). For any string s, let |P (s)| = n.
Let sk denote the string that consists of the first k events in P (s) for k = 0, . . . , n and
ek denote the (k+1)
th event in P (s) for k = 0, . . . , n−1, so that s0 = ε, s1 = e0, etc. . .
Define y0 as usual. For k = 0, . . . , n, let zk = hY Z(yk, S(sk)), and for k = 0, . . . , n−1,
define yk+1 = hZY (zk, ek). By definition, we know that
RG(s,L(S/G)) = {v ∈ X : ∃s′ ∈ L(S/G) s.t. P (s)=P (s′) ∧ v=δ(x0, s′)} (2.11)
Therefore, the inductive hypothesis is that:
I(zk) = {v ∈ X : ∃s′k ∈ L(S/G) s.t. P (s′k)=sk ∧ v=δ(x0, s′k)} (2.12)
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Induction Basis: s0 = ε
I(z0) = URS(ε)(y0) = {v ∈ X : ∃t ∈ (S(ε) ∩ Σuo)∗ s.t. v=δ(x0, t)}
= {v ∈ X : ∃t ∈ L(S/G) s.t. P (t) = ε ∧ v = δ(x0, t)}
Induction Step: Assume that the induction hypothesis is true at k. Then
yk+1 = hZY (zk, ek)
= {v ∈ X : ∃u ∈ I(zk) s.t. v = δ(u, ek)}
= {v ∈ X : ∃s′k ∈ L(S/G) s.t.P (s′k) = sk ∧ v = δ(x0, s′kek)} (2.13)
and
I(zk+1) = URS(skek)(yk+1)
= {v ∈ X : ∃u ∈ yk+1,∃t ∈ (S(skek) ∩ Σuo)∗ s.t. v = δ(u, t)}
= {v ∈ X : ∃s′k+1 ∈ L(S/G) s.t. P (s′k+1) = skek ∧ v = δ(x0, s′k+1)}
This completes the proof.
By the above Lemma and the definition of L(S/G), we can also express ISYS (s)
and the information state component of ISZS (s) as follows
ISYS (s) = {x ∈ X : ∃t ∈ (Σ∗Σo ∪ {ε}) ∩ L(S/G) s.t. P (t) = s ∧ δ(x0, t) = x}
I(ISZS (s)) = {x ∈ X : ∃t ∈ L(S/G) s.t. P (t) = s ∧ δ(x0, t) = x}
With the above notions, we can “decode” supervisors from a BTS as explained in
the following definition.
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Definition 2.4.2. A supervisor S is said to be included in a complete BTS T if
(∀s ∈ P (L(S/G)))[S(s) ∈ CT (ISYS (s))]. (2.14)
We denote by S(T ) the set of all supervisors included in T .
Example 2.4.2. The BTS shown in Figure 2.2(b) is a complete BTS. By picking
control decision {b, o1, o2} (shown as {b} in the figure) at the initial Y -state {0},
no future observable behavior can occur, since the only enabled and feasible event e
forms an unobservable self-loop at state 1. This leads to a BTS-included supervisor
S defined by S(ε) = {b, o1, o2}.
If a BTS T is deterministic, then the supervisor included in T is unique, since
the control decision at each Y -state is unique. In this case, we denote by ST the
unique supervisor included in T , i.e., S(T ) = {ST}. Essentially, T is a realization
of supervisor ST . However, not all supervisors can be realized by a BTS, since a
supervisor may make different control decisions at different visits to the same Y -
state. We say that a supervisor S is information-state-based (IS-based) if
∀s, t ∈ P (L(S/G)) : ISYS (s) = ISYS (t)⇒ S(s) = S(t).
Then, a supervisor can be realized by a BTS iff it is IS-based.
2.5 A Uniform Approach for Enforcing Properties
In this section, we define the All Enforcement Structure, a specific type of BTS
that embeds all supervisors that enforce a given IS-based property in its transition
structure. We then discuss its properties and its construction.
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2.5.1 All Enforcement Structure for a Given Property
In Lemma 2.4.1, we have shown that given a supervisor S, for any string s ∈
P (L(G)), the Z-state ISZS (s) reached is the set of all possible states the system could
be in after s. As a consequence, if we construct a BTS that is “as large as possible”
and in which all reachable Z-states satisfy the IS-based property, then the resulting
structure should contain all valid property-enforcing supervisors. This leads to the
definition of the All Enforcement Structure for a given property.
Definition 2.5.1. (All Enforcement Structure). Given a system G and an IS-based
property ϕ : I → {0, 1} w.r.t. G, the All Enforcement Structure (AES) for property
ϕ, denoted by
AESϕ(G) = (QAESY , QAESZ , hAESY Z , hAESZY ,Σ,Γ, y0), (2.15)
is defined as the largest complete BTS w.r.t. G such that ∀z ∈ QAESZ : ϕ(I(z)) = 1.
By “largest” subsystem, we mean that for any T satisfying the above conditions, we
have that T v AESϕ(G).
Note that if T1 and T2 are two complete BTSs in which all Z-states satisfy ϕ, then
it is easy to see that the union of them is still a BTS in which all Z-states satisfy ϕ.
Therefore, the notion of “largest BTS” in the definition is well defined. This will also
be seen when we present the algorithm for the construction of the AES later.
Example 2.5.1. We return to system G in Figure 2.1(a) with the IS-based property
in Equation (2.6). The BTS shown in Figure 2.2(b) is, in fact, its AES. For example,
at initial Y -state {0}, we cannot make control decision {a, b, c}, which would lead us
to Z-state ({0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, {a, b, c}). This is because upon the occurrence of event o2,
Y -state {5} would be reached, from which no matter what control decision we take,
the secret will be revealed. We will discuss later that how to construct the AES.
Remark 2.5.1. In Figure 2.2(a), we can also take control decision {a} at the initial
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(b) The constructed AES
Figure 2.2:
Example of the construction of the AES. In the diagrams, rectangular
(blue) states correspond to Y -states and oval (yellow) states correspond
to Z-states. For simplicity, in the diagrams, we omit all uncontrollable
events in the control decisions, e.g., decision {} represents {o1, o2}, and
so forth.
event a will never be executed within the unobservable reach. Formally, we say that
a control decision γ ∈ Γ is irredundant at information state i ∈ I if, for any σ ∈ γ,
there exists x ∈ URγ(i) such that δ(x, σ) is defined. From now on, we only consider
irredundant control decisions in the AES, which will clearly not affect its properties.
Similarly, we say that a supervisor S is irredundant if for any s ∈ P (L(S/G)), control
decision S(s) is irredundant at information state ISYS (s). Hereafter, we also assume
without loss of generality that any S is irredundant.
The following theorem shows that the AES (only) contains valid solutions to the
property enforcement problem.
Theorem II.1. Suppose that ϕ is an IS-based property w.r.t. G. A supervisor en-
forces property ϕ if and only if it is an AES-included supervisor. Mathematically,
L(S/G) |=G ϕ⇔ S ∈ S(AESϕ(G)) (2.16)
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Proof. By Lemmas 2.4.1, we know that the LHS of Equation (2.16) holds if and only
if ∀s ∈ P (L(S/G)) : ϕ(I(ISZS (s))) = 1, Therefore, the “if” part follows immediately
from Definitions 2.4.2 and 2.5.1.
Next, we prove the “only if” part by contradiction. Suppose that L(S/G) |=G ϕ,
i.e., ∀s ∈ P (L(S/G)) : ϕ(I(ISZS (s))) = 1. We assume that S 6∈ S(AESϕ(G)).
First, we know that there exists a complete BTS T such that S ∈ S(T ). Specif-
ically, the complete BTS T can be constructed as follows: QTY := {y ∈ I : ∃t ∈
P (L(S/G)) s.t. y = ISYS (t)}, QTZ := {z ∈ I × Γ : ∃t ∈ P (L(S/G)) s.t. z = ISZS (t)}
and for any y ∈ QTY , CT (y) := {γ ∈ Γ : ∃t ∈ P (L(S/G)) s.t. y = ISYS (t)∧ γ = S(t)}.
In other words, any Y or Z-state in T are a Y or Z-state reached by supervisor S under
some string t ∈ P (L(S/G)), respectively. Clearly, we know that ∀z ∈ QTZ : ϕ(I(z)) =
1. Since S /∈ S(AESϕ(G)), we know that there exists a string s ∈ P (L(S/G)), such
that S(s) /∈ CAESϕ(G)(ISYS (s)). In this case, the union of T and AESϕ(G) is strict-
ly larger than AESϕ(G), since control decision S(s) is defined at Y -state ISYS (s)
in T ∪ AESϕ(G) but not in AESϕ(G). This is a contradiction since by definition,
AESϕ(G) is the largest BTS satisfying the condition in Definition 2.5.1.
2.5.2 Construction of the AES
The construction algorithm for the AES follows directly from its definition and
proceeds in two steps. First, we construct the BTS that enumerates all possible
behaviors for each state by a depth-first search and remove all Z-states that violate
the IS-based property. Second, we prune states that violate the completeness from
the remaining part of the BTS, until convergence is achieved. In practice, in the
depth-first search part, we do not need to search the whole state space and we can
stop the search of a branch once a Z-state that violates the IS-based property is
encountered.
The above procedure is formally described in Algorithm FIND-AES whose pa-
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Algorithm 1: FIND-AES
input : G and ϕ
output: AES
1 AES.Y ← {y0}, AES.Z ← ∅ and AES.h← ∅;
2 DoDFS(G, y0, AES);
3 Prune(AES);
4 AES ← Accessible(AES);
procedure DoDFS(G, y, AES, ϕ);
5 for γ ∈ Γ do
6 z ← hY Z(y, γ);
7 if ϕ(I(z)) = 1 then
8 AES.h← AES.h ∪ {(y, γ, z)};
9 if z 6∈ AES.Z then
10 AES.Z ← AES.Z ∪ {z};
11 for σ ∈ γ ∩ Σo do
12 y′ ← hZY (z, σ);
13 AES.h← AES.h ∪ {(z, σ, y′)};
14 if y′ 6∈ AES.Y then
15 AES.Y ← AES.Y ∪ {y′};
16 DoDFS(G, y′, AES, ϕ);
procedure Prune(AES);
17 while exists Y -state in AES that has no successor do
18 Delete all such Y -states in AES and delete all their predecessor Z-states;
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rameters are as follows: (i) AES represents the AES that we want to construct; (ii)
AES.Y and AES.Z are its sets of Y - and Z-states, respectively; and (iii) AES.h is its
transition function. Initially, AES.Y is set to be y0 = {x0}. The depth-first search is
then started; it is implemented by the procedure DoDFS. Line 7 is used to determine
whether the Z-state encountered satisfies property ϕ. If not, we terminate the search
of this branch. Otherwise, we compute all possible Y -state successors and make a
recursive call. This recursive procedure allows us to traverse the whole reachable
space of Y - and Z-states. The above procedure may result in Y -states that have
no successors. Therefore, we need to iteratively prune: (i) all Y -states that have
no successor states; and (ii) all Z-states for which at least one observation is not
defined. This step is captured by procedure Prune. Finally, states that are no longer
accessible from the initial state of the AES need to be removed before the algorithm
returns. Algorithm FIND-AES will terminate in finite steps, since the number of Y -
and Z-states is finite.
Example 2.5.2. Consider our running example. We apply Algorithm FIND-AES
to construct the corresponding AES. The resulting BTS after running the procedure
DoDSF is shown in Figure 2.2(a). At the initial Y -state, we cannot take control de-
cision {} since this will lead to a deadlock Z-state ({0}, {}). The depth-first search
DoDSF terminates at Y -state {5}, since no matter what control decision we take
from {5}, a Z-state (marked in red in Figure 2.2(a)) that violates the IS-based prop-
erty (i.e., that reveals the secret) will be encountered. After procedure DoDSF is done,
we need to run procedure Prune. This starts by removing Y -state {5}, since no suc-
cessor state is defined from it. Since Y -state {5} has been removed, all its predecessor
Z-states, i.e., ({0, 3}, {c}), ({0, 1, 2}, {a, b}) and so forth, must also be removed. Fi-
nally, we remove inaccessible states {2, 5, 6} and {2} and obtain the AES shown in
Figure 2.2(b).
Theorem II.2. Algorithm FIND-AES correctly constructs the AES.
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Proof. Let T be the BTS returned by Algorithm FIND-AES. T is a complete BTS
by procedure Prune. Since procedure DoDSF only traverses the state space where
all Z-states satisfy ϕ, we know that ∀z ∈ QTZ : ϕ(I(z)) = 1. Therefore, it remains to
show that T is the largest BTS with the desired properties; for that proof, we proceed
by contradiction.
Assume that T ′ is another complete BTS such that ∀z ∈ QT ′Z : ϕ(I(z)) = 1 and




Z . Therefore, in
Algorithm FIND-AES, T is obtained by pruning states from some BTS T ′′ (which
may not satisfy the desired properties) such that T ′ v T ′′; e.g., T ′′ can be the resulting
BTS after procedure DoDFS. Then, any Y - or Z-states in T ′ will not be removed in
T ′′ by procedure Prune. Therefore, Algorithm FIND-AES will converge to a BTS
that is strictly lager than T (at least as large as T ′). This contradicts the fact that
Algorithm FIND-AES converges to T .
2.6 Synthesis of Maximally Permissive Supervisors
In this section, we present a synthesis algorithm that returns a solution to MPIEP.
We first discuss the general case, where Σc and Σo need not be comparable. Then we
show that, under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo, there always exists a unique supremal
solution to MPIEP.
2.6.1 General Case
Given an IS-based property, Theorem II.1 provides us with a straightforward
procedure for synthesizing a property-enforcing supervisor. We can simply start from
the initial Y -state and pick one control decision defined in the AES; then we pick
all possible observations for the successor Z-state, and so forth, until reaching a Z-
state that has no successor state. However, this procedure may result in a solution
with infinite domain, since we may select different control decisions upon different
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visits to the same information state. Therefore, we will restrict our attention to an
information-state-based (IS-based) solution. We will show later that, in fact, such a
restriction is without loss of generality.
We present a synthesis algorithm, called Algorithm MAX-SYNT, for constructing
an IS-based supervisor S∗ that solves MPIEP. This algorithm starts from y0. For
each reachable Y -state y, it picks one control that is locally maximal and for each
reachable Z-state, it picks all possible observations, until: (i) a terminal Z-state is
reached; or (ii) a Y -state that has already been visited is reached. This is implemented
by procedure Expand in Algorithm MAX-SYNT, which is simply a depth-first search.
In other words, we pick a locally maximal control decision and fix it for each Y -state.
This will result in a BTS T that includes a unique supervisor ST , which is our solution.




1 T.Y ← {y0}, T.Z ← ∅ and T.h← ∅;
2 Expand(T,AESϕ(G), y0);
3 S∗ ← ST ;
procedure Expand(T,AESϕ(G), y);
4 Find a locally maximal control decision
γ ∈ CAESϕ(G)(y) s.t. ∀γ′ ∈ CAESϕ(G)(y) : γ 6⊂ γ′;
5 z ← hY Z(y, γ);
6 T.h← T.h ∪ {(y, γ, z)};
7 if z 6∈ T.Z then
8 T.Z ← T.Z ∪ {z};
9 for σ ∈ γ ∩ Σo do
10 y′ ← hZY (z, σ);
11 T.h← T.h ∪ {(z, σ, y′)};
12 if y′ 6∈ T.Y then
13 T.Y ← T.Y ∪ {y′};
14 Expand(T,AESϕ(G), y′);
Theorem II.1. Let S∗ be a solution returned by Algorithm MAX-SYNT. Then S∗
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solves MPIEP.
Proof. First, we note that L(S/G) ]satisfies ϕ; this follows from Theorem II.1 and the
fact that, by construction, S∗ is an AES-included supervisor. Therefore, it remains
to show that S∗ is maximal; for that proof, we proceed by contradiction.
Assume that S∗ is not maximal, which means that there exists another AES-
included supervisor S ′ ∈ S(AESϕ(G)) such that L(S∗/G) ⊂ L(S ′/G). Therefore,
there exists a string w ∈ P (L(S∗/G)) ⊆ P (L(S ′/G)) such that S∗(w) ⊂ S ′(w)
and S∗(w′) = S ′(w′),∀w′ ∈ {w} \ {w}. We know that ISYS∗(w) = ISYS′(w); let us
call this Y -state y. But this means that the control decision S∗(w) at y violates
the locally maximal construction rule, i.e., there should not exist a control decision
γ ∈ CAESϕ(G)(y) : S∗(w) ⊂ γ. This is a contradiction. Hence no such S ′ exists.
By Theorem II.1, we know that the AES is non-empty if MPIEP has a solution.
Moreover, when the AES is non-empty, Algorithm MAX-SYNT always returns a
solution to MPIEP. Therefore, we have the following result.
Corollary 2.6.1. MPIEP is solvable if and only if the AES is non-empty.
Since supervisor S∗ is IS-based by construction, we also have the following result.
Corollary 2.6.2. For any IS-based property ϕ, there exists an IS-based supervisor
that solves MPIEP iff AESϕ(G) is non-empty.
Example 2.6.1. We return to our running example. If we pick locally maximal
control decision {a, c} at the initial Y -state {y0} and pick the unique control decision
∅ at the reachable Y -state, which means that all controllable events are disabled, then
we will obtain the maximal solution that was shown earlier in Figure 2.1(b). On the
other hand, if we pick control decision {b} at {0}, which is also locally maximal, then
no observable behavior can occur thereafter; this corresponds to the maximal solution
shown in Figure 2.1(c).
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Remark 2.6.1. The running time of the entire synthesis procedure is O(22|X|+2|Σc|).
First, we need to construct the AES by Algorithm FIND-AES, which consists of two
procedures, DoDSF and Prune. The procedure DoDSF may result in a BTS that,
in the worst case, has 2|X|+|Σc| + 2|X| states. The complexity of procedure Prune is
quadratic in the size of the above BTS. The complexity of Algorithm MAX-SYTN is
linear in the size of the AES that, in the worst case, also has 2|X|+|Σc| + 2|X| states.
Therefore, our synthesis procedure is exponential in the size of G. However, it was
shown in [99] that synthesizing a partial observation safe supervisor, which is a special
case of our problem, is NP-hard. Therefore, this exponential complexity seems to be
unavoidable and it is due to the partial observation feature of our problem.
2.6.2 Case of Σc ⊆ Σo
It was shown in [54] that, under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo, observability and
controllability together imply normality. Therefore, there exists a supremal control-
lable and observable sublanguage when Σc ⊆ Σo. It was also reported in [76] (respec-
tively, [26] and [78]) that, under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo, there exists a supremal
controlable, observable and diagnosable (respectively, opaque and attractable) sub-
language. In fact, we can prove the corresponding general result for any IS-based
property in our framework.
The following lemma reveals that, under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo, the infor-
mation state encountered does not depend on the control policy we take.
Lemma 2.6.1. Let S1 and S2 be two supervisors. Under the assumption that Σc ⊆
Σo, we have that
(∀s ∈ L(S1/G) ∩ L(S2/G))[I(ISZS1(P (s))) = I(ISZS2(P (s)))] (2.17)
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the length of P (s). For any string s, let
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|P (s)| = n. Let sk and ek be the same notations defined in the proof of Lemma 2.4.1.
For any i = 1, 2, define yi0 as usual and for k = 0, . . . , n, let z
i









Induction Basis (s0 = ε):
I(z20) = URS2(ε)(y0) = {v ∈ X : ∃t ∈ (S2(ε) ∩ Σuo)∗ s.t. v=δ(x0, t)}
= {v ∈ X : ∃t ∈ (S1(ε) ∩ Σuo)∗ s.t. v=δ(x0, t)}
= URS1(ε)(y0) = I(z
1
0)
where S2(ε) ∩ Σuo = S1(ε) ∩ Σuo holds because Σc ∩ Σuo=∅.
Induction Step:
Assume that the induction hypothesis is true at k. Then
y2k+1 = hZY (z
2
k, ek) = {v ∈ X : ∃u ∈ I(z2k) s.t. v = δ(u, ek)}















k+1) follows from the same argument as in the
induction basis. This completes the proof by induction.
Consider two different supervisors; under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo, the in-
formation state components of the Z-states encountered upon the occurrence of the
same string are identical. Therefore, in this scenario, state estimation (from observed
events) does not depend on the control policy we take. In [3], the authors show that
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for centralized partial observation control problems, a given Z-state (termed as max-
imal information set in [3]) is independent from the control policy the supervisor will
take in the future. (This is not true in general in decentralized control; see again [3].)
In essence, Lemma 2.6.1 extends this result and says that, under the assumption that
Σc ⊆ Σo, control and state estimation are one-way “fully separated”, i.e., in addition
to the non-dependency of state estimation on the future control actions, the Z-state
even does not depend on the past control actions. This separability also leads to the
follows theorem, which says that for any IS-based property, under the assumption
that Σc ⊆ Σo, there exists a unique maximal permissive supervisor that enforces the
property.
Theorem II.2. Assume that Σc ⊆ Σo. Then there exists a unique (supremal) solution
to MPISEP.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that ϕ : I → {0, 1} is the IS-based property that we
want to enforce. We assume that S1 and S2 are two different solutions to MPISEP, i.e.,
L(S1/G) and L(S2/G) are two incomparable maximal controllable and observable
sublanguages satisfying ϕ. Under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo and that the two
given languages are controllable and observable, we know that their union will also
be controllable and observable. Hence, there exists a partial observation supervisor
S∗ such that L(S∗/G) = L(S1/G) ∪L(S2/G). Specifically, for any s ∈ P (L(S∗/G))
we have S∗(s) = S1(s) ∪ S2(s).
Next, we show that S∗ also enforces ϕ. Let us assume that S∗ does not enforce
property ϕ, i.e., ∃s ∈ L(S∗/G) s.t. ϕ(RG(s,L(S∗/G))) = 0. Since L(S∗/G) =
L(S1/G) ∪ L(S2/G), we know that ∃i ∈ {1, 2} s.t. s ∈ L(Si/G). By Lemma 2.6.1,
we know that I(ISZS∗(P (s))) = I(IS
Z
Si(P (s))). Moreover, by Lemma 2.4.1, we know
that RG(s,L(S∗/G)) = RG(s,L(Si/G)). However, ϕ(RG(s,L(Si/G))) = 1, since Si
enforces property ϕ. This implies that ϕ(RG(s,L(S∗/G))) = 1, which is a contradic-
tion. Therefore, S∗ also enforces property ϕ.
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The above result contradicts the fact that L(S1/G) and L(S2/G) are maximal.
Therefore, there only exists a unique solution to MPISEP.
We have shown that Algorithm MAX-SYNT always returns a maximal solution;
moreover, under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo, this maximal solution is unique.
Therefore, in this scenario, Algorithm MAX-SYNT returns the unique supremal so-
lution.
Corollary 2.6.3. Let S∗ be the solution returned by Algorithm MAX-SYNT. When
Σc ⊆ Σo, S∗ is the unique supremal solution to MPIEP.
Remark 2.6.2. In the standard supervisory control problem, the supremal controllable
and observable sublanguage can be obtained under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo by
computing the supremal controllable and normal sublanguage [18]. Since both the
supremal normal approach and Algorithm MAX-SYNT take exponential complexity
in the size of the system, our approach does not improve upon the complexity of the
previous result under this restrictive assumption. Instead, Algorithm MAX-SYNT
provides an alternative approach for the computation of supermal controllable and
normal sublanguage for this special case.
2.6.3 The Issue of Liveness
In additional to IS-based property, in many applications, we also need to consider
the (weaker) liveness property. Liveness is an important property in many cyber
and cyber-physical systems, e.g., software systems [50] and flexible manufacturing
systems [49]. Formally, we say that a language L is live if for any s ∈ L, we have
∆L(s) 6= ∅. We say that system G is live if its generated language L(G) is live.
In fact, the definitions of many properties, e.g., diagnosability and detectability, are
based on the assumption that the system under consideration is live. Therefore, we
need to assume that G is live and we must ensure that the controlled system is also
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live. The liveness assumption on G is without essential loss of generality, since it
can be relaxed by adding observable self-loops at terminal states, as is done in [77].
(Essentially, this means that system deadlock is observable.) In order to enforce
liveness, we can added the following requirement to Definition 2.5.1: for any Z-state
z ∈ QAESZ , we have
∀x ∈ I(z), ∃σ ∈ Γ(z) : δ(x, σ)! (2.19)
It is straightforward to show that in the resulting modified AES, instead of the result
in Theorem II.1, we have instead that
[S/G is live] ∧ [L(S/G) |=G ϕ]⇔ S ∈ S(AESϕ(G)) (2.20)
In other words, the modified AES will contain all property-enforcing supervisors,
resulting in live behavior. The modified AES can be constructed in the same manner
as the construction the AES. Specifically, in line 7 of FIND-AES, in addition to check
if ϕ(I(z)) = 1, we also need to check if Equation (2.19) holds. Then we can apply
Algorithm MAX-SYNT based the modified AES, which will return a live property-
enforcing supervisor; the correctness of this approach is proved in [121].
2.7 Applications of the Uniform Approach
In this section, we show that how to apply the uniform approach described in this
chapter to the enforcement of several specific properties commonly encountered in
the study of DES. Our uniform approach comprises three steps:
1. Formulate the property to be enforced as an IS-based property;
2. Construct the AES using Algorithm FIND-AES;
3. Find a maximal solution based on the AES using Algorithm MAX-SYNT.
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In Sections 2.5 and 2.6, we have discussed Steps 2 and 3, respectively; it remains to
discuss how to formulate a given property as an IS-based property, whenever feasible.
As was mentioned earlier, there are properties that cannot be formulated as IS-based
properties; one such example is non-blockingness [120]. However, as we will see in this
section, many important properties in the DES literature, including but not restricted
to safety, opacity, diagnosability, detectbility, anonymity and attractability, can be
formulated as IS-based properties. Therefore, all of them can be enforced by using
the above three-step methodology.
2.7.1 Enforcement of Safety
Given a prefix-closed specification language K, we say that language L ⊆ L(G)
is safe if L ⊆ K. When the uncontrolled system is not safe, the standard supervisory
control and observation problem [20,52] asks to synthesize a least restrictive supervisor
such that the controlled system is safe. We show that this can be solved by our uniform
approach.
Let K = L(K), for some automaton K. In [18], the authors provide an algorithm
to construct refined automata KS = (XKS ,Σ, δKS , x0,KS) and GS = (XGS ,Σ, δGS , x0,GS)
such that the following holds: 1) L(GS) = L(G) and L(KS) = L(K); 2) KS is a
sub-automaton of GS; 3) KS @ GS. For the construction of GS and KS, the reader
is referred to [18]. The above conditions imply that XKS captures the legal behaviors,
i.e., any string in L(GS) that leads to a state in XKS is safe and any string in L(GS)
that leads to a state in XGS \XKS is unsafe.
For the refined system model GS, we define the IS-based property ϕsafe : 2
XGS →
{0, 1} w.r.t. GS as follows. For any information state i ∈ 2XGS , ϕsafe(i) = 1 ⇔ i ⊆
XKS . Then we have the following result.
Proposition 2.7.1. Let K be the specification automaton and GS be the refined
system automaton defined above, then language L ⊆ L(G) is safe if and only if
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L |=GS ϕsafe.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Definition 2.3.1 and Lemma 2.4.1, since L 6|=Gs
ϕsafe if and only if ∃s ∈ L : δGS(x0,GS , s) /∈ XKS , which is equivalent to L 6⊆ L(KS) =
L(K).
Hence, to solve the safety control problem, it suffices to synthesize a supervisor
that enforces the IS-based property ϕsafe w.r.t. the refined state space of GS. There-
fore, the maximally permissive safety control problem can be solved by our uniform
approach.
2.7.2 Enforcement of Current-State Opacity
Opacity is a confidentiality property for partially-observed systems. It captures
the plausible deniability of the system’s “secret” in the presence of an outside observer
that is potentially malicious. First, we recall the definition of current-state opacity,
as it is presented in [51,107].
Definition 2.7.1. Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0) be the system automaton. Language L ⊆
L(G) is said to be current-state opaque w.r.t. XS ⊆ X,G and P if
(∀s∈L : δ(x0, s)∈XS)(∃t∈L) [P (s)=P (t) ∧ δ(x0, t) 6∈XS] (2.21)
Note that we assume in this section that the external observer and the supervisor
have the same observation set, Σo.
To formulate the current-state opacity enforcement problem in our framework, we
define the IS-based current-state opacity property ϕopa : 2
X → {0, 1} as follows. For
any information state i ∈ 2X , we have
ϕopa(i) = 0⇔ i ⊆ XS (2.22)
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The following result says that the IS-based property ϕopa correctly captures the opac-
ity property.
Proposition 2.7.2. Let G be the system automaton, XS ⊆ X be the subset of secret
states, and ϕopa be the IS-based property defined above. Language L ⊆ L(G) is
current-state opaque if and only if L |=G ϕopa.
Proof. We proceed by contrapositive. By definition, G is not current-state opaque
if and only if (∃s ∈ L)(∀t ∈ L)[P (s) = P (t) ⇒ δ(x0, t) ∈XS], which is equivalent to
(∃s∈L)(∀x ∈ RG(s, L))[x ∈ XS]. This is equivalent to ∃s ∈ L : ϕopa(RG(s, L)) = 0,
i.e., L 6|=G ϕopa.
Consequently, the opacity enforcement problem can be solved by using ϕopa in
our uniform approach. Our running example has already shown how to synthesize a
maximally permissive supervisor enforcing opacity.
Remark 2.7.1. It was shown in [107] that several other notions of opacity, e.g.,
language-based opacity, initial-state opacity, and initial-and-final-state opacity, can be
transformed to current-state opacity in polynomial time. Therefore, the enforcement
of these notions of opacity can be done by first transforming them to current-state
opacity and then enforcing current-state opacity as discussed above.
2.7.3 Enforcement of K-Diagnosability
In fault diagnosis problems, ed ∈ Σuo is a fault event whose occurrences must
be diagnosed by the diagnoser within a finite number of steps. Suppose L is the
language to be diagnosed. We define Ψ(ed, L) = {sed ∈ L : s ∈ Σ∗} to be the set of
strings that end with the fault event. We say that a language is K-diagnosable if this
diagnosis delay is uniformly bounded by a given number K. The formal definition of
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(d) AESϕdiag (GD)
Figure 2.3:
For G: Σc = {b, o},Σo = {a, c, d, o}, and f is the fault event. For the sake
of brevity, in the diagram of the AES, we write state (x, n) in the form
of xn and all uncontrollable events in the control decisions are omitted.
We also represent all Z-states z such that ∀xn ∈ I(z) : n ≥ 0 as a single
state F , since we can diagnose the failure unambiguously at such states.
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Definition 2.7.2. (K-Diagnosability). A live language L is said to be K-diagnosable
w.r.t. P and ed ∈ Σuo if
(∀s ∈ Ψ(ed, L))(∀t ∈ L/s)[|t| ≥ K ⇒ (∀w ∈ P−1(P (st) ∩ L) : ed ∈ w)] (2.23)
To formulate K-diagnosability as an IS-based property, we need to refine the state
space of the original system G, which is similar to the refinement procedure in [22].
Given G = (X,Σ, δ, x0) and non-negative integer K, we define the new automaton
GD = (XD,Σ, δD, xD,0), where
• XD ⊆ X × {−1, 0, 1, . . . , K} is the set of states;
• Σ is the set of events (same as defined in G);
• δD : XD × Σ → XD is the partial transition function that is built from δ in G
as follows: for any u = (x, n) ∈ XD, σ ∈ Σ,
δD(u, σ) =

(δ(x, σ),−1), if n = −1 and σ ∈ Σ \ {ed}
(δ(x, σ), n+ 1), if 0 ≤ n < K or n = −1 ∧ σ = ed
(δ(x, σ), K), if n = K
(2.24)
• xD,0 = (x0,−1) ∈ XD is the initial state.
By construction, we have that L(G) = L(GD), i.e., GD is language-equivalent to G
but refines its state space. Therefore, we can analyze the (language-based) property
of diagnosability based on the refined system GD. To this end, we define the IS-based
property termed K-diagnosability.
Definition 2.7.3. The property of IS-based K-diagnosability ϕdiag : 2
XD → {0, 1}
w.r.t. GD is defined by: for any i ∈ 2XD ,
ϕdiag(i) = 0⇔ (∃u, v ∈ i)[[u]n = −1 ∧ [v]n = K] (2.25)
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where [u]n denotes the integer component of state u.
The following result establishes that to enforce K-diagnosablility, it suffices to
enforce the property of IS-based K-diagnosability defined above.
Proposition 2.7.3. A live language L ⊆ L(G) = L(GD) is K-diagnosable w.r.t. P
and ed if and only if L |=GD ϕdiag.
Proof. We proceed by contrapositive.
L is not K-diagnosable
⇔∃tv = tv,1tv,2, tu ∈ L s.t. tv,1 ∈ Ψ(ed, L) and
tv,2 ≥ K and ΣF 6∈ tu and P (tu) = P (tv) Def. 2.7.2
⇔∃tv, tu ∈ L s.t. [δK(xD,0, tv)]n = K and [δD(xD,0, tu)]n = −1 and P (tu) = P (tv)
⇔∃tv ∈ L s.t. ϕdiag(RGD(tv, L)) = 0 Def. 2.7.3
⇔L 6|=GD ϕdiag Def. 2.3.1
The second equivalence is from the definition of GD.
Example 2.7.1. Let us consider the system G in Figure 2.3(a), where the set of
controllable events is Σc = {b, o} and the set of observable events is Σo = {a, c, d, o};
these two sets are incomparable. Event f is the unique fault event. Consider a
desired diagnosis delay of K = 2. The corresponding unfolded system GD is shown
in Figure 2.3(b). The corresponding AES AESϕdiag(GD) for GD w.r.t. ϕdiag is given
in Figure 2.3(d). Note that, to construct the AES, we need to consider the issue of
liveness discussed in Section 2.6.3. For the sake of brevity, we write state (x, n) in
the form of xn. For example, at Y -state {31, 2−1, 4−1}, we cannot enable event o,
since no matter what control decision we take after the occurrence of o, a Z-state that
contains both states 32 and 4−1 will be encountered, i.e., the IS-based property ϕdiag
will be violated.
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By applying Algorithm MAX-SYNT to AESϕdiag(GD), a maximally permissive
supervisor S∗ is obtained; we highlight the chosen locally maximal control decision at
each reachable Y -state (which in this example is unique) and all feasible observable
events at each reachable Z-state in the diagram. The corresponding controlled behavior
is given in Figrue 2.3(c). By Theorem II.1, L(S∗/G) is a maximal live, controllable,
observable and 2-diagnosable sublanguage of L(G).
2.7.4 Enforcement of Strong Detectability
Detectability is a property arising in state estimation of DES. In [87], the en-
forcement of strongly detectability is studied under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo.
Here, we show that strongly detectability with a pre-specified detection delay K, or
strongly K-detectability, can be enforced without such an assumption by using the
uniform approach. First, we recall the formal definition of strongly K-detectability
from [87,89].
Definition 2.7.4. (Strongly K-Detectability). A live language L ⊆ L(G) is said to
be strongly K-detectable w.r.t. P and G if
(∀s ∈ L)[|P (s)| ≥ K ⇒ |RG(s, L)| = 1] (2.26)
Analogous to the enforcement of diagnosability, given an automaton G = (X,Σ, δ, x0),
we can build a new automaton GT = (XT ,Σ, δT , xT,0), where
• XT ⊆ X × {0, 1, . . . , K} is the set of states;
• Σ is the set of events;
• δT : XT × Σ → XT is the partial transition function and for any u = (x, n) ∈
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XT , σ ∈ Σ, δT is defined by
δT (u, σ) =

(δ(x, σ), n), if σ ∈ Σuo ∧ n<K
(δ(x, σ), n+ 1), if σ ∈ Σo ∧ n<K
(δ(x, σ), K), if n = K
(2.27)
• xT,0 = (x0, 0) is the initial state.
With the refined system GT , we define IS-based K-detectability as follows.
Definition 2.7.5. (IS-Based Strongly K-Detectability). The property of IS-based K-
detectability ϕdet : 2
XT → {0, 1} w.r.t. GT is defined by: for any i ∈ 2XT ,
ϕdet(i) = 0⇔ (∃u ∈ i : [u]n = K) ∧ |i| > 1, (2.28)
where [u]n denotes the integer component of u.
The following result says that to enforce strongly K-detectability it suffices to
enforce the IS-based property ϕdet defined above.
Proposition 2.7.4. A live language L is strongly K-detectable w.r.t. P and G if and
only if L |=GT ϕdet.
Proof. We proceed by contrapositive.
L is not strongly K-detectable w.r.t. P and G
⇔∃s ∈ L s.t. |P (s)| ≥ K and |RG(s, L)| > 1 Def. 2.7.4
⇔∃s ∈ L s.t. |P (s)| ≥ K and |RGT (s, L)| > 1
⇔∃s ∈ L s.t. [δT (xT,0, s)]n = K and |RGT (s, L)| > 1
⇔∃s ∈ L s.t. ϕdet(RGT (s, L)) = 0
⇔L 6|=GT ϕdet Def. 2.3.1
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The third and fourth equivalences follow from the construction of GT and the def-
inition of ϕdet, respectively. For the second equivalence, first we have the following
observations:
(1) |RG(s, L)| > 1 if and only if
∃t ∈ L : P (s) = P (t) ∧ δ(x0, t) 6= δ(x0, s) (2.29)
(2) |RGT (s, L)| > 1 if and only if
∃t ∈ L : [P (s) = P (t)] ∧ [δ(x0, t) 6= δ(x0, s) or max{|P (t)|, K} 6= max{|P (s)|, K}]
(2.30)
However, is always true that max{|P (t)|, K}=max{|P (s)|, K} if P (s)=P (t). There-
fore, Equation (2.30) is equivalent to Equation (2.29), which implies that |RG(s, L)|>
1⇔|RGT (s, L)|>1.
2.7.5 Enforcement of Anonymity
Strong detectability requires that the supervisor eventually be able to determine
the exact system state. In security and privacy applications, when the system is
monitored by a potentially malicious observer, we may want to enforce the exact
opposite, i.e., the exact system state should never be revealed. This is related to the
notion of opacity discussed earlier and it is termed anonymity [90], which is defined
as follows.
Definition 2.7.6. (Anonymity). Language L ⊆ L(G) is said to be anonymous w.r.t.
P and G if
(∀s ∈ L)(∃t ∈ L)[P (s) = P (t) ∧ δ(x0, s) 6= δ(x0, t)] (2.31)
Anonymity is different from either detectability or opacity. However, anonymity
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can be easily formulated as an IS-based property, which means that it can enforced
by using the uniform approach. To this end, we define the IS-based property ϕano :
2X → {0, 1} w.r.t. G by: for any i ∈ 2X , ϕano(i) = 0 ⇔ |i| = 1. Then we have
the following result, which says that enforcing anonymity is equivalent to enforcing
IS-based property ϕano.
Proposition 2.7.5. Language L is anonymous w.r.t. P and G if and only if L |=G
ϕano.
Proof. L is not anonymous if and only if (∃s ∈ L)(∀t ∈ L)[P (s) = P (t)⇒ δ(x0, s) =
δ(x0, t)], This is equivalent to (∃s∈L)[|RG(s, L)| = 1], i.e., L 6|=G ϕano.
2.7.6 Enforcement of Attractability
The last property enforcement problem we study in this section is the state at-
traction problem. In this problem, the goal is to design a supervisor such that the
controlled system will converge to a desired attractor in a bounded number of event
occurrences. In [78], the state attraction problem under partial observation is studied
under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo. We show that this assumption can be relaxed by
taking the uniform approach developed in this chapter. Hereafter, instead of allow-
ing arbitrary bounded convergence delay, we require that the system converge to the
attractor in a pre-specified number of steps, leading to the notion of K-attractability.
Definition 2.7.7. (K-Attractability). Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0) be the system automaton.
Language L ⊆ L(G) is said to be K-attractable w.r.t. G and A ⊆ X if for any s ∈ L,
we have
1. |s| ≥ K ⇒ δ(x0, s) ∈ A;
2. δ(x0, s) ∈ A⇒ ∀st ∈ L : δ(x0, st) ∈ A.
Remark 2.7.2. In [78], the authors assume that A ⊆ X is an invariant set, i.e., (∀x ∈
A)(∀s ∈ Σ∗)[δ(x, s) ∈ A]. In this case, the second requirement in Definition 2.7.7
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will be satisfied trivially. Therefore, the definition of attractability we consider here
is more general.
Given an automaton G = (X,Σ, δ, x0), to formulate K-attractability as an IS-
based property, we first construct the new automaton GA = (XA,Σ, δA, xA,0), where
• XA ⊆ X × {0, 1, . . . , K} is the set of states;
• Σ is the set of events;
• δA : XA × Σ → XA is the partial transition function and for any u = (x, n) ∈
XA, σ ∈ Σ, δT is defined by
δA(u, σ)=
 (δ(x, σ), n+ 1), if n < K ∧ x 6∈ A(δ(x, σ), K), if n < K ∧ x ∈ A or n = K (2.32)
• xA,0 = (x0, 0) is the initial state.
We define IS-based K-attractability as follows.
Definition 2.7.8. The property of IS-based K-attractability ϕatt : 2
XA → {0, 1} w.r.t.
GA is defined by: for any i ∈ 2XA,
ϕatt(i) = 0⇔ ∃u ∈ i : [u]x 6∈ A ∧ [u]n = K (2.33)
where [u]x and [u]n are the state component and the integer component of u, respec-
tively.
The following result says that to enforce K-attractability w.r.t. G, it suffices to
enforce the IS-based property ϕatt w.r.t. GA defined above.
Proposition 2.7.6. A live language L is K-attractable w.r.t. G if and only if L |=GA
ϕatt.
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Proof. We proceed by contrapositive.
L is not K-attractable w.r.t. G
⇔∃s ∈ L s.t. [|s| ≥ K ∧ δ(x0, s) 6∈ A] or [δ(x0, s) ∈ A ∧ ∃t ∈ L/s : δ(x0, st) 6∈ A]
⇔∃w∈L s.t. [δA(xA,0, w)]x 6∈ A and [δA(xA,0, w)]n = K
⇔∃w ∈ L s.t. ϕatt(RGA(w,L)) = 0 Def. 2.7.8
⇔L 6|=GA ϕatt Def. 2.3.1
For the second equivalence, the proof of the “⇒” direction can be done by taking
w = s if the first case holds and w = st if the second case holds. For the “⇐”
direction, since [δA(xA,0, w)]n = K, by the construction of GA, we know that (i)
|w| ≥ K or (ii) ∃w1w2 ∈ {w} s.t. δ(x0, w1) ∈ A and δ(x0, w1w2) 6∈ A. These two
cases correspond to the two cases after the first equivalence, respectively.
Remark 2.7.3. So far, we have discussed the enforcement of K-diagnosability, K-
detectability andK-attractability. SinceK-diagnosability (respectively, K-detectability
and K-attractability) is stronger than diagnosability (respectively, detectability and
attractability), enforcing the former one implies that the latter one is also enforced.
Moreover, the uniform approach guarantees the diagnosis (respectively, detection and
attraction) delay of the controlled system, which cannot be guaranteed by the previ-
ous approaches. In this sense, enforcing these properties with desired delay K is a new
feature of the uniform solution rather than a restrictive assumption. However, if one
does not care about the diagnosis (respectively, detection and attraction) delay and
just wants to enforce diagnosability (respectively, detectability and attractability),
then the maximally permissive solution obtained for K-diagnosability (respectively,
K-detectability and K-attractability) may not be the maximally permissive solution
for diagnosability (respectively, detectability and attractability). Moreover, as K
increases, the permissiveness of the solution increases, but the complexity of the syn-
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thesis algorithm also increases, since we need to “unfold” the system for more steps.
In other words, there is a tradeoff between the permissiveness of the solution and the
complexity of synthesis algorithm when there is no delay K required a priori. In this
case, one may proceed as follows. First, one may start with a solution by choosing a
relatively small K. If the permissiveness of this solution satisfies the design require-
ment, then stop. Otherwise, choose a larger K and repeat the above procedure until
a desirable solution is found.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a uniform approach to the problem of synthesizing
a maximally permissive supervisor that enforces a certain property for a partially-
observed discrete-event system that does not originally satisfy the property. To this
end, we defined a class of properties called Information-State-Based properties and a
novel information structure called the All Enforcement Structure that embeds all valid
supervisors enforcing any IS-based property. Based on the AES, a synthesis algorithm
was provided to synthesize a locally maximal solution to this problem, without making
any assumptions about the observability properties of the controllable events. In this
regard, our approach relaxes the assumption that all controllable events are observable
in the existing works on property enforcement by supervisory control. We showed
that many important properties in the DES literature can be enforced by the uniform
approach described in this chapter. Moreover, this approach can be applied to enforce
other properties, such as anonymity, for which no synthesis methodologies exist in
the current literature. In addition, the AES can be used for solving quantitative
optimal property enforcement control problems when a cost structure is imposed
on this problem. Since the AES embeds all valid property-enforcing supervisors, it
provides a suitable solution space over which to solve such optimal control problems.
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CHAPTER III
Synthesis of Non-blocking Supervisors for
IS-Based Properties
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter II, we have proposed a uniform approach that is applicable to the
enforcement of a large class of properties called the IS-based properties. Unfor-
tunately, non-blockingness, one of the most important property in the supervisory
control theory cannot be formulated as an IS-based property. This is because that
non-blockingness requires that for any string in the closed-loop language, there exists
a continuation of the string leading to a marking state; this information depends on
the future behaviors of the system, which cannot be simply evaluated based on the
current information-state.
In this chapter, we tackle the supervisor synthesis problem for non-blockingness
in addition to IS-based property. We define another finite bipartite transition system
that we call the “Non-Blocking All Enforcement Structure” (or NB-AES hereafter).
The NB-AES contains in its transition structure all supervisors that are deadlock-free.
We obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions for the solvability of the maximally
permissive control problem. We then provide a synthesis algorithm, based on the
NB-AES, that constructs a non-blocking and maximally permissive supervisor that
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enforces an IS-based property, if one exists. This is the first algorithm with such
properties. Unlike the case of IS-based property, for which an IS-based supervisor
is always sufficient when a solution exists, we show that 2X may not be sufficient
to represent a non-blocking supervisor; additional memory is required in general.
However, we show that a finite memory is also sufficient to represent a non-blocking
supervisor.
This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we revisit some basic ter-
minologies and formulate the problem we want to solve. In Section 3.3, we define
a new BTS called the NB-AES. In Section 3.4, we present an algorithm based on
the NB-AES that returns a solution to the non-blocking synthesis problem (if one
exists) and the correctness proof of the proposed algorithm. An illustrative example
of our synthesis algorithm, for which previous approaches return empty solutions is
provided in Section 3.5. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.6. In addi-
tion, Appendix 3.7.1 discusses in more detail implementation issues that arise in the
synthesis algorithm of Section 3.5. The computational complexity of the synthesis
algorithm of Section 3.5 is analyzed in Appendix 3.7.2.
3.2 Problem Formulation
Let L ⊆ L(G) be a prefix-closed language. We say that L is non-blocking
(w.r.t. G) if L ∩ Lm(G) = L. Given an automaton G, an execution is a sequence
〈x1, σ1, . . . , σk−1, xk〉, where xi ∈ X, σi ∈ Σ and xi+1 = δ(xi, σi),∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k−1}.
We say that an execution forms a cycle if x1 = xk; we say that a cycle is an elementary
cycle if ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k−1} : i 6= j ⇒ xi 6=xj. A Strongly Connected Componen-
t (SCC) in G is a maximal set of states C ⊆ X such that ∀x, y∈C, ∃s∈Σ∗ : δ(x, s)=y;
a SCC C is said to be non-trivial if ∀x, y∈C, ∃s∈Σ∗ \ {ε} : δ(x, s)=y. A livelock in
G is a non-trivial SCC C such that: (i) C ∩ Xm = ∅, i.e., there is no marked state
in it; and (ii) ∀x ∈ C, ∀σ ∈ Σ : δ(x, σ) ∈ C, i.e., there is no transition defined out
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of it. We say that 〈x1, σ1, . . . , σk−1, xk〉 is an elementary livelock cycle if: (i) it is an
elementary cycle; and (ii) there exists a livelock C, such that {x1, x2, . . . , xk−1} ⊆ C.
We say that L ⊆ L(G) is a livelock language if any automaton generating L contains
a livelock; otherwise, we say that L is livelock-free. Also, we say that L ⊆ L(G) is
a deadlock language if ∃s ∈ L : ∆L(s) = ∅ ∧ s /∈ Lm(G); otherwise, we say that L
is deadlock-free. Clearly, L is non-blocking if and only if it is both deadlock-free and
livelock-free. We can also extend these concepts to a supervisor by evaluating its
generated langauge. Specifically, let S : P (L(G))→ Γ be a supervisor for G. We say
that S is
• non-blocking (w.r.t. G) if L(S/G) is non-blocking w.r.t. G
• deadlock-free (w.r.t. G) if L(S/G) is deadlock-free w.r.t. G.
Similarly to the Maximally Permissive IS-Based Property Enforcement Problem
(MPIEP) we formulate the Non-blocking Maximally Permissive IS-Based Property
Enforcement Problem (NB-MPIEP) as follows.
Problem 3. (Non-blocking Maximally Permissive IS-Based Property Enforcement
Problem). Given system G and IS-based property ϕ : 2X → {0, 1} w.r.t. G, synthesize
a partial observation supervisor S : P (L(G))→ Γ, such that
1. L(S/G) is non-blocking w.r.t. G;
2. L(S/G) |=G ϕ;
3. For any S ′ satisfying 1)-2), we have that L(S/G) 6⊂ L(S ′/G).
3.3 Non-blocking All Enforcement Structure
In this section, we tackle the non-blockingness requirement. We first define the
Non-Blocking AES (NB-AES), a bipartite transition system obtained from the AES
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that contains all non-blocking control policies satisfying the IS-based property; then
we investigate its construction and properties.
3.3.1 Definition of the NB-AES
Definition 3.3.1. (Live decision string). Given a BTS T , for any Y -state y ∈ QTY
and state x ∈ y in it, we say that a decision string γ1γ2 . . . γn, where γi ∈ Γ for
i = 1, . . . n, is live for (y, x) in T if there exists a string s = ξ1σ1ξ2 . . . σn−1ξn, where
ξi ∈ (Σuo ∩ γi)∗, σi ∈ Σo ∩ γi, such that δ(x, s) ∈ Xm and ∀i < n : γi+1 ∈ CT (yi),
where y
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Figure 3.1:
An example of (NB-)AES. For G: Σc = {c1, c2}, Σo = {o1, o2} where
state 15 is illegal. uc denotes all uncontrollable events.
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Example 3.3.1. Let G be the automaton shown in Figure 3.1(a). Let us consider
safety specification ϕ defined by ϕ(i) = 0⇔ 15 ∈ i, i.e., state 15 is the unique illegal
state. The resulting AES w.r.t. G for ϕ is shown in Figure 3.1(b). Then {uc}{c2, uc}
is a live decision string for state 1 ∈ {1, 2}, since string o1c2, which leads state 1 to
marked state 8, exists under this decision string.
Intuitively, the liveness property of a Y -state simply says that given a current in-
formation state, for each state in it, we can always find a sequence of control decisions
under which this state will be able to reach some marked state through some string.
The verification of the liveness property of a Y -state is a reachability problem in an
automaton that is built from the original BTS by explicitly adding transitions to
capture reachability within states in Z-states. Details can be found in the appendix.
The purpose of the above notion of liveness of information states is to eliminate
one source of blocking: clearly, if a Y -state is not live, then no matter what control
decision we take at that Y -state, we will always be blocked by some state in it.
In the case of Z-states, we introduce a notion of deadlock-freeness to complement
the notion of liveness of Y -states. Specifically, for a Z-state z, we require that any
state x ∈ I(z) should either have an unobservable path to a marked state or a path
that goes outside of the Z-state; otherwise, it will also be a source of blocking. This
leads to the following definition, which depends on Z-state z and on G, but not on
the BTS that z is part of.
Definition 3.3.2. (Deadlock-free Z-state). A Z-state z is said to be deadlock-free if
for all x ∈ I(z) we have
(∃s ∈ (Γ(z) ∩ Σuo)∗)[δ(x, s) ∈ Xm] ∨ (∃s ∈ (Γ(z) ∩ Σuo)∗(Γ(z) ∩ Σo))[δ(x, s)!] (3.1)
Otherwise, z is said to be a deadlock Z-state.
We are now ready to define the NB-AES structure, which contains all safe and
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non-blocking solutions.
Definition 3.3.3. (Non-blocking All Enforcement Structure). Given a system G
and an IS-based property ϕ : I → {0, 1} w.r.t. G, the Non-blocking All Enforcement
Structure (NB-AES) for property ϕ, denoted by
AESNBϕ (G) = (QNBY , QNBZ , hNBY Z , hNBZY ,Σ,Γ, y0), (3.2)
is defined as the largest complete BTS w.r.t. G such that
1 ∀y ∈ QNBY : y is live in AESNBϕ (G); and
2 ∀z ∈ QNBZ : ϕ(I(z)) = 1 and z is deadlock-free.
In the above definition, the largest non-blocking subsystem of the AES is uniquely
defined, since the union of any subsystems satisfying the above properties still satisfies
these properties. Similar to the case of the AES, we also only consider the reachable
part of the NB-AES hereafter.
Example 3.3.2. Going back to Figure 3.1, the NB-AES w.r.t. G for ϕ is shown in
Figure 3.1(c). Comparing with its AES, since all Y -states in it are live, the deadlock
Z-states that are removed are ({3, 4}, {uc}) and ({5, 6}, {uc}).
3.3.2 Properties and Construction Algorithm
By definition, the NB-AES is also a complete BTS. Thus, we can talk about the
properties of its included supervisors, which are given in the following theorem.
Theorem III.1. For the set of NB-AES included supervisors, the following two prop-
erties are satisfied:
1. If S ∈ S(AESNBϕ (G)), then S is a deadlock-free supervisor satisfying ϕ;
2. If S is a non-blocking supervisor satisfying ϕ, then S ∈ S(AESNBϕ (G)).
58
Proof. 1) Since the NB-AES is a subsystem of the AES, we know that L(S/G) |=G ϕ.
Now, let us assume that L has a deadlock, which implies that there exists s ∈ L such
that δ(x0, s) /∈ Xm and δL(s) = ∅. In terms of information state evolution, we
know that δ(x0, s) ∈ ISZS (P (s)). By Definition 3.3.2, this implies that the Z state
ISZS (P (s)) is a deadlock state, which contradicts the definition of the NB-AES. Thus,
S is deadlock-free.
2) We prove by contrapositive, i.e., we show that if S /∈ S(AESNBϕ (G)) then S
cannot cannot simultaneously be non-blocking and ϕ-enforcing. Since the NB-AES
is a subsystem of the AES, there are two cases for S /∈ S(AESNBϕ (G)):
Case 1: S /∈ S(AESϕ(G)). By Theorem II.1, S is not ϕ-enforcing.
Case 2: S ∈ S(AESϕ(G)) but S /∈ S(AESNBϕ (G)). We now show that in this case S
is blocking. By Definition 3.3.3, it can be shown by contradiction that there exists
s ∈ L(S/G) such that one of the two following cases holds: (i) ISZS (P (s)) is a
deadlock Z-state. By Definition 3.3.2, L is blocking; (ii) ISYS (P (s)) is not live. If
y = ISYS (P (s)) is not live, then by Definition 3.3.1, there exists at least one state in
y where no control decision can be made to lead it to a marked state. Specifically,





















{1},{  ,  } {2},{ }
{ }
(b) The corresponding NB-AES
Figure 3.2: For G: Σuo = ∅ and Σuc = {b}.
Note that for S ∈ S(AESNBϕ (G)), S need not be livelock-free in general. Let us
consider the automaton G in Figure 3.2(a) and its corresponding NB-AES shown in
Figure 3.2(b). Clearly, supervisor S such that L(S/G) = (ab)∗ is included in the NB-
AES, but it is a livelock supervisor. However, the above statement is true when G is
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acyclic, i.e., there is no cycle in G, since in this case, the deadlock-freeness condition
and the non-blockingness condition are equivalent. Therefore, we have the following
result.






2 Delete all Z-states in A that are deadlock states;
3 while exists Y -state in A that is not live do
4 Delete all Y -states in A that are not live;
5 while exists Y -state in A that has no successor do
6 Delete all such Y -states in A and delete all their predecessor
Z-states;
7 if the initial Y -state has been removed then
8 return the NB-AES does not exist;
else
9 AESNBϕ (G)← Accessible(A);
The construction procedure for the NB-AES is given by Algorithm FIND-NB-AES.
The basic idea of the construction algorithm follows directly from the definition. We
need to keep pruning states from the AES structure until convergence. Specifically,
there are three kinds of states that we need to prune:
(i) All Z-state that are deadlock states;
(ii) All Y -states that are not live; and
(iii) All Y or Z-states that violate the definition of completeness.
In the algorithm, the elimination of (i), (ii) and (iii) are implemented in line-2, line-4
and line-6, respectively. Note that for (ii) and (iii), iteration steps are required, since
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pruning states may change the liveness or the completeness of the transition system.
However, (i) just needs to be executed once, since the deadlock property does not
depend on T .
Proposition 3.3.1. The running time of FIND-NB-AES is in O(|X||Σ|22|X|+|Σc|−1).
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
3.4 Synthesis of Non-blocking Supervisors
3.4.1 Synthesis Algorithm
We now tackle the synthesis problem for non-prefix-closed specification languages,
i.e., non-blockingness must be ensured in addition to an IS-based property. Formally,
we show how to synthesize a maximal non-blocking supervisor from the NB-AES.
In the prefix-closed case, once the AES is built, we can randomly pick one control
decision and fix it at each reachable information state and this will give us a (IS-
based) supervisor for IS-based property ϕ. However, this strategy may not work in
the non-prefix-closed case, since the NB-AES only guarantees that there exists a good
decision, but arbitrarily choosing one control decision may return a livelock solution.
This phenomenon was already pointed out by the example in Figure 3.2. Moreover,
if we go back to the example in Figure 3.2, we find that we cannot remove any (Y or
Z) state from the NB-AES, otherwise, some nonblocking solutions will be excluded.
This means that the NB-AES is already the most “compact” structure that contains
all non-blocking solutions, even if it contains some livelock solutions. One conjecture
is that we can search through the space of IS-based supervisors, which is finite, for
the desired maximal solution. Unfortunately, an IS-based solution does not exist in
general; an example where this occurs is presented in Section 3.5.
The non-existence, in general, of an IS-based supervisor that is both ϕ-enforcing
and non-blocking implies immediately that state space refinement is required if we
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want to synthesize a solution from the NB-AES. Our synthesis algorithm, which is
described formally below, is based on the idea of suitably “unfolding” the NB-AES.
To begin with, we need to build an IS-based supervisor (Step 1) and then determine
whether or not there exists a livelock in it (Step 2). If not, then we are done and
return the solution. If yes, then we need to break the livelock at some point and
resolve it by unfolding the NB-AES at that point such that a live decision string can
be added at the livelock point (Steps 3 and 4). This will give us a new (non-IS-
based) supervisor. Finally, we need to go back to Step 2 and test again until the
iteration converges (Step 5). However, two questions arise: (i) Where should we
break a livelock? and (ii) How can we unfold the NB-AES? In order to answer these
two questions, we first define the concept of “extended BTS” and then we use this
notion to define “unfolded” BTS.
Let Z be the set of integers and N be the set of non-negative integers. E is called
an Extended Bipartite Transition System (EBTS) of T if it is a partial unfolding of a
BTS T resulting in sets QEY = Q
T
Y ×Z and QEZ = QTZ×Z with corresponding transition
functions hEY Z : Q
E
Y × Γ → QEZ and hEZY : QEZ × Σ → QEY over the extended state
space, such that the restrictions of hEY Z and h
E









Y Z and h
E
ZY are defined. Specifically,
hEY Z((y, n), γ) (respectively, h
E
ZY ((z, n), σ)) is of the form (h
T
Y Z(y, γ), δ(y, n, γ)) (re-
spectively, (hTZY (z, σ), δ(z, n, σ))), where δ : (Q
T
Y ∪ QTZ) × Z × (Γ ∪ E) → Z is some
updating function for the integer component of the state. (The exact form of δ is left
unspecified for the purpose of this general definition.) Given an EBTS E, its included
supervisors is defined analogously as before for a BTS in Definition 2.4.2 we will still
use the notations S(E) to represent the supervisors included in E. Clearly, if E is a
complete EBTS of a complete BTS T , then S(E) ⊆ S(T ).
The definition of an EBTS only requires that the restriction of the transition func-
tion to domains QTY and Q
T
Z be consistent with the BTS. However, we also want that
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the restriction of the transition function to domain Z satisfy certain rules (namely,
it should “remember” the number of times the current state has been visited). This
leads to the notion of an Unfolded Bipartite Transition System (UBTS), which is a
particular type of EBTS defined as follows. For simplicity, we will write state (y, n)
as yn. Given an extended state xn ∈ QEY ∪ QEZ , PreEY (xn) and PreEZ (xn) denote,
respectively, the set of Y -states and the set of Z-states that can reach this state
through some runs in E, excluding itself; also, we call xn a control state if n ∈ N and
a transient state if n ∈ Z \ N.
Definition 3.4.1. We say that U is an unfolded BTS of a complete BTS T if it is
an EBTS of T , such that:
1. (∀yn ∈ QUY )[|CU(yn)| ≤ 1];
2. (∀zn ∈ QUZ)(∀σ ∈ Σ)[hZY (z, σ)!⇒ hUZY (zn, σ)!];
3. There are no cycles in U ;
4. For any yn ∈ QUY , if n ∈ N, then n = |{yñ ∈ PreUY (yn) : ñ ∈ N}|. Similarly, for
any zn ∈ QUZ , if n ∈ N, then n = |{zñ ∈ PreUZ(zn) : ñ ∈ N}|.
5. The terminal states of U are either (i) terminal Z-states or (ii) Y -states of the
form yn with n ≥ 1.










n, σ) = yn
′
.
Conditions 1) and 2) together imply that except for Y -states with no defined con-
trol decision, a UBTS will be complete. Condition 4) says that the integer component
of any control state in U is n if there are n control states in its predecessors that have
the same Y - or Z-state component. By condition 5), any branch of the UBTS ends
up with a repeated control Y -state or a terminal Z-state. Thus, given a UBTS U ,
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we can merge each terminal Y -state yn, n ≥ 1 with its predecessor state y0 and de-
note the resulting new EBTS by Ũ . Specifically, Ũ is obtained by removing states
R := {yn ∈ QUY : |CU(yn)| = 0} from U and for any yn ∈ R, any transition that origi-
nally goes to state yn in U will go to the corresponding state y0 in Ũ . By definition of
a UBTS, Ũ is a complete EBTS. Moreover, we note that the set of supervisors S(Ũ)
included in Ũ is a singleton, since there is only one control decision at each Y -state
in Ũ . Thus, we call the unique supervisor included in Ũ the supervisor induced by
UBTS U and denote it by SU . Similarly, for any Y -state y ∈ QŨY , we denote by cŨy
the unique control decision defined at y, i.e., CŨ(y) = {cŨy }. The supervisor SU can
be realized by an automaton AU = (Q
Ũ
Y ,Σ, ξ, q0, Q
Ũ
Y ), where q0 is the initial Y -state
of Ũ and ξ : QŨY ×Σ→ QŨY is a partial function defined by: for any q ∈ QŨY , σ ∈ Σ, we
have (i) ξ(q, σ)=q if σ∈cŨy ∩ Σuo; (ii) ξ(q, σ)=hŨZY (hŨY Z(y, cŨy ), σ) if σ∈cŨy ∩ Σo; and
(iii) ξ(q, σ) is undefined if σ 6∈ cŨy . Then we can compute the controlled behavior by
L(SU/G) = L(AU×G), where “×” denotes the usual product composition operation
of automata; see, e.g., [12] (p. 78).
If L(SU/G) is a livelock language, then there exists an elementary livelock cycle
〈q1, σ1, . . . , σk−1, qk〉 in AU ×G such that ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1} : σi ∈Σo, since U only
contains deadlock-free Z-states. We call such a cycle a Critical Elementary Livelock
Cycle (CELC). In our problem, any CELC in a livelock of AU×G corresponds to the
presence of some elementary cycle in Ũ . Moreover, since a cycle in Ũ is obtained by
merging some terminal Y -state ym and its corresponding y0 in U , then for a CELC,
there exists some terminal Y -state in U that leads to it. We call such a terminal
Y -state an entrance Y -state of the CELC. More specifically, let 〈q1, σ1, . . . , σk−1, qk〉
be a CELC. Note that qi is in the form of (y
ni
i , xi). Then, there exists an observable








ymi+1,m 6= 0, where cŨynii is the unique control decision defined at y
ni
i in Ũ . In other
words, ymi+1 is a terminal Y -state of U , which is not in Ũ . Then y
m
i+1 is an entrance
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(c) L(SU0/G) = L(AU0 ×G)
Figure 3.3: Example of Steps 1 and 2.
Y -state of the CELC and we call xi+1 ∈ yi+1 a corresponding state in the entrance
Y -state. In Definition 3.3.1, we introduced the notion of live decision string for a state
pair (y, x), y ∈ QTY , x ∈ y in a BTS T . We say that a live decision string γ1γ2 . . . γn is
locally maximal for (y, x) if there does not exist another live decision string γ′1γ
′
2 . . . γ
′
n
for (y, x) in T such that ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : γi ⊆ γ′i and ∃j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : γj ⊂ γ′j.
Example 3.4.1. Consider the automaton G shown in Figure 3.1. An example
of UBTS is given in Figure 3.3(a); it is an unfolding of AESNBϕ (G). By merg-
ing state pairs ({3, 4}0, {3, 4}1) and ({5, 6}0, {5, 6}1) in U0 (connected by the dashed
lines), we get the corresponding EBTS Ũ0. The induced supervisor SU0 is realized by
the automaton AU0 shown in Figure 3.3(b). The language of the controlled system
L(SU0/G) = L(AU0×G) is given in Figure 3.3(c). By the properties of the NB-AES,
we know that SU0 is ϕ-enforcing and deadlock-free. However, we see that it is blocking.
In AU0 ×G, we see that 〈({3, 4}0, 4), c2, ({3, 4}0, 9), o1, ({1, 2}0, 2), o1, ({3, 4}0, 4)〉 is
a CELC, which is due to the presence of the cycle {3, 4}0 → {1, 2}0 → {3, 4}0 in Ũ0
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(we omit the Z-states in the cycle since they are uniquely determined). Therefore,
{3, 4}1 is an entrance Y -state of this CELC and 4 ∈ {3, 4} is a corresponding state
in it.
We are now ready to state our synthesis algorithm, which is formally presented
in Algorithm NB-SOLU. For the sake of readability, we decompose Algorithm NB-
SOLU into five steps that are mapped to the corresponding lines in the statement of
the algorithm.
Step 1: Generate an initial UBTS (lines 1-2): The goal of this step is
to initially generate an IS-based supervisor via building a UBTS from the NB-AES.
First, we set U0 to be the UBTS that only contains the initial state y
0
0 of the NB-AES
and call procedure EXPAND (lines 13-26). This procedure expands the initial state
and constructs a UBTS by a breadth-first search in the NB-AES. First, pick a locally
maximal control decision for y00; then, for the Z-state encountered, find all its Y -state
successors and pick one locally maximal control decision for each of them, and so
forth, until: (i) a terminal Z-state is reached; or (ii) a Y -state yn whose information
state component has already been visited is reached, i.e., n 6= 0. Note that, all the
states added by EXPAND are control states, since the integer components are always
greater than or equal to zero. Since the construction procedure stops once a Y -state
is repeated, the largest index for a Y -state in the UBTS at this step should be 1
and the UBTS induced supervisor is IS-based. Note that the language L(SU0/G) is a
maximal language, since we take locally maximal control decisions in the construction
procedure; however, it may be blocking in general.
Step 2: Detect livelock (lines 4-5): The goal of this step is to detect a livelock
(if one is present) and find a state where it can be properly broken. If L(SUi/G) is
livelock-free, then we stop the algorithm and return the current UBTS as the solution.
If not, we need to find one CELC causing livelock and a corresponding entrance Y -
state, as defined earlier.
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Algorithm 4: NB-SOLU)
input : AESNBϕ (G)
output: SUk
1 Set i← 0, QUiY ← {y00},M = 0;
2 EXPAND(Ui);
3 i← i+ 1, Ui ← Ui−1;
while L(SUi−1/G) is a livelock language do
4 find an entrance state yke ∈ Q
Ui
Y for one CELC and a corresponding
state xe ∈ ye that is also in the livelock.;
5 Find a locally maximal live decision string γ1γ2 . . . γn for (ye, xe) in the
NB-AES.;
6 From state yke , augment Ui with run γ1σ1 . . . σn−1γn and the Y and
Z-states reachable along its prefixes, where σj is defined in Def. 3.3.1.












where the values of yj and zj are determined by hZY and hY Z ,
respectively, by the definition of an EBTS and kj = M − j, for any
j = 1, . . . , 2n− 1.;
7 M ←M − 2n+ 1.;
8 EXPAND(Ui);
9 i← i+ 1, Ui ← Ui−1;
10 return SUi−1 ;
procedure Expand(U);
11 while ∃yn ∈ QUY such that CU(yn) = ∅ ∧ n = 0 or ∃zn ∈ QUZ such that
∃σ ∈ Γ(z) ∩ Σo : hZY (z, σ)! ∧ hUZY (zn, σ) is not defined (3.3)
do
12 for yn∈QUY such that CU(yn) = ∅ ∧ n = 0 do
13 Find a control decision γ ∈ CAESNBϕ (G)(y) in AES
NB
ϕ (G) such that
∀γ′ ∈ CAESNBϕ (G)(y) : γ 6⊂ γ
′;
14 Augment U with transition: yn
γ−→U zn
′
, where z = hY Z(y, γ) and
n′ = |{z̃ñ ∈ PreUZ(yn) : z̃ = z and ñ ≥ 0}|
15 for zn ∈ QUZ such that (3.3) holds do
16 for σ∈Γ(z)∩Σo satisfying (3.3) do
17 Augment U with transition: zn
σ−→U yn
′
, where y = hZY (z, σ) and
n′ = |{ỹñ ∈ PreUY (zn) : ỹ = y and ñ ≥ 0}|
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Step 3: Resolve livelock (lines 6-7): This step aims to resolve the livelock
found in Step 2. Specifically, we unfold the UBTS from an entrance Y -state of the
livelock by finding a live decision string in the NB-AES. The states added at this
step are transient states and we use a global variable M in Algorithm NB-SOLU
to remember how many transient states we have added to U . Consequently, all the
transient states in U have different (negative) integer components. Also, to achieve
maximality, all newly added control decisions are locally maximal.
Remark 3.4.1. To find such locally maximal live decision strings, one approach is to
first find an arbitrary live string and then sequentially replace each control decision
in it by a larger one, whenever feasible, from γ1 to γn. A formal algorithm for this
construction is given in the appendix.
Step 4: Complete the UBTS (line 8): After Step 3, the resulting transition
system may no longer be a UBTS. Thus, we need to complete Ui as a UBTS such
that we can again induce a supervisor from it. This step is implemented by calling
again the procedure EXPAND, which finds one control decision for each Y -state that
has no successors, and adds all observations for each Z-state that has some defined
observations (i.e., is not terminal).
Step 5: Iteration: Finally, we need to go back to Step 2 until the iteration
stops, i.e., until all livelocks have been resolved.
Example 3.4.2. Consider the automaton G and its NB-AES from Figure 3.1. Con-
sider the UBTS U0 and its induced language L(SU0/G) shown in Figure 3.3. We see
that U0 is a valid UBTS generated after Step 1, which ends up with the repeated
Y -states {3, 4}1 and {5, 6}1, but it induces a livelock solution. Consider the CEL-
C highlighted in Figure 3.3 as we have discussed in Example 3.4.1. In Step 2, we
find that ye = {3, 4}1 is an entrance Y -state of this livelock and return ({3, 4}1, 4).
For Step 3, one possible choice is to take control decision {c1, uc} at {3, 4}1, s-
ince state 4 will be able to reach marked state 10 via c1. Therefore, a transient
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(c) L(SU1/G) = L(AU1 ×G)
Figure 3.4:
Example of Steps 3, 4 and 5. Note that states in AU1 × G have been
renamed for simplicity.
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Z-state ({3, 4, 7, 10}, {c1, uc})−1 is added and the resulting BTS U ′1 is shown in Fig-
ure 3.4(a). However, in U ′1, the enabled observable event o1 is not defined at Z-state
({3, 4, 7, 10}, {c1, uc})−1. Thus, Step 4 will call procedure EXPAND again to com-
plete the UBTS by adding a new Y -state {1, 2}1 that can be reached by observing o1
into U ′1. Since {1, 2} already exists in the UBTS, we stop the procedure EXPAND and
get U1 shown in Figure 3.4(b) and its induced language L(SU1/G) is shown Figure
3.4(c). Since L(SU1/G) is livelock-free, we stop the synthesis procedure and return it
as a maximal controllable, observable, safe, and non-blocking solution.
Remark 3.4.2. In Figure 3.3(a), we could also select control decision {c2, uc} at state
{5, 6}0. It can be easily verified that this will induce a non-blocking and IS-based
solution. Thus we can stop the synthesis at Step 2 and return this solution. However,
as discussed earlier, the above situation may not always hold. This is why we chose
the non-IS-based solution to illustrate all the steps of Algorithm NB-SOLU.
3.4.2 Correctness of the Synthesis Algorithm
In this section, we show that (i) the synthesis algorithm presented in the previous
section converges in a finite number of iterations and (ii) the resulting solution is
maximal.
In the synthesis steps of Algorithm NB-SOLU, the supervisor should not only know
its current information state, but it also needs to remember the number of times the
current state has been visited. However, this does not tell us how much memory we
need to realize the supervisor. The following theorem reveals that the supervisor can
be represented in a finite structure, i.e., the resulting language is regular.
Theorem III.1. Algorithm NB-SOLU converges in a finite number of iterations.
Proof. Suppose that x ∈ yn is detected in AUi×G at Step 2, where x is a correspond-
ing state of an entrance Y -state yn, n ≥ 1 and i ≥ 1. This implies that there exists
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a CELC 〈(y0, x), σ1, . . . , σk, (y0, x)〉 in AUi ×G. We define the pair being resolved for
the CELC as the last state in the CELC before the final state (y0, x) such that (i) its
first component is y0; and (ii) it is entered by an observable event. More specifically,































kr−−−−−−→ (y0, x) (3.4)
where σjkj ∈ Σo, j = 1, . . . , r and (y
0, xr) is the pair being resolved. Note that, inside
of the CELC, cycle 〈y0, . . . , yn−1, y0〉 in AUi may be involved for r times. Figure 3.5
illustrates the notions of detected and resolved states in the context of the CELC.
In order to prove the theorem, it suffices to prove that any pair (y0, x), x ∈ y can
be resolved at most once in Step 3. To see this, let us first suppose that x ∈ yn was
detected in AUi ×G at Step 2, where n ≥ 1 and i ≥ 1. Let (y0, xr), xr ∈ y be the
corresponding pair being resolved. Note that xr and x need not necessarily be the
same state. Since Step 3 is executed after detecting x ∈ yn, the above CELC will be
broken and a path from x ∈ yn to a marked state is introduced. Formally, in AUi+1×G,
we know that f[AUi+1×G]((y
0, xr), σr1σ
r
2 . . . σ
r
kr




2 . . . σ
r
kr
t) ∈ QUi+1Y ×Xm, where f[AUi+1×G] denotes the
transition function of AUi+1 ×G. This path is also illustrated in Figure 3.5. In fact,
t can be the corresponding live path for the live decision string introduced at yn as
defined in Definition V.1.
Now, let us assume that after some iteration steps, xr ∈ y0 is resolved again for
a CELC in AUi+q ×G, q ≥ 2. This means that (y0, xr) is in a livelock of AUi+q ×G.
Moreover, we have already shown that there exists a string σr1σ
r
2 . . . σ
r
kr
t from (y0, xr)
to a marked state in AUi+1 ×G. Such a marked state is also reachable from (y0, xr)



















Figure 3.5: Conceptual illustration of the proof of Theorem III.1.
still reachable in Ui+q. More specifically, such a marked state can be reached from
(y0, xr) via the same string σr1σ
r
2 . . . σ
r
kr
t as above. Therefore, (y0, xr) cannot be in any
livelock, which gives us a contradiction. Thus we conclude that any pair (y, x), x ∈ y
can be resolved at most once in Step 3.








= |X|2|X|−1 gives an upper bound for the number of iterations.
Proposition 3.4.1. If the NB-AES has been constructed, then the running time of
Algorithm NB-SOLU is O([|X|32|X| + |Σ|]|X|22|X|+|Σ|).
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
Suppose that Algorithm NB-SOLU stops after n steps of iteration and returns
UBTS Un; then the induced supervisor SUn has the following properties.
Theorem III.2. SUn is a non-blocking supervisor that enforces ϕ.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem III.1 and the livelock-free stopping condition
in Step 2.
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Theorem III.3. SUn is maximal, i.e., for any non-blocking S
′ satisfying ϕ, we have
L(SUn/G) 6⊂ L(S ′/G).
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assume that L(SUn/G) is not max-
imal, i.e., ∃S ′ ∈ S(AESNBϕ (G)) such that S ′ is non-blocking and L(SUn/G) ⊂
L(S ′/G). This implies the following two facts1:
1. (∀s ∈ L(SUn/G))[SUn(s) ⊆ S ′(s)];
2. (∃t ∈ L(SUn/G))[SUn(t) ⊂ S ′(t)].
Let us consider the string t ∈ L(SUn/G) such that SUn(P (t)) ⊂ S ′(P (t)) and SUn(t′) =
S ′(t′), ∀t′ ∈ {P (t)} \ {P (t)}. Then we know that ISYSUn (P (t)) = IS
Y
S′(P (t)), and we
call this Y -state y. Then, for the control decision at y in SUn , i.e., SUn(P (t)), one of
the two following cases holds:
(i) SUn(P (t)) is a control decision returned by Step 1 or 4. By the construction rule,
we know that ∀γ′ ∈ CAESNBϕ (G)(y) : SUn(P (t)) 6⊂ γ
′. Since S ′ ∈ S(AESNBϕ (G)), by
Definition 2.4.2, we know that SUn(P (t)) ⊂ S ′(P (t)) cannot happen.
(ii) SUn(P (t)) is a control decision returned by Step 3. Suppose that SUn(P (t)) is in
a live control decision string γ1γ2 . . . γn and let w := ξ1σ1ξ2 . . . ξi−1σi−1ξn be the corre-
sponding live path as defined in Definition 3.3.1. We assume, without loss of general-
ity, that SUn(P (t)) = γ1, SUn(P (t)σ1) = γ2, . . . , SUn(P (t)σ1 . . . σn−1) = γn. Consider
another live control decision string γ′1γ
′





′(P (t)σ1 . . . σi−1), 1 ≤
i ≤ n. Such a live control decision string is well defined since L(SUn/G) ⊂ L(S ′/G)
and tw is also in L(S ′/G). By fact 2) above we know that γi ⊆ γ′i, i ≥ 2. Moreover,
we know that γ1 ⊂ γ′1. Thus, γ′1γ′2 . . . γ′n is strictly lager than γ1γ2 . . . γn, which con-
tradicts the fact that γ1γ2 . . . γn is locally maximal.
For each case, we obtain a contradiction. Thus, no more permissive supervisor exist-
s.
1Without loss of generality, we assume that the supervisors are irredundant.
73
Remark 3.4.3. The intuition behind the above proof is that it is impossible to con-
struct a supervisor that generates a language strictly larger than the one obtained by
the proposed algorithm, since we have taken either locally maximal control decisions
(case (i)) or locally maximal control decision strings (case (ii)). For the first case, it
is easy to see that the control decision SUn(P (t)) is locally maximal. For the second
case, it does not mean that we cannot find a single control decision γ′1 such that
γ1 ⊂ γ′1. However, if we do so, then γ′1γ2 . . . γn will not be a live decision string. The
intuition behind this phenomenon is that, in partially-observed DES, enabling more
events at the current state may result in more conservative decisions in the future.
In other words, the control decision string γ1γ2 . . . γn is locally maximal as a whole.
Recall that the NB-AES exists if there exists a non-empty solution to the problem
under consideration and Algorithm NB-SOLU always returns a maximal solution in a
finite number of iterations if the NB-AES exists. Consequently, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem III.4. NB-MPIEP is solvable if and only if AESNBϕ (G) exists.
Hence, the existence of the NB-AES provides the solvability condition for NB-
MPIEP.
3.4.3 Discussion
We have solved the maximally permissive supervisor synthesis problem for IS-
based property with prefix-closed and non-prefix-closed specification languages. It
was shown in [64] that when the plant can be fully observed, under the assumption
that H v G, the maximal permissive supervisor (for safety and non-blockingness)
can be repressed in the form of S : X → Γ. For the partially-observed prefix-closed
specification case, since the information state we defined captures all the information
we need to solve the problem, the supervisor for any IS-based property we synthe-
sized is in the form of S : I → Γ. For the non-prefix-closed specification case, we have
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shown that the information state is not sufficient anymore to carry all the informa-
tion we need for synthesis purposes; in this case, the “real” information state is the
information state originally defined augmented with an integer that represents the
number of times the current state has been visited. Thus, the maximally permissive
supervisor is in fact in the form of S : I × Z→ Γ.
3.5 Illustrative Example
We illustrate the synthesis algorithm of Section 3.4, Algorithm NB-SOLU, by an
illustrative example. In particular, this example shows that: (i) IS-based non-blocking
supervisors may not always exist in general; and (ii) a maximal solution can still be
obtained by using Algorithm NB-SOLU, even when other algorithm return empty
solutions.
System Model: Consider the following guideway problem: A town is divided into
two zones, zone 1 and zone 2, with single-way streets as shown in Figure 3.6. At
the top of the zones, there is a recycling station. Everyday, only one zone will send
a robot (r1 or r2) to clean up the streets. The robot sent by zone 1 can only move
counter-clockwise, i.e., move forward or turn left; the robot sent by zone 2 can only
move clockwise.
Control: There are two traffic lights, L1 and L2, close to the bottom intersection as
shown in the figure. The lights control the robots as follows: When L1 is red, if robot
r1 is at point a, then it must wait until the light turns green; if robot r2 is at point
c, then it can choose to wait there or turn right. The effect of L2 is analogous.
Sensing: There is a radar around the traffic lights that detects whether there is a
robot in region D, which is in front of each light, every time unit. However, the radar
cannot distinguish which zone the detected robot belongs to.
Specification: Since all streets are one-way streets, with legal directions shown in
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Figure 3.6: Example discussed in Section 3.5.
any traffic light, the robot from zone 1 could possibly violate this specification by
entering zone 2 through the points a, b, c and d. Clearly, if both L1 and L2 are kept
red, then the above specification can be satisfied trivially. However, in order for the
robot to be able to unload the trash it collected along the streets, we require that
the robot should always be able to enter region E. In summary, the goal for us is
to design a control policy for the traffic lights for one day’s operation based on the
radar information and such that the above requirements are satisfied.
The above problem can be modeled as a supervisory control problem under par-
tial observation. First, we use unobservable and uncontrollable events a1 and a2 to
represent the nondeterministic initial setting, since we do not know where the robot
starts from. Event o is used to model the event that the radar detects a robot in
region D, which is observable but not controllable. We use event c1 to represent that
there is a robot that crosses L1 (from the RHS to the LHS or from the LHS to the
RHS); this event is controllable but not observable. We define c2 analogously for the
control effect of L2. Events b1 and b2 represent that robots r1 and r2 unload their
trash, respectively; these events are unobservable and uncontrollable. The automaton
model G of this system is shown in Figure 3.7(a), in which states 9 and 10 are illegal
states.
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Figure 3.7: For G: Σc = {c1, c2},Σo = {o}, and states 9 and 10 are illegal.
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ure 3.7(b). By applying Algorithm NB-SOLU, we first obtain the initial UBTS U0
shown in Figure 3.7(c), which induces a livelock solution. Thus, we need to un-
fold from the entrance Y -state {3, 4}, which results in the UBTS U1 shown in Fig-
ure 3.7(d). UBTS U1 induces the controllable, observable, safe, and non-blocking
sublanguage L(Ũ1/G) shown in Figure 3.7(e). Moreover, this language is maximal.
This example, while simple, has important implications. First, note that the
solution obtained by Algorithm NB-SOLU is a non-IS-based solution, since it enables
c1 when state {3, 4} is visited for 2k + 1 times and it enables c2 when state {3, 4} is
visited for 2k times, k ∈ N. Moreover, we see that any fixed control decision at Y -state
{3, 4} will result in a livelock solution. This verifies our earlier assertion in Section 3.4
that IS-based solutions may not exist in general and that the unfolding steps of
Algorithm NB-SOLU are indeed needed. Second, for this problem, the supremal
controllable normal solution and the solutions obtained by using the methods in
[11,93] are all empty, even though a solution exists.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we solves the problem of synthesizing a non-blocking supervisor
for an IS-based property. This extends the results in Chapter II from the prefix-
closed case to the non-prefix-closed case. This results in a maximally permissive
non-blocking supervisor enforcing an IS-based property for a partially observed DES.
For this purpose, defined the Non-Blocking All enforcement Structure, another new
bipartite transition system obtained from the AES that takes non-blockingness into
account in addition to IS-based property. We provided a synthesis algorithm that
uses the NB-AES to synthesize the desired maximal, controllable, and observable
sublanguage. Finally, the convergence and maximality of this algorithm were proved.
This also solve the previously open problem of synthesizing a safe and non-blocking
supervisor, which is a special case of NB-MPIEP.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Implementation of the Algorithms
In this section, we discuss implementation issues related to the construction and
synthesis algorithms in the chapter. Specifically, we answer the following two ques-
tions.
1). How to verify the liveness property defined in Definition 3.3.1?
2). How to find a local maximal live decision string γ1γ2 . . . γn for any state pair
(y, x), y ∈ QTY , x ∈ y in a BTS T?
The key to these two problems is to build an automaton that contains all state
connections inside of each Y -or Z-state in the BTS. We call such an automaton the
Inter-Connected System (ICS).
Definition 3.7.1. (Inter-Connected System). Given a bipartite transition system T












• QICST ⊆ (QTY ×X) ∪ (QTZ ×X) is the set of states defined by
– (y, x) ∈ QICST if y ∈ QYT and x ∈ y,
– (z, x) ∈ QICST if z ∈ QZT and x ∈ I(z);
• ΣICST = Σ ∪ Γ is the set of events;
• δICST : QICST × Σ → QICST is the partial transition function defined by: for
any γ ∈ Γ, σ ∈ Σ
– δICS
T
((y, x1), γ) = (z, x2) if x1 = x2 and h
T
Y Z(y, γ) = z
– δICS
T
((z, x1), σ) = (z, x2) if δ(x1, σ) = x2 and σ ∈ Γ(z) ∩ Σuo
– δICS
T
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Figure 3.8:
Example of Inter-Connected System: The figure shows the corresponding
ICS for the automaton and its NB-AES shown in Figure 3.1. The blue
dashed rectangles and yellow dashed rectangles correspond to the Y -states
and the Z-states in the BTS, respectively.
• qICST0 = ({x0}, x0) is the initial state;
• QICSTm = {(z, x) ∈ QICS
T
: x ∈ Xm} is the set of marked states.
The ICS for an EBTS U is defined analogously.
Given an automaton, we say a state is co-accessible if there is a string from this
state to a marked state and we say an automaton is co-accessible if all states in it
are co-accessible; see, e.g., [12]. The following result says that to verify the liveness
a Y -state in T it suffices to verify the co-accessibility of its corresponding states in
ICST .
Proposition 3.7.1. Given a BTS T and its Inter-Connected System ICST , a Y -state
y in T is live if and only if for any state x ∈ y in it, (y, x) ∈ QICST is co-accessible
in ICST .
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Proof. (⇒) Since the Y -state y is live in T , then Definition 3.3.1 implies that for any
state x ∈ y in it, there exists a decision string γ1γ2 . . . γn such that under this decision
string there exists a string s = ξ1σ1ξ2 . . . σn−1ξn, ξi ∈ (Σuo∩γi)∗, σi ∈ Σo∩γi, such that
δ(x, s) ∈ Xm. By the definition of the ICS, such a string w = γiξ1σ1γ2 . . . σn−1γnξn
also exists in ICST and δICS
T
((y, x), w) ∈ QICSTm . Thus, (y, x) is co-accessible.
(⇐) By construction. Recall that ΣICST = Σo ∪Σuo ∪Γ. Then we first define two
natural projections PC : (Σo ∪Σuo ∪Γ)∗ → Γ∗ and PCO : (Σo ∪Σuo ∪Γ)∗ → (Σo ∪Γ)∗,
i.e., for any s ∈ (ΣICST )∗, PC(s) is of the form γ1γ2γ3 . . . , γi ∈ Γ and PCO(s) is of the
form γ1σ1γ2σ2 . . . , γi ∈ Γ, σi ∈ Σo.
Since for any x ∈ y, (y, x) is co-accessible in ICST , we can find a string t =
e1e2 . . . em ∈ (ΣICS
T
)∗ such that δICS
T
((y, x), t) ∈ QICSTm . By Definition 3.3.1, it is
clear that PC(t) is a live decision string for (y, x). Consequently, y is live in T .
Corollary 3.7.1. Given a BTS T , all Y -states in T are live if and only ICST is
co-accessible.
In the construction algorithm of the NB-AES, we need to check whether or not
there exists a Y -state in a BTS that is not live. By Corollary 3.7.1, this suf-
fices to check the co-accessibility of the ICST . Specifically, we need to first build
ICSAESϕ(G), the ICS of the AES; then, for each iteration step, we check whether or
not ICSAESϕ(G) is co-accessible. If a state (y, x) ∈ QICSAESϕ(G) is not co-accessible,
then (i) the Y -state y in AESϕ(G) should be removed and; (ii) the set of states
{(y′, x′) ∈ QICSAESϕ(G) : y′ = y} should also be removed from the ICS; we then repeat
until the ICS is accessible.
Now we are ready to show how to find a locally maximal live decision string
γ̃1γ̃2 . . . γ̃n for (y, x), as needed in Algorithm NB-SOLU. In the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.7.1, we have already shown how to find a live decision string for a given (y, x).
For computation simplicity, we can find a shortest live path s in ICST such that
δICS
T
((y, x), s) ∈ QICSTm and get the shortest live decision string γ1γ2 . . . γn = PC(s)
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and its corresponding run γ1σ1γ2σ2 . . . σn−1γn = PCO(s). To find a locally maximal
decision string, our approach is simply to sequentially replace each single control de-
cision in PC(s) by one that is as large as possible. Specifically, we start from γ1 and
see whether or not we can pick a control decision γ′1 in CAESNBϕ (G)(y) such that: (i)
γ1 ⊂ γ′1 and (ii) γ′1γ2 . . . γn is also a live decision string. If γ′1 satisfies these two
conditions, then we replace γ1 by γ
′
1, and try to grow γ
′
1, and so forth, until we can-
not find a larger one. Then we proceed to analyze γ2, γ3, . . . by the same manner.
The only difference is that when we try to replace γi by γ
′
i, we just need to consider
the existence of the decision string γ′iγi+1 . . . γn and do not need to consider those
that have already been grown to be maximal (namely, γ1 to γi−1). This procedure is
formally described by Algorithm L-MAX.
Algorithm 5: L-MAX
input : y and γ1σ1γ2σ2 . . . σn−1γn
output: γ̃1γ̃2 . . . γ̃n
1 i← 1, y1 ← y;
2 while i ≤ n do
3 for γ′ ∈ CAESNBϕ (G)(yi) do
4 if γi ⊂ γ′ and the run γ′σiγi+1σi+1 . . . σn−1γn is defined at yi in the
NB-AES then
5 γ̃i ← γ′;
else
6 γ̃i ← γi;
7 yi+1 ← hZY (hY Z(yi, γ̃i), σi);
8 i← i+ 1;
3.7.2 Complexity Analysis
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1.
Proof. First, we need to build AESϕ(G), which can be done in O(|X||Σ|2|X|+|Σc|) as
discussed earlier. For each Z-state in AESϕ(G), checking whether it is deadlock-free
can be done inO(|X||Σ|). Thus, line 2 in the algorithm can be done inO(|X||Σ|2|X|+|Σc|).
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(2|Σc| + 2|Σc||Σ|)|X|2|X|−1 number of transitions; we denote these upper bounds by
n1 and n2, respectively. Thus, the construction of ICS
AESϕ(G) can be done in
O(|X||Σ|2|X|+|Σc|−1).
Since we need to remove at least one Y -state for each iteration step, the whole
iteration procedure will execute at most |QAESY | number of times, which is bounded by
2|X|. For each iteration step, by Corollary 3.7.1, we need to verify the co-accessability
of ICSAESϕ(G), which can be done in O(n1 + n2); then we search through the state
space of QAESY and remove the Y -states that have no successors and the corresponding
states in the ICS, which is still bounded by O(n1 + n2). Thus, the total complexity
for the construction of the NB-AES is O(|X||Σ|22|X|+|Σc|−1).
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Proof. First, in Algorithm NB-SOLU, the EBTS Ũi contains at most |X|222|X| Y -
states and the same number of Z-states. Therefore, in the ICS ICSŨi , there are at
most n′1 := |X|322|X|+1 states and n′2 := |X|322|X|+|Σ|+1 transitions. The above n′1 and
n′2 are estimated based on the fact that the largest superscript of any control Y -state
y is |y| and for each iteration we introduce at most |X|2|X| transient Y -states. Now
we are ready to analyze the complexity of the synthesis algorithm.
First, let us consider the complexity of each single iteration step (Step 2-4):




• Step 3 involves two problems:







2) the problem of growing this path to be maximal. For this problem, since
such path has a length N = |X|2|X|+1, in the worst case, then it requires a




• Step 4 calls the procedure EXPAND, which can be done in O(|Σo|2|X|+|Σc| +
|Σo||X|2|X|).
Thus, the complexity of a single iteration step is of O([|X|32|X| + |Σ|]2|X|+|Σ|).
In the convergence proof of Algorithm NB-SOLU, we have already shown that
|X|2|X|−1 provides an upper bound for the number of iterations. Combining this




The Range Control Problem
4.1 Introduction
So far, we have solved the problem of synthesizing a non-blocking supervisor that
enforces an IS-based property. As we have shown in Chapters II and III, the supervisor
synthesis problem may not have a unique supremal solution in general. Instead, there
may be several incomparable locally maximal solutions. Our approach “randomly”
selects one solution among these locally maximal solution. In particular, the maximal
solution obtained is a particular type of maximal solutions, namely, greedy maximal
solutions. In a greedy maximal solution, the supervisor tries to enable as many events
as possible at each control decision instant. However, no consideration is given to
including some minimum required behavior in these solutions, a meaningful criterion
when choosing among locally maximal solutions. This phenomenon is illustrated in
Figure 4.1.
In order to resolve the above issue, we consider in this chapter a generalized su-
pervisor synthesis problem called the Maximally-Permissive Range Control Problem.
In this problem, we not only want to find a locally maximal supervisor, but we also
require that the synthesized maximal supervisor contain a given behavior. Namely,
we want to find a “meaningful” maximal solution. However, instead of investigating








Let G be the system, K be the legal behavior and R be the required
behavior. Max1 and Max2 are two incomparable maximal solutions in
K, i.e., Max1 6⊂ Max2 and Max2 6⊂ Max1. However, Max1 contains
the required behavior R, while Max2 does not contain any string in R.
ters II and III, in this chapter, we only restrict our attention to safety requirement
and not do consider the issue of blockingness. More specifically, we consider two
specification languages: the safety specification language K, which is also referred
to as the upper bound language, and a prefix-closed lower bound language R ⊆ K,
which models the required behavior that the closed-loop system must achieve. To
solve the range control problem, we present a new synthesis algorithm based on the
two notions of AES and Control Simulation Relation (CSR). Although we only con-
sider prefix-closed languages, i.e., nonblockingness is not considered, to the best of
our knowledge, the maximally-permissive range control problem we solve herein was
an open problem even in this case.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we formulate the maximally-
permissive range control problem that we solve in the chapter. In Section 4.3, we
first reveal that the notion of strict sub-automaton plays an important role in the
range control problem. Then we provide a new constructive approach for computing
the infimal supervisor. In Section 4.4, we define the notion of Control Simulation
Relation (CSR). The CSR is used to resolve the future dependency issue, which is the
main difficulty in handling maximal permissiveness with the lower bound constraint.
In Section 4.5, we first provide an algorithm to synthesize a maximally-permissive
supervisor that contains the required behavior. Then we prove the correctness of
the proposed algorithm. We also discuss how to verify whether a given supervisor is
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maximal or not. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 4.6.
4.2 Problem Formulation
In this chapter, we consider a generalized supervisory control synthesis problem,
called the range control problem, where we have two prefix-closed specification lan-
guages:
• the upper bound language K=K⊆L(G); and
• the lower bound language R=R⊆K.
The upper bound K describes the legal behavior of the system and we say that a
supervisor S is safe if L(S/G) ⊆K. Recall that the maximal safe supervisor may
not be unique and there may be two incomparable maximal supervisors S1 and S2
such that L(S1/G) 6⊂ L(S2/G) and L(S2/G) 6⊂ L(S1/G). In order to synthesize a
“meaningful” maximal solution, we introduce a lower bound language R describing
the required behavior that the closed-loop system must achieve. Examples of using
the range requirement to impose design constraints can be found in [38, 52, 53, 58].
We now formulate the Maximally-Permissive Range Control Problem (MPRCP):
Problem 4. (Maximally-Permissive Range Control Problem). Given system G, low-
er bound language R and upper bound language K, synthesize a maximally-permissive
supervisor S∗ : P (L(G))→ Γ such that R ⊆ L(S∗/G) ⊆ K.
Remark 4.2.1. We make several comments on MPRCP.
1. First, under the assumption that Σc ⊆ Σo, MPRCP has a unique solution, if one
exists. Specifically, it suffices to compute the supremal controllable and normal
sub-language of K, denoted by K↑CN , and test whether or not R ⊆ K↑CN . If
so, then K↑CN is the unique supremal solution; otherwise, there does not exist a
solution to MPRCP.
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2. Second, when the lower bound requirement is relaxed, i.e., R = {ε}, MPRCP is
solved by the results in Chapter II, since safety is an IS-based property and it
suffices to synthesize an arbitrary maximal supervisor without taking the lower
bound into consideration.
3. Finally, if the maximal permissiveness requirement is relaxed, then we just need to
compute infimal controllable and observable language of R, denoted by R↓CO, and
test whether or not R↓CO ⊆ K. If so, then R↓CO is the most conservative solution;
otherwise, MPRCP does not have a solution.
Hence, many existing problems solved in the literature are special cases of MPRCP.
However, to the best of our knowledge, MPRCP is still open for the general case,
which is clearly more difficult than the above special cases.
Throughout this chapter, we use K = (XK ,Σ, δK , x0,K) to denote the automaton
generating K, and use R = (XR,Σ, δR, x0,R) to denote the automaton generating
R. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, as we have discussed
in Section 2.7.1. we assume that K @ G. Therefore, in the chapter, we consider
IS-based property ϕsafe, which is essentially the upper bound (safety) requirement,
defined by:
∀i ∈ 2X : ϕsafe(i) = 1⇔ i ⊆ XK (4.1)
Since ϕsafe is uniquely defined based on K, hereafter, we also write the AESAESϕsafe(G)
as AES(G,K).
4.3 Synthesis of the Infimal Supervisor
Although there does not exist a unique maximal safe supervisor in general, there
does exist a unique infimal supervisor that contains the lower bound. Here we explain
the intuition of the existence of the infimal supervisor; formal proof can be found
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in [68]. Let S1 and S2 be two safe supervisors. Then we can always construct a new
supervisor S12 defined by ∀s ∈ Σ∗o : S12(s) = S1(s) ∩ S2(s). It is easy to show that
L(S12/G) = L(S1/G) ∩ L(S2/G). Therefore, if both S1 and S2 achieves R, then S12
also achieves R. Hence, there always exists a unique infimal supervisor that achieves
R. We denote by R↓CO the closed-loop behavior of the unique infimal supervisor; this
language is also referred to as the infimal prefix-closed controllable and observable
super-language of R [68].
The goal of this section is to synthesize a BTS TR that realizes the infimal super-
visor achieving the lower bound, i.e., L(STR/G) = R↓CO. This infimal supervisor will
be further used as a basis to solve MPRCP. Before we start this section, we introduce
the following monotonicity properties of the AES defined for the safety specification.
Let y ∈ QAESY be a Y -state in AES(G,K). We say that a control decision γ ∈ Γ is
safe at y if γ ∈ CAES(G,K)(y). Then we have the following monotonicity properties.
Proposition 4.3.1. (Monotonicity Properties [109]).
1. Any control decision that is safe at Y -state y1 is also safe at Y -state y2 ⊆ y1.
2. If control decision γ1 is safe at Y -state y, then so is any control decision γ2 ⊆ γ1.
Note that the monotonicity properties only hold for safety specification in the
prefix-closed case. In general, they do not hold for other IS-based property in the
non-prefix-closed case.
4.3.1 The Role of Strict Sub-automaton
Recall that the goal of this section is to construct a BTS TR such that L(STR/G) =
R↓CO. Although we know that R↓CO is shown to be a regular language, this fact in
itself is not sufficient for the purpose of synthesis. Specifically, we are interested
in whether or not R↓CO can be achieved by an IS-based supervisor which can be
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Figure 4.2: For G, we have Σo = {a, b} and Σc = {c1, c2}.
the right state space in order to realize the infimal supervisor that contains R. One
may conjecture that there always exists a BTS TR such that L(STR/G) = R↓CO
when R↓CO ⊆ K. However, this is not true in general as illustrated by the following
example.
Example 4.3.1. Let us consider the system G shown in Fig. 4.2(a). The upper
bound automaton K is obtained by removing the single illegal state 7 from G. Then
the AES for safety specification AES(G,K) is shown in Fig. 4.2(b). We consider a
lower bound language R which is generated by automaton R shown in Fig. 4.2(c). One
can easily check that any IS-based supervisor S does not contain R. This is because
events a and b lead to the same Y -state {3, 4} in any BTS and control decision S(a)
and S(b) should always be the same in any IS-based supervisor S. However, we can
find a non-IS-based supervisor S ′, which enables c1 after observing a and enables c2
after observing b, such that R↓CO = L(S ′/G).
The reason why there may not exist an IS-based supervisor that achieves R↓CO
is explained as follows. Suppose that R is a sub-automaton of K such that we can
90
match the state space of R with the state space of K. Let s ∈ P (R) be an observable
string in P (s) and define
yR(s) = {x ∈ XR : ∃t ∈ R ∩ (Σ∗Σo ∪ {ε}) s.t. δR(x0, t) = x ∧ P (t) = s}
as the “information state” of R reached upon observing s, which is analogous to a
Y -state in a BTS. Then it is possible that two different “information states” under the
original control strategy can be merged as a single information state under the new
(more permissive) control strategy. As a consequence, information is lost by using
the newly reached information state. We call this phenomenon information merge.
For example, for the lower bound automaton R shown in Fig. 4.2(c), we have that
yR(a) = {3} and yR(b) = {4}. In order to achieve R, in addition to enabling events a
and b initially, we also need to enable event u, since it is uncontrollable. Then the two
different “information states” {3} and {4} in R, which are reached by observing a
and b, respectively, will be merged as a single state {3, 4}. However, simply knowing
state {3, 4} is not sufficient for making control decisions in order to contain the lower
bound behavior. To find an IS-based solution, state {3, 4} has to be split into two
states: one is reached by observing a and the other is reached by observing b.
Let y ∈ 2X be an information state and suppose that XR ⊆ X. We denote by
y|R the restriction of y to the state space of R, i.e., y|R = {x ∈ XR : x ∈ y}. The
following result says that the state merging phenomenon described above will not
occur when R is a strict sub-automaton of K.
Proposition 4.3.2. Assume that R @ K @ G. Then for any supervisor S such that
R ⊆ L(S/G), we have that
1. ∀s∈P (R) : ISYS (s)|R = yR(s);
2. ∀s, t∈P (R) : yR(s) 6=yR(t)⇒ISYS (s) 6=ISYS (t).
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Proof. First, we show the first statement. By the definition of ISYS , we have that
ISYS (s) ={x ∈ X : ∃w ∈ {ε} ∪ (L(S/G) ∩ Σ∗Σo) s.t. δ(x0, w) = x ∧ P (w) = s}
={x ∈ XR : ∃w ∈ {ε} ∪ (R ∩ Σ∗Σo) s.t. δR(x0, w) = x ∧ P (w) = s} ∪ AG\R
=yR(s) ∪ AG\R
where AG\R = {x∈X : ∃w∈{ε}∪((L(S/G)\R)∩Σ∗Σo) s.t. δ(x0, w)=x∧P (w)=s} ⊆
X \ XR. The reason why we know that AG\R does not contain a state in R is that
we have already assumed that R is a strict sub-automaton of both K and G. Hence,
any string that goes outside of R will not go back to the state space of R. Therefore,
we have that
ISYS (s)|R = yR(s)|R ∪ AG\R|R = yR(s) (4.2)
Next, we show the second statement. Let us consider two arbitrary strings s, t ∈
P (L(R)) such that yR(s) 6= yR(t). By the first statement, s we can write ISYS (s) in
the form of ISYS (s) = yR(s) ∪ AG\R, where AG\R ⊆ X \XR. Similarly, we can write
ISYS (t) in the form of IS
Y
S (t) = yR(t) ∪ BG\R, where BG\R ⊆ X \ XR. Note that
yR(s), yR(t) ⊆ XR. Therefore, since yR(s) 6= yR(t), we have ISYS (s) 6= ISYS (t).
Remark 4.3.1. The intuition of the above result is explained as follows. Since R @ K,
any newly introduced string, namely a string in L(K) \ L(R), must lead to a state
in XK \ XR. Therefore, if strings s and t lead to two distinct “information states”
y1 = yR(s) and y2 = yR(t) under the original supervisor, respectively, then the newly
reached Y -states y′1 and y
′
2 under a supervisor whose closed-loop language contains
R must be in the form of y′1 = y1 ∪ ŷ1 and y′2 = y2 ∪ ŷ2, respectively, where ŷ1, ŷ2 ⊆
XK \XR. Since y1 6= y2, we know that y′1 6= y′2.
Based on Lemma 4.3.2, we make the following assumption hereafter.
Assumption 1: R @ K @ G.
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Remark 4.3.2. Note that the above assumption is without loss of generality: if R,
K and G do not satisfy this assumption, then we can always refine the state spaces
of R, K and G by constructing new automata R′, K′ and G′ such that 1) R′ @
K′ @ G′; and 2) L(R) = L(R′), L(K) = L(K′) and L(G) = L(G′). Such a pre-
processing algorithm can be found in the Appendix, which generalizes the procedure
in [18] from two automata to three automata. In the worst case, the refined system
model G′ contains |X| × (|XK |+ 1)× (|XR|+ 1) states. Therefore, only polynomial-
space refinement is needed to make Assumption 1 hold; this is different from the
state-partition-automata-based refinement in the literature, which has an exponential
complexity. This assumption and Proposition 4.3.2 play important roles in this paper;
they will also be involved several times in our later development. Finally, we remark
that the reason why we assume that K @ G and the reason why we assume that
R@K are different. We assume that K@G to guarantee that legality of strings is
fully captured by states. We assume that R@K to make sure that the information
merge phenomenon will not occur.
Example 4.3.2. Let us return to Example 4.3.1. The original automata R and K
in Figs. 4.2(c) and 4.2(a) do not satisfy the assumption that R @ K. Therefore, we
refine the state spaces of K and G and obtain new automata K′ and G′ shown in
Fig. 4.3(a) such that R @ K′ @ G′, L(K) = L(K′) and L(G) = L(G′). The AES
AES(G′,K′) for the refined system is shown in Fig. 4.3(b). We see that the original
state {3, 4} in AES(G,K) splits into two states {3′, 4} and {3, 4′} in AES(G′).
4.3.2 Synthesis Algorithm
We are now ready to show how to compute the supervisor that achieves R↓CO. In
particular, we show that such a supervisor can be realized by a BTS.
93
{ }
    �       
1 
2 4 3 
5 6 7 
        �  




  3 ’ 4 ’ 




, ′, ′ , { }{ }{ }
{ }, ′ , { }
, ′
, , {  },  { } { }
{  }
, , , ,, , { }
, , { }′,
′, , { }
, ′, , ′ , { }′, , , ′ , { }
    { } , , ,{ }{ }
(a) K′ and G′
{ } 
1 
2 4 3 












2 4 3 












3 ’ 4 ’ 
5 6 ’ ’ 
𝑐2  𝑐1  
𝑐2  𝑐1  
𝑐2  𝑐1  
1  




{  } 





3,4′ , { } 
3,4′  
1,2 , {  } 
𝑎, 𝑏  
{𝑐1} 
{ } 
{  } 
1  
3,4,5 , 3,4  
3,4 , { } 
1,2 , {𝑐1} 3′, 4  
3′, 4 , { } 
3,4′, 5,5′ , {𝑐1} 3′, 4,6,6′ , {𝑐2} 
1 4 3 5 6 







In Fig. 4.3(a), G′ is the entire automaton and K′ is obtained by removing
illegal state 7 from G′.
Let y ⊆ XR be a set of states in R. We first define the following set of events
ΓR(y) := {σ ∈ Σ : ∃x ∈ y,∃s ∈ Σ∗uo s.t. δR(x, sσ)!}
The following result reveals that ΓR(y) is indeed the set of events that should be
enabled at y in order to achieve R.
Proposition 4.3.3. For any supervisor S : P (L(G))→ Γ, R ⊆ L(S/G), if and only
if,
∀s ∈ P (L(S/G)) : ISYS (s)|R 6= ∅ ⇒ ΓR(ISYS (s)|R) ⊆ S(s).
Proof. (⇒) By contradiction. Assume that ∃s ∈ P (L(S/G)) such that ISYS (s)|R 6= ∅
and ΓR(IS
Y
S (s)|R) 6⊆ S(s). Let σ be an event in ΓR(ISYS (s)|R)\S(s). By the definition
of ΓR(·), we have that ∃x ∈ ISYS (s)|R,∃w ∈ Σ∗uo s.t. δR(x,wσ)!. Since x ∈ ISYS (s)|R,
there exists a string t ∈ R such that P (t) = s and δR(x0, t) = x, which implies that
twσ ∈ R. However, since σ /∈ S(s) = S(P (tw)), we know that twσ /∈ L(S/G). This
contradicts the fact that R ⊆ L(S/G).
(⇐) It suffices to show that, t ∈ R ⇒ t ∈ L(S/G). We proceed by induction on
the length of the projection of t.
Induction Basis: For string t ∈ R such that |P (t)| = 0, we know that t ∈
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(ΓR({x0}) ∩ Σuo)∗ ∩ R. Since ΓR({x0}) = ΓR(ISYS (ε)) ⊆ S(ε), we know that t ∈
(S(ε) ∩ Σuo)∗ ∩ L(G) ⊆ L(S/G), i.e., the induction basis holds.
Induction Hypothesis: Assume that t ∈ R ⇒ t ∈ L(S/G) for any t such that
|P (t)| = k.
Induction Step: To prove the induction step, we show that vσw ∈ R ⇒ vσw ∈
L(S/G), where |P (v)| = k, σ ∈ Σo and w ∈ Σ∗uo. Note that any string t such that
|P (t)| = k+ 1 can be written in the above form. Let v′ ∈ {v} be the longest prefix of
v that ends up with an observable event and let x = δ(x0, v
′) ∈ XR. Since |P (v′)| =
|P (v)| = k, by the induction hypothesis, we know that v′ ∈ L(S/G). Therefore,
x = δ(x0, v
′) ∈ ISYS (P (v)). By the definition of ΓR(·), all events between v′ and vσ
are in ΓR({x}). Since x ∈ XR and x ∈ ISYS (P (v)), we know that ISYS (P (v))|R 6= ∅.
Therefore, ΓR({x}) ⊆ S(P (v)), which implies that vσ ∈ L(S/G). Similarly, let
x′ = δ(x0, vσ) ∈ XR. We know that x′ ∈ ISYS (P (v)σ) and ISYS (P (v)σ)|R 6= ∅. Again,
since ΓR({x′}) ⊆ S(P (v)σ), we have sσw ∈ L(S/G). This completes the induction
step.
Now, we are ready to present the algorithm that constructs the BTS TR such
that L(STR/G) = R↓CO. Specifically, the BTS TR is constructed by a depth-first
search as follows. Initially, we start from the initial Y -state y0. For each Y -state
y encountered, if y|R 6= ∅, we choose ΓR(y|R) ∪ Σuc as the unique control decision
defined at y. Note that y|R 6= ∅ implies that y can be reached by some string in P (R),
i.e., the supervisor is not sure whether or not the system has already gone outside the
lower bound language R. Therefore, we choose ΓR(y|R) ∪Σuc as the control decision
since it is the smallest control decision we need in order to contain R. If y|R = ∅,
then we know for sure that the system has already gone outside R and we just choose
Σuc as the control decision, i.e., all controllable events are disabled. To summarize
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the above rule, in the constructed BTS TR, we have that
∀y ∈ QTRY : cTR(y) =
 ΓR(y|R) ∪ Σuc if y|R 6= ∅Σuc if y|R = ∅
Based on the above discussion, Algorithm INF-SYNT is proposed to constructed TR.
Namely, for each Y -state encountered, we choose one control decision based on the
above-discussed rules; for each Z-state encountered, we need to consider all observable
events that are feasible. Such a depth-first search is implemented by the recursive
procedure termed DoDFS. Moreover, Algorithm INF-SYNT returns “No Solution”
when a Y -state y such that ΓR(y|R) ∪ Σuc 6∈ CAES(G,K)(y) is encountered. This
implies that achieving the lower bound R will violate the safety specification, either
immediately or unavoidably in the future. In this case, MPRCP has no solution. Of
course, R↓CO always exists, but our focus herein is on solving MPRCP. (If the focus
is solely on the computation of R↓CO, then it suffices to set K = L(G) in the above
development.)
Next, we first illustrate Algorithm INF-SYNT by an example. Then we prove its
correctness.
Example 4.3.3. Let us return to the running example in this chapter. The input
parameters of Algorithm INF-SYNT are R and AES(G′,K′) shown in Figs. 4.2(c)
and 4.3(b), respectively. We start procedure DoDFS from the initial Y -state y0 = {1}.
Since {1}|R 6= ∅, we take control decision ΓR({1}) ∪ Σuc = Σuc (which is depicted
as {} in Fig. 4.3(b) for simplicity since all events in it are uncontrollable events),
and move to the successor Z-state ({1, 2}, {}). Then we need to consider all possible
event occurrences from this Z-state. If a occurs, then Y -state {3, 4′} is reached. Since
{3, 4′}|R = {3} 6= ∅, we need to take control decision ΓR({3}) ∪ Σuc = {c1} ∪ Σuc.
Similarly, we need to take control decision {c2} ∪ Σuc if Y -state {3′, 4} is reached.




input : R and AES(G,K).
output: TR.






4 if y|R 6= ∅ then
5 if ΓR(y|R) ∪ Σuc ∈ CAES(G,K)(y) then
6 Act← ΓR(y|R) ∪ Σuc;
else
7 return “No Solution”;
else
8 Act← Σuc;
9 z ← hY Z(y, Act);
10 Add transition y
Act−−→ z to hTRY Z ;
11 if z /∈ QTRZ then
12 QTRZ ← Q
TR
Z ∪ {z};
13 for σ ∈ Σo : hZY (z, σ)! do
14 y′ ← hZY (z, σ);
15 Add transition z
σ−→ y′ to hTRZY ;
16 if y′ /∈ QTRY then




We now prove the correctness of Algorithm INF-SYNT. First, we show that,
under the assumption that R @ K @ G, Algorithm INF-SYNT will never return “No
Solution” when a solution exists.
Theorem IV.1. Algorithm INF-SYNT returns “No Solution” if and only if R↓CO 6⊆
K.
Proof. (⇐) By contraposition. Suppose that Algorithm INF-SYNT returns BTS TR.
Since STR is an IS-based supervisor, we know that, for any s ∈ P (L(STR/G)) such
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that ISYSTR








Therefore, by Proposition 4.3.3, we know thatR ⊆ L(STR/G). Then, by the definition
of ↓CO, we know that R↓CO ⊆ L(STR/G). Moreover, STR is safe since it is an AES-
included supervisor, i.e., L(STR/G) ⊆ K. Overall, we know that R↓CO ⊆ K.
(⇒) By contradiction. Assume that Algorithm INF-SYNT returns “No Solution”
but R↓CO ⊆ K. Therefore, we know that there exists a supervisor S such that
R ⊆ L(S/G) ⊆ K and there exists a sequence in the form of
y0
ΓR(y0|R)∪Σuc−−−−−−−−→ z1
σ1−→ y1 . . .
ΓR(yn−1|R)∪Σuc−−−−−−−−−−→ zn
σn−→ yn (4.3)
in procedure DoDFS in Algorithm INF-SYNT such that
1. ∀i = 0, . . . , n : yi|R 6= ∅; and
2. ∀i = 0, . . . , n− 1 : ΓR(yi|R) ∪ Σuc ∈ CAES(G,K)(yi); and
3. ΓR(yn|R) ∪ Σuc 6∈ CAES(G,K)(yn).
Next, we show by induction that, for any i = 0, . . . , n, we have that
yi ⊆ ISYS (σ1 . . . σi) and yi|R = ISYS (σ1 . . . σi)|R (4.4)
Clearly, the induction basis holds for i = 0, since y0 = IS
Y
S (ε). Let us assume that
Equation (4.4) holds for i = k; we need to show that Equation (4.4) holds for i = k+1.
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By definition, we know that
yk+1
={x∈X : ∃x′∈yk,∃w∈((ΓR(yk|R) ∪ Σuc) ∩ Σuo)∗ s.t. δ(x′, wσk+1) = x} (4.5)
={x∈XR : ∃x′∈yk|R,∃w∈((ΓR(yk|R) ∪ Σuc) ∩ Σuo)∗ s.t. δR(x′, wσk+1) = x} ∪ AG\R
(4.6)
where AG\R ⊆ X \ XR. Note that the second equality is a consequence of the as-
sumption that R @ G, since any string that leaves the state space of R must lead to
a state in X \XR. Similarly, we can write
ISYS (σ1 . . . σk+1)
={x∈X : ∃x′∈ISYS (σ1 . . . σk),∃w∈(S(σ1 . . . σk) ∩ Σuo)∗ s.t. δ(x′, wσk+1)=x} (4.7)
={x∈XR : ∃x′∈ISYS (σ1 . . . σk)|R,∃w∈(S(σ1 . . . σk)∩Σuo)∗ s.t. δR(x′, wσk+1) = x}
∪BG\R (4.8)
={x∈XR : ∃x′∈ISYS (σ1 . . . σk)|R,∃w∈((ΓR(ISYS (σ1 . . . σk)|R) ∪ Σuc)∩Σuo)∗
s.t. δR(x
′, wσk+1) = x} ∪BG\R (4.9)
={x∈XR : ∃x′∈yk|R,∃w∈((ΓR(yk|R) ∪ Σuc) ∩ Σuo)∗ s.t. δR(x′, wσk+1) = x} ∪BG\R
(4.10)
where BG\R ⊆ X \XR. Note that the second equality also comes from the assumption
that R @ G. The third equality comes from the fact that, for any string
w ∈ ((S(σ1 . . . σk) \ ΓR(ISYS (σ1 . . . σk)|R)) ∩ Σuo)∗
δR(x
′, wσk+1) is not defined for x
′ ∈ XR. The last equality follows from the induction
hypothesis that yk|R = ISYS (σ1 . . . σk)|R.
Therefore, by Equations (4.6) and (4.10), we know that yk+1|R = ISYS (σ1 . . . σk+1)|R.
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Moreover, by the induction hypothesis and Proposition 4.3.3, we know
ΓR(yk|R) = ΓR(ISYS (σ . . . σk)|R) ⊆ S(σ1 . . . σk). (4.11)
Since Equation (4.4) holds for i = k, combing Equations (4.5), (4.7) and (4.11)
together, we know that yk+1 ⊆ ISYS (σ1 . . . σkσk+1), i.e., Equation (4.4) holds for
i = k + 1.
Now, let us go back to the sequence in Equation (4.3). Since L(S/G) ⊆ K, we
know that
S(σ1 . . . σn) ∈ CAES(G,K)(ISYS (σ1 . . . σn)) (4.12)
We have proved that yn ⊆ ISYS (σ1 . . . σn). Then, by Proposition 4.3.1, we know
that S(σ1 . . . σn) ∈ CAES(G,K)(yn). Moreover, since we have shown that ΓR(yn|R) =
ΓR(IS
Y
S (σ1 . . . σn)|R), by Proposition 4.3.3, we know that ΓR(yn|R)∪Σuc ⊆ S(σ1 . . . σn).
Then, by Proposition 4.3.1 again, we know that ΓR(yn|R) ∪ Σuc ∈ CAES(G,K)(yn).
However, this is a contradiction.
Remark 4.3.3. Note that the “only if” part of the proof of the above theorem relies on
the assumption that R @ K. In fact, if R @ G does not hold, then Algorithm INF-
SYNT may return “No Solution” even whenR↓CO ⊆ K. For example, let us use R and
AES(G,K) shown in Figs. 4.2(c) and 4.2(b), respectively, as the input parameters
of Algorithm INF-SYNT, where R is a sub-automaton of G but not a strict sub-
automaton. Then, after taking control decision Σuc at the initial state and observing
event a, we will reach Y -state {3, 4}. Since ΓR({3, 4}) ∪ Σuc = {c1, c2} ∪ Σuc /∈
CAES(G,K)({3, 4}), Algorithm INF-SYNT returns “No Solution”. However, a solution
does exist since R↓CO ⊆ K. This highlights our earlier assertion that the strict
sub-automaton condition plays an important role in the synthesis algorithm.
The next result reveals that the BTS returned by Algorithm INF-SYNT is indeed
the one that realizes the infimal safe supervisor.
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Theorem IV.2. Suppose that Algorithm INF-SYNT returns BTS TR. Then we have
L(STR/G) = R↓CO.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Let us assume that L(STR/G) 6= R↓CO. In
the proof of Theorem IV.1, we have shown that R ⊆ L(STR/G). Then we know that
there exists a supervisor S ′ such that R ⊆ L(S ′/G) ⊂ L(STR/G). Therefore, we
know that there exists an observable string s ∈ P (L(S ′/G)) ∩ P (L(STR/G)) such
that S ′(s) ⊂ STR(s). For string s, we have the following two cases.
Case 1: ISYSTR
(s)|R = ∅.




However, it contradicts the fact that S ′(s) ⊂ STR(s), since S ′(s) always contains Σuc.
Case 2: ISYSTR
(s)|R 6= ∅.




Since R ⊆ L(S ′/G), by Proposition 4.3.3, we know that ΓR(ISYS′(s)|R) ∪ Σuc ⊆
S ′(s). Moreover, by Proposition 4.3.2, we know that ISYS′(s)|R = ISYSTR (s)|R = yR(s),
since both S ′ and STR contains R. This implies that ΓR(IS
Y
STR
(s)|R) ∪ Σuc ⊆ S ′(s).
However, this also contradicts the fact that S ′(s) ⊂ STR(s).
Remark 4.3.4. Although language-based formulas for R↓CO were provided in [44,68],
the formula-based approach does not tell us what is the right structure to realize the
supervisor achieving R↓CO. To the best of our knowledge, no constructive approach
for R↓CO, in terms of supervisor, is provided in the literature. The results in this
section not only provide a direct constructive approach to compute the infimal prefix-
closed controllable and observable super-language, but also provides a new structural
property about the corresponding infimal supervisor. In particular, we show that,
under the assumption that R @ K @ G, 2X is sufficient enough to represent this
supervisor, i.e., the infimal supervisor can be written in the form of STR : 2
X → Γ.
Moreover, the BTS TR that realizes the infimal supervisor will be further used as a
basis to synthesize a maximal safe supervisor containing R. This will be discussed in
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Section 4.5.
4.4 Control Simulation Relation
In this section, we first discuss the difficulty that arises in solving the range control
problem. Then we define the notion of Control Simulation Relation (CSR) as the tool
to overcome the difficulty.
4.4.1 Difficulty in Handling the Lower Bound
In order to synthesize a maximal supervisor, the general idea is to guarantee by
construction that the control decision made by the supervisor at each instant cannot
be improved any further. However, this is not an easy task. Suppose that y ∈ QAESY
is a Y -state in the AES; we know that any control decision in CAES(G,K)(y) is a safe
control decision. Therefore, if there is no lower bound requirement and one is only
interested in the safety upper bound K, then we can simply pick a “greedy maximal”
decision from CAES(G,K)(y). This is essentially the strategy we use in Chapters II
and II; a similar strategy (but not based on the AES) is used in [4]. However,
the following example illustrates how to choose a control decision from CAES(G,K)(y)
becomes much more complicated when the lower bound specification R has to be
considered.
Example 4.4.1. Let us consider automata R,K and G shown in Figs. 4.4(a), 4.4(b)
and 4.4(c), respectively, where we have R @ K @ G. Let Σc = {v, w} and Σo =
{a, b, v}. The AES AES(G,K) is shown in Fig. 4.4(d). By applying Algorithm INF-
SYNT, we construct BTS TR that realizes the infimal supervisor achieving R
↓CO; TR
is shown in Fig. 4.4(e). Initially, TR chooses to disable w, i.e., cTR(y0) = {}, while
enabling w is also a safe choice at the initial Y -state according to the AES. It seems
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Figure 4.4: For R, K and G: Σc = {v, w} and Σo = {a, b, v}.
{w}, then upon the occurrence of a, we can only choose to disable v, since we are not
sure whether the current state is 3 or 4. This leads to failure to contain the lower
bound behavior (av)∗, where we need to enable v after observing a. Therefore, the
lower bound behavior can only be achieved by choosing {} at the beginning rather than
choosing {w}, which is greedy maximal.
The above example illustrates the following issue. In some scenario, enabling more
events is not a good choice, since it may introduce more information uncertainty.
Consequently, to maintain safety, the control decision may become more conservative
in the future due to this information uncertainty. This may make the lower bound
behavior unachievable. More problematically, we do not know whether or not enabling
an event will lead to failure to contain the lower bound behavior, unless we get stuck
at some instant in the future, e.g., after observing event o in the previous example.
Moreover, we do not know a priori, when or whether or not this phenomenon will
103
occur in the future. In other words, whether or not a decision defined in the AES is a
“good” control decision depends on its effects in the future. This future dependency
is the fundamental difficulty of the range control problem and it is in fact the essential
difference between MPRCP and the standard supervisor synthesis problem without
a lower bound requirement.
4.4.2 Definition of the CSR
In order to resolve the future dependency issue discussed above, we propose a
simulation-like relation, called the Control Simulation Relation (CSR), to pre-process
this future dependency and transform it to local information. The key idea is to
compare two BTSs T1 and T2 and to establish a formal relationship between states
in T1 and states in T2. The formal definition of the CSR is presented next.
Definition 4.4.1. (Control Simulation Relation). Let T1 and T2 be two BTSs. A






Z ) is said to be a control simulation
relation from T1 to T2 if the following conditions hold:
1. (y0, y0) ∈ Φ;
2. For every (y1, y2) ∈ ΦY we have that:
y1
γ1−→T1 z1 in T1 implies the existence of y2
γ2−→T2 z2 in T2 such that γ1 ⊆ γ2 and
(z1, z2) ∈ ΦZ;
3. For every (z1, z2) ∈ ΦZ we have that:
z1
σ−→T1 y1 in T1 implies the existence of z2
σ−→T2 y2 in T2 such that (y1, y2) ∈ ΦY .
We say that T1 is control-simulated by T2 or that T2 control-simulates T1, denoted by
T1  T2, if there exists a control simulation relation from T1 to T2.
Intuitively, the control simulation relation captures whether or not T2 is able to
match an arbitrary control decision made by T1 by either taking the same control
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decision or a control decision that is strictly larger than the one made by T1 and
maintain this ability for all possible future behaviors.
Given two BTSs T1 and T2, a relevant question is whether or not there exists a


















as follows. For any Φ = ΦY ∪ ΦZ ⊆ (QT1Y ×Q
T2




Z ), we have that
1. (y1, y2) ∈ F (ΦY ) if (y1, y2) ∈ ΦY and for any transition y1
γ1−→T1 z1 in T1, there
exists y2
γ2−→T2 z2 in T2 such that γ1 ⊆ γ2 and (z1, z2) ∈ ΦZ .
2. (z1, z2) ∈ F (ΦZ) if (z1, z2) ∈ ΦZ and for any transition z1
σ−→T1 y1 in T1, there
exists z2
σ−→T2 y2 in T2 such that (y1, y2) ∈ ΦY .
The following results reveal how operator F is related to the CSR.
Proposition 4.4.1. The operator F has following properties:
1. Φ is a control simulation relation from T1 to T2, if and only if, Φ ⊆ F (Φ) and
(y0, y0) ∈ Φ;
2. Φ1 ⊆ Φ2 ⇒ F (Φ1) ⊆ F (Φ2).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof in [91] for the standard simulation relation.
Suppose that Φ = ΦY ∪ ΦZ is a control simulation relation from T1 to T2. Let
(y1, y2) ∈ ΦY . Since (∀y1
γ1−→T1 z1)(∃y2
γ2−→T2 z2)[γ1 ⊆ γ2 ∧ (z1, z2) ∈ ΦZ ], we know
that (y1, y2) ∈ F (Φ). Similarly, for any (z1, z2) ∈ ΦZ , since (∀z1
σ−→T1 y1)(∃z2
σ−→T2
y2)[(y1, y2) ∈ ΦY ], we know that (z1, z2) ∈ F (ΦZ). Therefore, we conclude that
Φ ⊆ F (Φ) and (y0, y0) ∈ Φ.
Suppose that Φ ⊆ F (Φ) and (y0, y0) ∈ Φ. Clearly, the first requirement in Def-
inition 4.4.1 is satisfied. For any (y1, y2) ∈ ΦY , we know that the first requirement
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in the definition of F implies that second requirement in Definition 4.4.1. Similarly,
for any (z1, z2) ∈ ΦZ , we know that the second requirement in the definition of F
implies that third requirement in Definition 4.4.1. Hence, we know that Φ is a control
simulation relation from T1 to T2.
Now we prove the second property. For any (y1, y2) ∈ F (Φ1) ∩ (QT1Y × Q
T2
Y ), we
have that (y1, y2) ∈ Φ1 and
(∀y1
γ1−→T1 z1)(∃y2
γ2−→T2 z2)[γ1⊆γ2 ∧ (z1, z2)∈Φ1] (4.13)
Since Φ1 ⊆ Φ2, we know that (y1, y2), (z1, z2) ∈ Φ2. Therefore, Equation (4.13) implies
that (y1, y2) ∈ F (Φ2). Similarly, for any (z1, z2) ∈ F (Φ1)∩ (QT1Z ×Q
T2
Z ), we have that
(z1, z2) ∈ Φ1 and (∀z1
σ−→T1 y1)(∃z2
σ−→T2 y2)[(y1, y2) ∈ Φ1]. Since Φ1 ⊆ Φ2, we also
know that (y1, y2), (z1, z2) ∈ Φ2. Therefore, (z1, z2) ∈ F (Φ2).
The above results have the following implications. First, since Φ ⊆ F (Φ) for
any CSR Φ, we know that the maximal relation Φ is a fixed-point of operator F ,
i.e., F (Φ) = Φ. Note that F (Φ) ⊆ Φ always holds. By the second property in
Proposition 4.4.1, we know that F is monotone. Therefore, by Tarski’s fixed-point
theorem [94], we know that the supremal fixed-point of F , denoted by Φ∗(T1, T2),
exists and it can be computed as follows









In other words, Φ∗(T1, T2) is a maximal control simulation relation from T1 to T2 if
(y0, y0) ∈ Φ∗(T1, T2). Otherwise, T1 6 T2 if (y0, y0) 6∈ Φ∗(T1, T2). This is similar to the
standard simulation relation; see, e.g., [91]. Note that the limit in Equation (4.14)







Example 4.4.2. We consider again the AES AES(G,K) and BTS TR shown in
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Figs. 4.4(e) and 4.4(d), respectively. We compute the maximal CSR between TR and





Z ×QAESZ . Then we have
Φ∗Y = {({1}, {1}), ({3}, {3}))}
Φ∗Z = {(({1}, {}), ({1}, {})), (({3}, {v}), ({3}, {v})), (({3}, {v}), ({3, 5}, {v, w}))}
The reason why ({3}, {3, 4}) /∈ Φ∗Y is that {v} is defined at {3} in TR but there is
no decision containing {v} defined at {3, 4} in the AES. Consequently, we know that
(({1}, {}), ({1, 2}, {w})) /∈ Φ∗Z, where ({1}, {}) and ({1, 2}, {w}) are the predecessor
Z-states that enter {3} and {3, 5} with the same event a, respectively.
4.4.3 Properties of the CSR
Hereafter, we present properties of the CSR that will be used later.
The first result reveals that the CSR indeed captures whether or not any possible
behavior from a state in a BTS can be matched by another BTS from some different
state.
Proposition 4.4.2. Let T1 and T2 be two complete BTSs and z1 ∈ QT1Z and z′1 ∈ Q
T2
Z
be two Z-states in T1 and T2, respectively. Then (z1, z
′




γ1−→ . . . γn−1−−−→ zn−1
σn−→ yn
γn−→ zn (4.15)
in T1, there exists a sequence
z′1
σ1−→ y′1




in T2, such that γi ⊆ γ′i,∀i ≥ 0.
Proof. The “only if” part is straightforward. For a sequence in Equation (4.15), we
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can always construct a sequence in Equation (4.16) by choosing γ′i for each i ≥ 0 such
that γi ⊆ γ′i and (hY Z(yi, γi), hY Z(y′i, γ′i)) ∈ Φ∗(T1, T2). The definition of the CSR
guarantees the existence of such γ′i at each y
′
i encountered.
Next, we show the “if part” by contraposition. Suppose that (z1, z
′
1) 6∈ Φ∗(T1, T2).
Then, by Equation (4.14), either there exists an event σ1 ∈ Σo : hZY (z1, σ1)! but σ1 ∈
Σo : hZY (z1, σ1)¬!, where “¬!” means “is not defined”; or there exists Φ1 ⊃ Φ∗(T1, T2)
such that (z1, z
′
1) ∈ Φ1 but
(∃σ1 ∈ Σo)[(y1, y′1) 6∈ Φ1] (4.17)
where y1 = hZY (z1, σ1) and y
′
1 = hZY (z
′
1, σ1).
For the first case, we know immediately that there exists a sequence z1
σ1−→ y1
γ1−→ z2
in T1, where γ1 is an arbitrary control decision in CT1(y1), such that there does not
exist a sequence z′1
σ1−→ y′1
γ′1−→ z′2 in T2 satisfying γ1 ⊆ γ′1. Hereafter, we consider the
case where Equation (4.17) holds. Again, by Equation (4.14), (y1, y
′
1) 6∈ Φ1 implies
that either
(∃γ1 ∈ CT1(y1))(∀γ′1 ∈ CT2(y′1))[γ1 6⊆ γ′1] (4.18)
or there exists Φ2 ⊃ Φ1 such that (y1, y′1) ∈ Φ2 but
(∃γ1 ∈ CT1(y1)(∀γ′1 ∈ CT2(y′1) : γ1 ⊆ γ′1)[(z2, z′2) 6∈ Φ2] (4.19)
where z2 = hY Z(y1, γ1) and z
′





Suppose that Equation (4.18) holds, then we also know immediately that there
exists a sequence z1
σ1−→ y1
γ1−→ z2 in T1, such that there does not exist a sequence
z′1
σ1−→ y′1
γ′1−→ z′2 in T2 satisfying γ1 ⊆ γ′1. Suppose that Equation (4.19) holds. Let
γ1 ∈ CT1(y1) be a control decision satisfying Equation (4.19) and let γ′1 ∈ CT2(y′1)
be an arbitrary control decision such that γ1 ⊆ γ′1. Note that γ1 ⊆ γ′1 implies
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2, σ)!. Since (z2, z
′
2) /∈ Φ2, by Equation (4.14),
∃Φ3 ⊃ Φ2 such that (z2, z′2) ∈ Φ3 but
(∃σ2 ∈ Σo)[(y2, y′2) 6∈ Φ3] (4.20)
where y2 = hZY (z2, σ2) and y
′
2 = hZY (z
′
2, σ2).
By iteratively applying the above arguments, suppose that, for some m ≥ 1, we
have that
(∃γm ∈ CT1(ym))(∀γ′m ∈ CT2(y′m))[γm 6⊆ γ′m] (4.21)
and
(∀1 ≤ i ≤ m)(∃Φ2i−1 ⊃ Φ2i−2 : (zi, z′i) ∈ Φ2i−1)(∃σi ∈ Σo :)[(yi, y′i) 6∈ Φ2i−1] (4.22)
where yi = hZY (zi, σi), y
′
i = hZY (z
′
i, σi) and Φ0 = Φ
∗(T1, T2); and
(∀1≤ i≤m− 1)(∃Φ2i⊃Φ2i−1 : (yi, y′i)∈Φ2i)(∃γi∈CT1(yi))
(∀γ′i ∈ CT2(y′i) : γi ⊆ γ′i)[(zi+1, z′i+1) 6∈ Φ2i] (4.23)
where zi+1 = hY Z(yi, γi) and z
′




i). In particular, Equations (4.21),
(4.22), and (4.23) are the generalizations of Equations (4.18), (4.20) and (4.19), re-
spectively. Then we know that there exists a sequence z1
σ1−→ y1
γ1−→ . . . γm−1−−−→ zm−1
σm−→
ym
γm−→ zm in T1 such that, for any sequence z′1
σ1−→ y′1




in T2, if γi ⊆ γ′i, i = 0, . . . ,m − 1, then there does not exist a control decision
γ′m ∈ CT2(y′m) such that γm ⊆ γ′m. This completes the contrapositive proof.
Note that, since Φ1 ⊂ Φ2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Φ2m is strictly increasing, such a m always








Z ), which is the largest possible
relation. Suppose that for any i < m, there exists Φ2i ⊃ Φ2i−1 such that (yi, y′i) ∈ Φ2i
but (∃γi ∈ CT1(yi))(∀γ′i ∈ CT2(y′i) : γi ⊆ γ′i)[(zi+1, z′i+1) 6∈ Φ2i] Then for Φ2m, it must
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be (∃γm ∈ CT1(ym))(∀γ′m ∈ CT2(y′m))[γm 6⊆ γ′m] since there does not exist a relation
that is larger than Φ2m anymore.
The next result reveals the relationship between the CSR and the closed-loop
behavior of the system.
Proposition 4.4.3. Let T1 and T2 be two deterministic BTSs. Then L(ST1/G) ⊆
L(ST2/G), if and only if, T1  T2.
Proof. (⇒) By contraposition. Suppose that T1 6 T2, which means that (y0, y0) /∈
Φ∗(T1, T2). Therefore, either (i) cT1(y0) 6⊆ cT2(y0); or (ii) (z11 , z21) /∈ Φ∗(T1, T2), where
zi1 = hY Z(y0, cTi(y0)), i = 1, 2. If case (i) holds, then we know immediately that
L(ST1/G) 6⊆ L(ST2/G), since ST1(ε) = cT1(y0) 6⊆ cT2(y0) = ST2(ε). If case (ii) holds,
then by Proposition 4.4.2, there exists a string σ1 . . . σn ∈ P (L(ST1/G)) such that
ST1(σ1 . . . σi) ⊆ ST2(σ1 . . . σi),∀i = 1, . . . , n − 1 but ST1(σ . . . σn) 6⊆ ST2(σ . . . σn).
Therefore, we still have that L(ST1/G) 6⊆ L(ST2/G).
(⇐) By contraposition. Suppose that L(ST1/G) 6⊆ L(ST2/G). Then we know that
there exists σ1 . . . σn ∈ P (L(ST1/G)) such that ST1(σ1 . . . σn−1) ⊆ ST2(σ1 . . . σn−1) but
ST1(σ1 . . . σn) 6⊆ ST2(σ1 . . . σn). Since T1 is deterministic, the above string σ1 . . . σn








where γ1i = ST1(σ1 . . . σi) is the unique control decision defined at y
1
i . However, there








in T2 such that γ
1
i ⊆ γ2i ,∀i = 1, . . . , n, since the control decision from each y2i in T2 is
uniquely defined and the only control decision defined at y2n, i.e., ST2(σ1 . . . σn), does
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not contain γ1n = ST1(σ1 . . . σn).
The last result reveals that the CSR is transitive.
Proposition 4.4.4. Let T1, T2 and T3 be three BTSs such that T1  T2 and T2  T3.
For i = 1, 2, 3, let yi ∈ QTiY and γi ∈ CTi(yi) be a Y -state in Ti and a control decision
defined at this state, respectively. Then
[(z1, z2) ∈ Φ∗(T1, T2) ∧ (z2, z3) ∈ Φ∗(T2, T3)]⇒ [(z1, z3) ∈ Φ∗(T1, T3)]
where zi = hY Z(yi, γi), i = 1, 2, 3.
Proof. Let z1
σ1−→ y11
γ11−→ . . .
γ1n−1−−−→ z1n−1
σn−→ y1n
γ1n−→ z1n be an arbitrary sequence in
T1. Since (z1, z2) ∈ Φ∗(T1, T2), by Proposition 4.4.2, there exists a sequence z2
σ1−→
y21
γ21−→ . . .
γ2n−1−−−→ z2n−1
σn−→ y2n
γ2n−→ z2n in T2 such that γ1i ⊆ γ2i ,∀i = 1, . . . , n. Similarly,






γ3n−→ z3n in T3 such that γ2i ⊆ γ3i ,∀i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore,
(z1, z3) ∈ Φ∗(T1, T3) by Proposition 4.4.2.
4.5 Synthesis of a Maximally-Permissive Supervisor
In this section, we first present the main synthesis algorithm that solves MPRCP.
Then we prove its correctness.
4.5.1 Synthesis Algorithm
As we discussed earlier, to synthesize a maximally permissive supervisor contain-
ing R, we need to consider some information in the future. Fortunately, such future
information has been transformed to local information by the CSR. The idea of the
synthesis algorithm is as follows. First, we construct BTS TR that includes the infimal
supervisor STR achieving R
↓CO. Then we compute the maximal CSR between BTS
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TR and the AES AES(G,K). Next, we construct a new BTS, denoted by T ∗, such
that TR  T ∗, by using a depth-first search procedure. Specifically, suppose that y
is a Y -state in T ∗ at which we need to choose a control decision. First, this control
decision should be chosen from CAES(G,K)(y) in order to guarantee safety. In order
to take care of the lower bound behavior, we need to make sure that this control
decision preserves the CSR. The reason why we consider the CSR between TR and
AES(G,K) is that TR realizes the infimal supervisor containing R; namely, any BTS
whose induced supervisor contains R should “simulate” the behavior of TR.
In order to formalize the above idea, let y ∈ QAESY be a Y -state in the AES and
ŷ ∈ QTRY be a Y -state that “tracks” y in TR such that y|R, ŷ|R 6= ∅. (How ŷ “tracks”
y will be clear later.) We denote by Φ∗R := Φ
∗(TR,AES(G,K)) the maximal CSR
from TR to AES(G,K). Then we define
Ξ(y, ŷ) :=
γ ∈ Γ : γ∈CAES(G,K)(y) and γ⊇cTR(ŷ) and(hY Z(ŷ, cTR(ŷ)), hY Z(y, γ)) ∈ Φ∗R

Set Ξ(y, ŷ) will be the key in the synthesis algorithm. Intuitively, γ ∈ Ξ(y, ŷ) is a
control decision such that:
1. It is safe at y, i.e., γ ∈ CAES(G,K)(y); and
2. It contains the corresponding control decision made by STR at ŷ, i.e., cTR(ŷ); and
3. Any behavior that can occur from the corresponding Y -state ŷ in TR can still occur
from y in the AES by taking γ.
We are now ready to present the main synthesis algorithm, which is formal-
ly presented in Algorithm MAX-RANGE. Let us explain how it works. Initially,
we construct TR and compute the maximal CSR Φ
∗(TR,AES(G,K)) from TR to
AES(G,K). Then we construct a new deterministic BTS T ∗ by a depth-first search
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as follows. Initially, we start from the initial Y -state y0. We pick one control deci-
sion from the AES for each Y -state encountered (how this control decision is picked
will be specified soon) and pick all observations for each Z-state encountered. This
depth-first search is implemented by recursive procedure DoDFS in Algorithm MAX-
RANGE, which traverses the reachable state space of T ∗. Moreover, during the
construction BTS of T ∗, we use TR to track the sequence that reaches the Y - or Z-
state in T ∗. Specifically, whenever T ∗ moves from a Y -state y to a Z-state z (line 10),
we need to move from Y -state ŷ to its (unique) successor Z-state ẑ in TR (line 12).
Similarly, whenever T ∗ moves from a Z-state z to a Y -state y via observable event
σ (line 18), we need to move from Z-state ẑ to a successor Y -state ŷ in TR through
the same observable event σ (line 20). In other words, Y -state ŷ in TR essentially
“tracks” Y -state y in the AES or in T ∗, since they are always reached by sequences
that have the same projected string. Note that we use TR to track T
∗ only when the
current Y -state y encountered in T ∗ satisfies y|R 6= ∅. Whenever y|R = ∅, then we
just set ŷ = ∅ (line 21). This means that we know for sure that the string is already
outside of L(R).
Now it still remains to discuss how to choose the control decision at each Y -state
in T ∗. To this end, we need to consider two cases for each Y -state y encountered:
1) Suppose that y|R 6= ∅; this means that y must be reached by a sequence y0
γ1σ1...γnσn−−−−−−→
y such that the projected string in this sequence is in P (R), i.e., σ1 . . . σn ∈ P (R).
Then we know that there exists a sequence in TR that “tracks” the above sequence,
which means that ŷ 6= ∅. In this case, we choose a locally maximal decision in Ξ(y, ŷ),
since we still need to be able to match any behavior in R in the future. This case is
implemented by line 8 of Algorithm MAX-RANGE.
2) Suppose that y|R = ∅; this means that y must be reached by a sequence y0
γ1σ1...γnσn−−−−−−→
y such that σ1 . . . σn /∈ P (R). This also implies that ŷ = ∅. Then we simply chose
a locally maximal decision in CAES(G,K)(y), since we know for sure that the string
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is already outside of L(R). This case is implemented by line 9 of Algorithm MAX-
RANGE.
We illustrate Algorithm MAX-RANGE in the next example.
Example 4.5.1. Let us return to the system we have considered in Example 4.4.1.
The inputs are BTS TR that includes the infimal supervisor and the AES AES(G,K),
which are shown in Figs. 4.4(e) and 4.4(d), respectively. We first start procedure
DoDFS from the pair of initial Y -states, i.e., y = ŷ = y0 = {1}. Since (({1}, {}),
({1, 2}, {w})) /∈ Φ∗R, we know that Ξ({1}, {1}) = {∅}. Therefore, the only control
decision we can choose is {} and we have z = ẑ = hY Z(y, {}) = ({1}, {}). Then upon
observing o, we reach new Y -states y = ŷ = {3}. This time we have Ξ({3}, {3}) =
{{w}, {v, w}}, since ({3}, {v}) is related to both ({3}, {v}) and ({3, 5}, {v, w}). There-
fore, we choose {v, w} at state {3} in T ∗. Then we move to z = ({3, 5}, {v, w}) and
ẑ = ({3}, {v}).
Now, from Z-state ({3, 5}, {v, w}), if event v occurs, T ∗ moves to Y -state y =
{1}, which has already been visited. If event b occurs, T ∗ moves to Y -state y =
{6}. However, TR cannot track this move since b is not defined at ẑ = ({3}, {v})
in TR. Therefore, we set ŷ = ∅, which means that the string is already outside of
R. Therefore, for Y -state {6}, we just choose a locally maximal control decision in
CAES(G,K)({6}), i.e., {w}, and move to z = ({5, 6}, {w}) and ẑ = ∅. Finally, by
observing b again, T ∗ moves back to Y -state {6} that has been visited. This completes
the depth-first search and returns the deterministic BTS T ∗ shown in Fig. 4.5(a),
which includes a supervisor ST ∗ such that R ⊆ L(ST ∗/G) ⊆ K, where L(ST ∗/G) is
shown in Fig. 4.5(b). (We will prove later that this supervisor is indeed maximal.)
Remark 4.5.1. One can verify that the language shown in Fig. 4.5(c) is a maximal
controllable and observable sub-language of K. In fact, this solution is obtained
by using the strategies proposed in [4], i.e., we pick a locally maximal decision in
CAES(G),K(y) for each Y -state y and disregard the lower bound requirement. However,
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Algorithm 7: MAX-RANGE
input : R and AES(G,K).
output: T ∗.
1 TR ←INF-SYNT(R,AES(G,K)) ;
2 Φ∗R ← Φ∗(TR,AES(G,K)) ;
3 QT
∗
Y ← {y0}, QT
∗
Z ← ∅;
4 DoDFS(y0, y0, T
∗);
5 return T ∗;
6 procedure DoDFS(y, ŷ, T ∗);
7 if y|R 6= ∅ then
8 Find a locally maximal element Act in Ξ(y, ŷ), i.e.,
∀γ ∈ Ξ(y, ŷ) : Act 6⊂ γ;
else
9 Find a locally maximal element Act in CAES(G,K)(y), i.e.,
∀γ∈CAES(G,K) : Act 6⊂γ;
10 z ← hY Z(y, Act);
11 if ŷ 6= ∅ then
12 ẑ ← hY Z(ŷ, cTR(ŷ));
else
13 ẑ ← ∅;
14 Add transition y
Act−−→ z to hT ∗Y Z ;






17 for σ ∈ Σo : hZY (z, σ)! do
18 y′ ← hZY (z, σ);
19 if ẑ 6= ∅ and hZY (ẑ, σ)! then
20 ŷ′ ← hZY (ẑ, σ);
else
21 ŷ′ ← ∅;
22 Add transition z
σ−→ y′ to hT ∗ZY ;






25 DoDFS(y′, ŷ′, T ∗);
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this solution does not fully contain R although it is maximal.
Note that, given arbitrary Y -states y and ŷ, set Ξ(y, ŷ) may be empty. For
example, in Fig. 4.4, if we take y = {3, 4} and ŷ = {3}, the we know that Ξ(y, ŷ} = ∅,
since cTR(ŷ) = {v} but no control decision defined at y in the AES contains {v}.
If such a scenario occurs, then Algorithm MAX-RANGE may get stuck before it
correctly returns T ∗. However, the following result reveals that Ξ(y, ŷ) is always non-
empty for any Y -states y and ŷ encountered in Algorithm MAX-RANGE, i.e., the
control decision Act in line 8 of Algorithm MAX-RANGE is always well-defined.
Proposition 4.5.1. For any Y -state y reached in procedure DoDFS, if ŷ 6= ∅, then
Ξ(y, ŷ) 6= ∅. Moreover, y|R = ŷ|R.
Proof. We prove by induction on the length of the sequence that reaches y in proce-
dure DoDFS.
Induction Basis: The induction basis holds, since for the initial state, we have
that y0|R = y0, i.e., cTR(y0|R) ∈ Ξ(y0, y0).




σ1−→ y1 . . .
γn−1−−−→ zn
σn−→ yn
in procedure DoDFS, if ŷn 6= ∅, we have Ξ(yn, ŷn) 6= ∅ and yn|R = ŷn|R.
Induction Step: To proceed, we show that, for any Y -state reached by sequence
in the form of
y0
γ0−→ z1





in procedure DoDFS, if ŷn+1 6= ∅, we have that Ξ(yn+1, ŷn+1) 6= ∅ and yn+1|R =










First, we show that yn+1|R = ŷn+1|R. To see this, we write
yn+1|R
={x∈X : ∃x′∈yn,∃wσn+1∈L(G) s.t. w∈(γn∩Σuo)∗ and δ(x′, wσn+1)=x}|R
={x∈XR : ∃x′∈yn|R,∃wσn+1∈L(R) s.t. w∈(γn∩Σuo)∗ and δ(x′, wσn+1)=x}|R
={x∈XR : ∃x′∈ ŷn|R,∃wσn+1∈L(R) s.t. w∈(cTR(ŷn)∩Σuo)∗ and δ(x′, wσn+1)=x}|R
={x∈X : ∃x′∈ ŷn, ∃wσn+1∈L(G) s.t. w∈(cTR(ŷn)∩Σuo)∗ and δ(x′, wσn+1)=x}|R
=ŷn+1|R
The second and the fourth equalities follow from the assumption that R @ G, since
any string that leaves the state space of R must lead to a state in X \XR. The third
equality follows from the induction hypothesis that yn|R = ŷn|R and the fact that
ΓR(ŷn|R) = cTR(ŷn) ⊆ γn.
Next, we show that Ξ(yn+1, ŷn+1) 6= ∅. According to line 8 in Algorithm MAX-
RANGE, we know that γn is chosen such that γn ∈ Ξ(yn, ŷn). Note that Ξ(yn, ŷn) is
non-empty by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, we know that cTR(ŷn) ⊆ γn and
(hY Z(ŷn, cTR(ŷn)), hY Z(yn, γn)) ∈ Φ∗R
This implies that (ŷn+1, yn+1) ∈ Φ∗R. Therefore, we know that for any sequence
ŷn+1
cTR (ŷn+1)−−−−−→ ẑn+2
σn+2−−→ . . .
cTR (ŷn+k−1)−−−−−−−→ ẑn+k
in TR, there exists a sequence
yn+1
γn+1−−−→ zn+2
σn+2−−−→ . . . γn+k−1−−−−→ zn+k
in the AES, such that cTR(ŷn+i) ⊆ γn+i,∀i ≥ 1. Hence, γn+1 ∈ CAES(G,K)(yn+1) and
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(ẑn+2, zn+2) ∈ Φ∗R, i.e.,
(hY Z(ŷn+1, cTR(ŷn+1)), hY Z(yn+1, γn+1)) ∈ Φ∗R (4.26)
Therefore, we know that γn+1 ∈ Ξ(yn+1, ŷn+1), i.e., Ξ(yn+1, ŷn+1) is also non-empty.
This completes the induction step.
Remark 4.5.2. Let us discuss the complexity of Algorithm MAX-RANGE. First, we
need to construct the AES, which takes O(|X||Σ|2|X|+|Σ|). Then Algorithm INF-
SYNT takes O(|X||Σ|2|X|) to construct TR, since there are at most 2|X| Y -states and
the same number of Z-states in TR; for each Y -state it takes O(|X||Σ|) to determine
its control decision and for each Z-state it takes O(|Σ|) to consider all possible obser-
vations. Computing the maximal CSR Φ∗R takes O(2
2|X|+2|Σ|). For procedure DoDFS
in Algorithm MAX-RANGE, it takes O(2|Σ|) to determine control decision Act for
each Y -state and it takes O(|Σ|) to consider all observations for each Z-state. In
the worst case, there are still 2|X| Y -states and the same number of Z-states in T ∗,
which implies that procedure DoDFS takes O(2|X|+|Σ|) to construct T ∗. Therefore,
the overall complexity of Algorithm MAX-RANGE is O(22|X|+2|Σ|), which is expo-
nential is the size of G. As we mentioned earlier, it is well-known that the supervisor
synthesis problem under partial observation is NP-hard even without the lower bound
requirement [99]. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm for MPRCP.
4.5.2 Correctness of the Algorithm
In this section, we establish the correctness of Algorithm MAX-RANGE, i.e., it
effectively solves MPRCP.
Hereafter, we still denote by T ∗ the BTS returned by Algorithm MAX-RANGE
and denote by ST ∗ the supervisor induced by T
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(c) Another maximal solution
Figure 4.5: Figures in Example 4.5.1.
supervisor.
Lemma 4.5.1. L(ST ∗/G) ⊆ K, i.e., ST ∗ is safe.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem II.1. Since for each Y -state y encountered,
cT ∗(y) is chosen from Ξ(y, ŷ), which is a subset of CAES(G,K)(y). Therefore, ST ∗ is an
AES-included supervisor, which means that it is safe.
Next, we show that language R is contained in L(ST ∗/G).
Lemma 4.5.2. R ⊆ L(ST ∗/G).
Proof. We use Proposition 4.3.3 to show that ST ∗ contains the lower bound R. Let us
consider an arbitrary observable string s ∈ P (L(ST ∗/G)) such that ISYST∗ (s)|R 6= ∅.
For simplicity, we denote y = ISYST∗ (s). Since y|R 6= ∅, when y is reached for the first
time in procedure DoDFS of Algorithm MAX-RANGE, i.e., when state y is added,
it is reached by a sequence y0
γ1σ1...γnσn−−−−−−→ y in T ∗, where σ1 . . . σn ∈ P (R). Since




in TR that tracks the above sequence leading to y in T
∗, i.e., ŷ is the Y -state that
tracks y in the depth-first search. Note that σ1 . . . σn need not be equal to s since there
may exist multiple sequences that lead to y and the depth-first search just randomly
picks one of them. Therefore, ŷ may depend on the specific implementation of the
depth-first search.
119
By Algorithm MAX-RANGE, we know that cT ∗(y) is chosen such that cTR(ŷ) ⊆
cT ∗(y). By Algorithm INF-SYNT, we know that cTR(ŷ) is chosen such that ΓR(ŷ|R)∪
Σuc = cTR(ŷ). By Proposition 4.5.1, we know that y|R = ŷ|R. Moreover, ST ∗ is an




(s)|R) = ΓR(ŷ|R) ⊆ cTR(ŷ) ⊆ cTR(y) = ST ∗(s).
Recall that s is an arbitrary string in P (L(ST ∗/G)). Therefore, by Proposition 4.3.3,
we know that R ⊆ L(ST ∗/G).
Finally, we show that ST ∗ is maximal.
Lemma 4.5.3. ST ∗ is a maximally-permissive supervisor, i.e., for any safe supervisor
S ′, L(ST ∗/G) 6⊂ L(S ′/G).
Proof. By contradiction. Assume that ST ∗ is not maximal. This implies that there
exists another safe supervisor S ′ such that L(ST ∗/G) ⊂ L(S ′/G). This implies that
1. ∀s ∈ L(ST ∗/G) : ST ∗(P (s)) ⊆ S ′(P (s)); and
2. ∃s ∈ L(ST ∗/G) : ST ∗(P (s)) ⊂ S ′(P (s)).
Let us consider an observable string t ∈ P (L(ST ∗/G)) such that ST ∗(t)⊂ S ′(t) and
∀t′ ∈ {t} \ {t} : ST ∗(t′) = S ′(t′). Then we have that ISYST∗ (t) = IS
Y
S′(t); we call this
Y -state y.
We claim that, for the above Y -state y and control decision S ′(t), we have
(hY Z(y, cT ∗(y), hY Z(y, S
′(t))) ∈ Φ∗(T ∗,AES(G,K)) (4.27)




cT∗ (y1)−−−−→ . . . zn
σn−→ yn
cT∗ (yn)−−−−→ zn+1 (4.28)
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S′(tσ1)−−−−→ . . . z′n
σn−→ y′n
S′(tσ1...σn)−−−−−−→ z′n+1 (4.29)
Since S ′ is a safe supervisor, by Theorem II.1, we know that S ′ is an AES-included
supervisor. This implies that the above sequence exists in the AES. Therefore, by
Proposition 4.4.2, we know that Equation (4.27) holds.
Next, we consider two cases for this Y -state y to show the contradiction.
Case 1: y|R = ∅.
Since S ′ is a safe supervisor, by Theorem II.1, we know that S ′(t) ∈ CAES(G,K)(y).
Moreover, cT ∗(y) is chosen as a maximal element in CAES(G,K)(y). Therefore, we
obtain a contradiction immediately since cT ∗(y) ⊂ S ′(t) is not possible.
Case 2: y|R 6= ∅.




γ2−→ . . . γn−→ zn
σn−→ y (4.30)
in procedure DoDFS in Algorithm MAX-RANGE. Since y|R 6= ∅, we know that
σ1 . . . σn ∈ P (R), i.e., ŷ 6= ∅. Let ŷ be the corresponding Y -state reached by the




cTR (ŷ1)−−−−→ . . .
cTR (ŷn)−−−−→ ẑn
σn−→ ŷ (4.31)
Since L(STR/G) ⊆ L(ST ∗/G), by Proposition 4.4.3, we know that TR  T ∗. There-
fore, by the definition of the CSR, Equations (4.30) and (4.31) imply that (y, ŷ) ∈
Φ∗(TR, T
∗). This further implies that
(hY Z(ŷ, cTR(ŷ)), hY Z(y, cT ∗(y))) ∈ Φ∗(TR, T ∗) (4.32)
121
Overall, by Eqs. (4.27) and (4.32) and by Proposition 4.4.4, we get
(hY Z(ŷ, cTR(ŷ)), hY Z(y, S
′(t))) ∈ Φ∗(TR,AES(G,K))
Note that we also have that cTR(ŷ) ⊆ cT ∗(y) ⊂ S ′(t) and S ′(t) ∈ CAES(G,K)(y).
Therefore, we know that S ′(t) ∈ Ξ(y, ŷ). However, cT ∗(y) ⊂ S ′(t) is not possible, since
cT ∗(y) is chosen as a maximal control decision in Ξ(y, ŷ). This is a contradiction.
Finally, combining Lemmas 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 together, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem IV.1. ST ∗ is a maximally-permissive supervisor such that R ⊆ L(ST ∗/G) ⊆
K, i.e., Algorithm MAX-RANGE effectively solves MPRCP.
Since the resulting supervisor ST ∗ is realized by BTS T
∗, we also have the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.5.1. ST ∗ is an IS-based solution, which implies that the closed-loop
language L(ST ∗/G) is regular.
Remark 4.5.3. We have shown that Algorithm MAX-RANGE solves MPRCP. In fact,
it also solves the maximal-permissiveness verification problem. Specifically, suppose
that there exists a given supervisor S : P (L(G))→ Γ and we want to verify whether
it is maximal or not. In this case, we can just set R = L(S/G) as the lower bound
requirement and apply Algorithm MAX-RANGE to find a maximal safe supervisor
S∗ that contains R. If L(S/G) = L(S∗/G), then we know that the given supervisor S
is already maximally permissive, since we cannot improve it any further. Otherwise,
if L(S/G) ⊂ L(S∗/G), then we know that S is not maximal. To the best of our
knowledge, the maximality verification problem was open in the literature; it is now
solved as a special case of the synthesis problem.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have solved a generalized supervisor synthesis problem, called
the range control problem, for partially-observed DES. We considered both a standard
upper bound specification that describes the legal behavior and a lower bound specifi-
cation that describes the desired behavior. We provided new information-state-based
constructive approaches for computing both infimal and maximal supervisors satisfy-
ing these requirements. The proposed approach combines the three notions of AES,
strict sub-automaton, and CSR, in a novel manner; each of them plays a different
role in the synthesis problem. This results in a “meaningful” maximally-permissive
safe supervisor that contains a given behavior. An interesting future direction is to
extend the results in this chapter to the non-prefix-closed case.
Finally, all results in Chapters II to IV have been implemented in software DPO-
SYNT [122]; it can be downloaded from https://github.com/xiang-yin/DPO-SYNT.
4.7 Appendix
This appendix provides a state space refinement algorithm, which generalizes the
procedure in [18] from two automata to three automata.
Let R = (XR,Σ, δR, x0,R), K = (XK ,Σ, δK , x0,K) and G = (XG,Σ, δG, x0,G) be
three automata such that L(R) ⊆ L(K) ⊆ L(G). We construct three new automata
R′,K′ and G′ by the following algorithm.
Algorithm PRE-PROCESS
Input: R,K and G such that L(R) ⊆ L(K) ⊆ L(G).
Output: R′,K′ and G′.
Step 1
1-1 Obtain A = (XA,Σ, δA, x0,A) from R by adding a new state called DeadA to
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XR and completing the transition function δA by: for any x ∈ XA, σ ∈ Σ,
we have δR(x, σ)¬! ⇒ δA(x, σ) = DeadA. In particular, we have XA = XR ∪
{DeadA}, x0,A = x0,R and L(A) = Σ∗.
1-2 Obtain B = (XB,Σ, δB, x0,B) from K by adding a new state called DeadB to
XK and completing the transition function δB by: for any x ∈ XB, σ ∈ Σ,
we have δK(x, σ)¬! ⇒ δB(x, σ) = DeadB. In particular, we have XB = XK ∪
{DeadB}, x0,B = x0,K and L(B) = Σ∗.
Step 2
2-1 Form the product automaton ABG := A×B×G = (XABG,Σ, δABG, x0,ABG),
where “×” denotes the usual product composition operation of automata; see,
e.g., [12] (p. 78).
Step 3
3-1 Obtain G′ by taking ABG.
3-2 Obtain K′ by taking the largest sub-automaton of ABG where the second
component is not equal to DeadB; that is, delete all state of ABG where the
second state component is DeadB.
3-3 Obtain R′ by taking the largest sub-automaton of ABG where the first com-
ponent is not equal to DeadA; that is, delete all state of ABG where the first
state component is DeadA.
After Step 2, we have that L(ABG) = L(G′) = L(G) since L(A) = L(B) = Σ∗.
By construction, L(K′) = L(K) since we only delete states that have DeadB as their
second component. Similarly, we know that L(R′) = L(R). Moreover, it is clear
from Step 3 that K′ @ G′. since for any string s ∈ L(G) \ L(G), it leads to a state
whose second component is DeadB, but K
′ does not contain such a state. Similarly,
we know that R′ @ K′. Overall, have
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1. L(G′) = L(G), L(K′) = L(K) and L(R′) = L(R);
2. R′ @ K′ @ G′.
In the worst case, G′ contains |X| × (|XK |+ 1)× (|XR|+ 1) states. Therefore, only




A Uniform Approach for Centralized Sensor
Activation
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the problem of dynamic sensor activation in cen-
tralized and partially-observed DES. The objective in this problem is to synthesize
a sensor activation policy that dynamically turns sensors on/off online in order to
achieve a given objective, e.g., to control the system or to diagnose faults. This prob-
lem is important since in many applications turning more sensors on implies that
more energy or bandwidth is consumed. Therefore, it is of interest to synthesize a
sensor activation policy that is optimal with respect to some criterion, subject to
the constraints of the problem. For instance, in control problems these constraints
involve the property of observability of DES, while in diagnosis problems they involve
the property of diagnosability of DES.
We use the MPO approach [16,22] to investigate the sensor activation problem for
centralized partially-observed DES. However, instead of investigating the enforcement
of a particular property, e.g., observability, diagnosability, or opacity, as was done in
previous works, we study a general class of properties called Information-State-based
(IS-based) properties, that captures all properties previously considered, and more.
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This is similar to the supervisory control problem studied in Chapters II and III.
However, the IS-based property is defined in a different manner due to the difference
between the supervisory control problem and the sensor activation problem. We first
formulate the problem of dynamic sensor activation for any property that can be
expressed as an IS-based property. We show that this problem formulation is more
general than both the state disambiguation problem and the opacity problem that
have been studied previously in the literature. To solve this problem, we define a
generalized version of the most permissive observer. This generalized MPO embeds
all valid solutions to the enforcement of an IS-based property in its finite structure.
Based on the MPO, we present an algorithm for the synthesis of optimal sensor
activation policies under a logical performance objective.
Compared with prior works where the MPO was employed [15, 16, 22], our con-
tributions are twofold. First, we define the MPO directly from the new notion of bi-
partite dynamic observer without using the recursive definition used in [22]. Second,
the MPO defined in this chapter is more general since we consider a general class of
properties and we show that the most permissive observer for K-diagnosability stud-
ied by [16,22] and the most permissive dynamic mask for opacity studied by [15] are
essentially special cases of the generalized MPO. Moreover, most permissive observers
for observability, detectability, and predictability, which have not been studied so far
in the literature, can all be defined as special cases of the generalized MPO. There-
fore, the dynamic sensor activation problems for these properties can all be solved by
our approach. Moreover, the problem of optimal sensor activation for predictability,
which to the best of our knowledge has not been considered in the literature, can also
be solved by our approach. Similarly, our approach can be employed to solve sensor
activation problems for the enforcement of a wide class of user-defined properties that
can be expressed as IS-based properties. Compared with other solution approaches
for dynamic sensor activation problems, our methodology has the following features.
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First, the optimal solution that we obtain is language-based. Recall that the solutions
obtained by [101,104] are optimal only w.r.t. finite (restricted) solution spaces, based
on the state space of the system model. Moreover, the generalized MPO that we
define embeds all solutions in its single finite structure. Therefore, it can serve as a
basis for optimization w.r.t. a numerical cost criterion, which cannot be done by the
online approaches described in [85,103].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we introduce
some basic terminologies. In Section 5.3, we formulate the optimal sensor activation
problem for IS-based properties that we solve in this chapter. In Section 5.4, the
generalized MPO is defined. A synthesis algorithm for solving the problem formulated
in Section 5.2 based on the MPO is provided in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6, we show
that: (i) the MPO defined in Section 5.3 generalizes the previous versions of this
notion in the literature; and (ii) new problems, e.g., dynamic sensor activation for
the purpose of fault prediction, can be solved by our approach. Finally, we conclude
the chapter in Section 5.7.
5.2 Preliminary
In this section, we introduce some basic terminologies and notations in the dy-
namic sensor activation problem.
5.2.1 Information Mapping
The DES of interest is still modeled as a deterministic finite-state automaton
G = (X,Σ, δ, x0). The set of marked states is omitted, since we are only interested in
the generated language in the sensor activation problem. In dynamic sensor activation
problems, the sensors are turned on/off dynamically based on the observation history.
When the sensor corresponding to an event σ ∈ Σ is turned “on”, we say that the
event is being monitored. While an event is monitored, any occurrence of it will be
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observed by the supervisor, diagnoser, predictor, or external observer, according to
the problem under consideration (e.g., control, diagnosis, prediction, or opacification).
At any point in the execution of the system, the set of events θ ∈ 2Σ that we decide
to monitor (by turning their sensors on), is called a sensing decision.
In the setting of dynamic observation, we assume that Σ is partitioned into three
disjoint sets, Σ = Σo∪̇Σs∪̇Σuo, where:
1. Σo is the set of events whose occurrences are always observed, i.e., their sensors
are always turned on and they are continuously monitored;
2. Σs is the set of events that we can choose to monitor or not (by turning their
sensors on/off);
3. Σuo is the set of events that are always unobservable (i.e., there are no sensors
for them).
We say that a sensing decision θ ∈ 2Σ is admissible if Σo ⊆ θ ⊆ Σo ∪Σs and we let Θ
denote the set of all admissible sensing decisions.
We consider a general dynamic observations setting, where the observability prop-
erties of events can be controlled by a sensor activation policy during the evolution of
the system. A sensor activation policy is defined as a deterministic labeled automaton
Ω = (R,L), where
R = (XR,Σ, δR, x0,R) (5.1)
is a deterministic (finite state or infinite state) automaton and L : XR → Θ is a
labeling function that specifies the current set of “observable” events within Σo ∪Σs.
Specifically, for any s ∈ (Σo∪Σs)∗, Σo ⊆ L(δR(s)) ⊆ Σo∪Σs denotes the set of events
that are monitored after observing s. While an event is monitored, any occurrence
of it will be observed by the observer. In other words, after string s, events not in
L(δR(s)) are currently “unobervable” (i.e., their sensors are turned off). To make Ω
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implementable, the pair (R,L) needs to satisfy the constraint that
(∀x, x′ ∈ XR)(∀σ ∈ Σ : δR(x, σ)=x′)[x 6= x′ ⇒ σ∈L(x)] (5.2)
This condition says that the sensing decision can be updated (by updating the state
of R) only when a monitored event occurs. In general, XR could be an infinite set.
However, we will show later that the optimal sensor activation policies of interest in
this chapter can always be constructed with finite state spaces.
We say that the observations are static if the set of observable events is fixed a
priori. We denote by ΩΣo the corresponding sensor activation policy for the static
observation with the set of observable events Σo. Specifically, ΩΣo = (R,L) is given
by: 1) XR = {x0,R}; 2) ∀σ ∈ Σo : δA(x0,R, σ) = x0,R; and 3) L(x0,R) = Σo.
Given a sensor activation policy Ω = (R,L), we define the corresponding infor-
mation mapping PΩ :L(G)→(Σo ∪ Σs)∗ recursively as follows:
PΩ(ε) = ε, PΩ(sσ) =
 PΩ(s)σ if σ ∈ L(δR(s))PΩ(s) if σ 6∈ L(δR(s))
That is, PΩ(s) is the observation of string s under Ω. For any language L ⊆ Σ∗, we
define PΩ(L) = {t∈Σ∗o : ∃s∈L s.t. PΩ(s)= t}.
Let s ∈ L(G). For the sake of simplicity, hereafter, we also denote by Ω(s) 1 the
sensing decision after observing PΩ(s), i.e., Ω(s) = L(δR(s)).
For any two sensor activation policies Ω = (R,L) and Ω′= (R′, L′), we write that
Ω′ ≤ Ω if
∀s ∈ L(G) : Ω′(s) ⊆ Ω′(s) (5.3)
1In fact, a sensor activation policy can also be represent by a mapping Ω : L(G)→ 2Σo∪Σs such
that ∀s, t ∈ L(G) : PΩ(s) = PΩ(t)⇒ Ω(s) = Ω(t); see, e.g., [101,104].
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and write that Ω′ < Ω if
[Ω′ ≤ Ω] ∧ [∃s ∈ L(G) : Ω′(s) ⊂ Ω′(s)] (5.4)
5.2.2 The Observer
For any i ∈ 2X , σ ∈ Σo ∪ Σs and θ ∈ 2Σo∪Σs . Recall that
Nextσ(i) = {x1 ∈ X : ∃x2 ∈ i s.t. δ(x2, σ) = x1} (5.5)
We also define
UORθ(i) = {x1 ∈ Q : ∃x2 ∈ i,∃s ∈ (Σ \ θ)∗ s.t. δ(x2, s) = x1} (5.6)
That is, Nextσ(i) is the set of states that can be reached from some state in i im-
mediately after observing σ and UORθ(i) is the set of states that can be reached
unobservably from some state in i under the set of monitored events θ. Note that
operator UOR is slightly different from operator UR defined in Equation (2.4)
Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0) be the system automaton and Ω = (R,L), R = (XR,Σ, δR, x0,R)
be a sensor activation policy. The observer for G under Ω is
ObsΩ(G) = (Q,Σo ∪ Σs, f, q0), (5.7)
where Q ⊆ 2X × XR is the state space and for any state q ∈ Q, we write q =
(I(q), R(q)) where I(q) ∈ 2X and R(q) ∈ XR. The partial transition function of the
observer is denoted by f : Q × (Σo ∪ Σs) → Q and is defined as follows. For any
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q = (i, x), q′ = (i′, x′) ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σo ∪ Σs, f(q, σ) = q′ iff x
′ = δR(x, σ)
i′ = URL(x′)(Nextσ(i))
(5.8)
Finally, the initial state of ObsΩ(G) is q0 = (UORL(x0,R)({x0}), x0,R). For simplicity,
we only consider the reachable part of ObsΩ(G). By the above definition, we have
that L(ObsΩ(G)) = PΩ(L(G)).
We define the state estimator function (or simply “state estimator”) under Ω,
EGΩ : L(G)→ 2X , as follows upon the occurrence of s ∈ L(G):
EGΩ (s) := {x ∈ X : ∃t ∈ L(G) s.t. PΩ(s) = PΩ(t) ∧ δ(x0, t) = x}
By a simple induction (see, e.g., [22]), we can show that, for any s ∈ L(G), we have
I(f(PΩ(s))) = EGΩ (s), i.e., the state components of the observer state reached upon
PΩ(s) is the state estimator value after s.
5.3 Problem Formulation
As was explained in the introduction, in a given problem domain (control, diagno-
sis, and so forth), the sensor activation policy must satisfy some problem-dependent
property (observability, diagnosability, and so forth). For the sake of generality, we
define a property ϕ as a function ϕ : Ω→ {0, 1} and for any sensor activation policy
Ω, we write ϕ(Ω) = 1 to mean that Ω satisfies property ϕ. The properties of interest
are typically defined in a language-based manner rather than a state-based manner.
Hereafter, similar to the supervisor synthesis problem, we also consider a special class
of properties called information-state-based (IS-based) properties. These are proper-
ties whose verification can be performed over information states (i.e., sets of states)
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Figure 5.1: System G with Σo = {o}, Σs = {σ1, σ2}, and Σuo = {e, f}
We still define an information state to be a subset of states in X and denote by
I = 2X the set of information states. Roughly speaking, an IS-based property is
a property that only depends on the current knowledge of the system, as provided
by the state estimator function EGΩ under a given sensor activation policy Ω. In
particular, the property should not depend on information about the future behavior
of the system. We will show later that most of the important properties in the DES
literature can be formulated as IS-based properties, possibly after suitable state space
refinements of the original model G. First, we present the formal definition of the
IS-based property.
Definition 5.3.1. (IS-based Property). Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0) be the system automa-
ton and Ω : L(G)→ Θ be a sensor activation policy. An IS-based property w.r.t. G is
a function ϕ : 2X → {0, 1}. We say that Ω satisfies ϕ w.r.t. G, denoted by Ω |=G ϕ,
if ∀s ∈ L(G) : ϕ(EGΩ (s)) = 1.
Example 5.3.1. Consider the system G in Figure 5.1. Let ϕ : 2X → {0, 1} be an
IS-based property defined as follow:
∀i ∈ 2X : [ϕ(i) = 1]⇔ [6 ∃x ∈ {1, 4, 5, 6} : {3, x} ⊆ i] (5.9)
This IS-based property ϕ requires that we should never confuse state 3 with any state
in {1, 4, 5, 6}.
Let us consider the information mapping Ω defined by ∀s ∈ L(G) : Ω(s) = {o}.
By taking eo ∈ L(G), we know that EGΩ (eo) = {3, 6}. Therefore, Ω 6|=G ϕ.
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As was mentioned earlier, the objective of this chapter is to synthesize a sensor
activation policy such that some given property provably holds. Since turning sensors
on/off can be costly (for some given cost function on power, bandwidth, or switching
for instance), we define the Minimal Sensor Activation Problem for IS-Based Prop-
erties as follows.
Problem 5. (Minimal Sensor Activation Problem for IS-Based Properties). Let G =
(X,Σ, δ, x0) be the system automaton and ϕ : 2
X → {0, 1} be an IS-based property
w.r.t. G. Find a sensor activation policy Ω such that:
(i) Ω |=G ϕ;
(ii) 6 ∃Ω′ such that Ω′ |=G ϕ and Ω′ < Ω.
In some contexts, we may be interested in the dual version of the Minimal Sensor Acti-
vation Problem, the Maximal Sensor Activation Problem for IS-Based Properties. Its
definition is analogous, with “<” replaced by ”>” in condition (ii). As is well known
for the main properties of interest in control or diagnosis of partially-observed DES,
Problem 5 does not have a unique “globally optimal” solution, and many incomparable
“locally optimal” solutions may exist in the logical setting under consideration. This
explains the manner in which condition (ii) is stated. (See Remark 5.5.1.)
Remark 5.3.1. In [102], the state disambiguation problem is defined. Formally, Tspec ⊆
X ×X is the set of state pairs that need to be distinguished and the goal is to find a
minimal Ω such that (∀s ∈ L(G))(∀x1, x2 ∈ EGΩ (s))[(x1, x2) /∈ Tspec]. Clearly, the state
disambiguation problem is a special case of the minimal sensor activation problem
for IS-based properties, since given Tspec, we can always define an IS-based property
ϕspec : 2
X → {0, 1} by: ∀i ∈ 2X : [ϕspec(i) = 0] ⇔ [∃x1, x2 ∈ i : (x1, x2) ∈ Tspec].
Therefore, the problem we consider here is more general than the state disambiguation
problem.
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Remark 5.3.2. In many cases, the system is not only monitored by its internal con-
troller, but it may also be monitored by an external observer that is potentially
malicious. Therefore, instead of disambiguating states, the objective is to confuse
the external observer so that it may not infer a given secret about the system. In
such a scenario, the “disablement” of sensors can be costly, since we need to spend
some additional effort, e.g., adding a dynamic mask, to hide the occurrences of the
corresponding events. In this regard, the optimal dynamic mask synthesis problem
investigated in the literature (see, e.g., [15]) is essentially the maximal sensor acti-
vation problem defined above. This justifies our earlier assertion that the problem
considered in this chapter is very general and covers many earlier works in different
problem domains. We further elaborate on this issue in Section 5.6.
5.4 A General Most Permissive Observer
In this section, we first discuss the evolution of the available information during
the execution of the system under dynamic observations. Then we define the notion
of bipartite dynamic observer, which is similar to the bipartite transition system for
the supervisor synthesis problem. Finally, we define the generalized most permissive
observer that embeds all valid sensor activation policies in its structure.
5.4.1 Information State Dynamics
A sensor activation policy Ω works dynamically as follows. Initially, a sensing
decision θ0 is issued. Then, upon the occurrence of (monitored) event σ1 ∈ θ0,
a new decision θ1 is made and so forth. We call such a sequence in the form of
θ0σ1θ1σ2 . . . , where θi ∈ Θ, σi+1 ∈ θi,∀i ≥ 0, a run. For any s ∈ L(G), suppose
that s = ξ0σ1ξ1σ2 . . . ξn−1σnξn, where ξi ∈ (Σ \ Ω(ξ0σ1 . . . ξi−1σi))∗,∀i ≥ 0 and σi ∈
Ω(ξ0σ1 . . . σi−1ξi−1),∀i ≥ 1, i.e., PΩ(s) = σ1 . . . σn. Intuitively, ξi is just an unobserved
string and σi is a monitored event. Then the information available to the sensor
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activation module upon the occurrence of s is, in fact, the run
RΩ(s) := θ0σ1θ1 . . . θn−1σnθn (5.10)
where θi = Ω(ξ0σ1 . . . ξi−1σiξi),∀i ≥ 0.
To capture the alternating nature of sensing decisions and observations of moni-
tored events, similar to the BTS, we define two analogous kinds of states, also termed
Y -states and Z-states, respectively. A Y -state y is an information state from which
a sensing decision is made and Y ⊆ I denotes the set of Y -states. A Z-state z
is an information state augmented with a sensing decision from which observations
of monitored events occur. Z ⊆ I × Θ denotes the set of Z-states and we write
z = (I(z),Θ(z)) for any z ∈ Z. Next, we define the transition function from Y -states
to Z-states, ~Y Z : Y ×Θ→ Z, and the transition function from Z-states to Y -states,
~ZY : Z × Σ→ Y . For any y ∈ I, z ∈ I ×Θ, σ ∈ Σ and θ ∈ Θ,
• z = ~Y Z(y, θ) if and only if
I(z) = {x ∈ X : ∃x′ ∈ y,∃s ∈ (Σ \ θ)∗ s.t. δ(x′, s) = x} and Θ(z) = θ
• y = ~ZY (z, σ) if and only if
σ ∈ Θ(z) and y = {x ∈ X : ∃x′ ∈ I(z) s.t. δ(x′, σ) = x}
For simplicity hereafter, we write y
θ−→ z if z = ~Y Z(y, θ) and z
σ−→ y if z = ~ZY (z, σ).
Intuitively, y
θ−→ z simply represents the unobserved reach under sensing decision θ
and it remembers the sensing decision that leads to it. On the other hand, z
σ−→ y
represents the set of states the system can reach immediately after the occurrence of
event σ. We require that σ ∈ Θ(z), since σ must be monitored.
Now, let s ∈ L(G) be a string and RΩ(s) = θ0σ1θ1 . . . θn−1σnθn be the corre-
sponding run defined in Equation (5.10). Let y0 = {x0} be the initial Y -state. Then






θ1−→ . . . θn−1−−→ zn−1
σn−→ yn
θn−→ zn (5.11)
We denote by IYΩ (s) and IZΩ (s), the last Y -state and Z-state in y0z0y1z2 . . . zn−1ynzn,
respectively, i.e., IYΩ (s) = yn and IZΩ (s) = zn. By induction on the length of PΩ(s), it
can be verified (see, e.g., the proof of Lemma III.1 in [22]) that
I(IZΩ (s)) = EGΩ (s) (5.12)
which essentially says that the information state component of IZΩ (s) is the state
estimator of s.
Example 5.4.1. Let us return to the system G in Figure 5.1. Consider the sensor
activation policy Ω that monitors event σ1 only when nothing has been observed so far
and monitors noting after the first event is observed. (Note that o is always monitored
by default.) Let us consider the string s = σ1σ2. The corresponding run of s is
RΩ(σ1σ2) = {o, σ1}σ1{o} (5.13)
and the corresponding sequence of Y - and Z-states is
{1} {o,σ1}−−−→({1, 2}, {o, σ1})
σ1−→{4} {o}−−→({4, 5}, {o}) (5.14)
So IYΩ (σ1σ2) = {4}, IZΩ (σ1σ2) = ({4, 5}, {o}) and EGΩ (σ1σ2) = I(IZΩ (σ1σ2)) = {4, 5}.
5.4.2 Bipartite Dynamic Observer
Recall that the sensor activation policy Ω is defined as an automaton A with a
function L. In the following, we define the structure of Bipartite Dynamic Observer
(BDO) that also provide a way to realize a (set of) sensor activation policy(ies).
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Definition 5.4.1. A bipartite dynamic observer O is a 7-tuple
O = (QOY , QOZ , ~OY Z , ~OZY ,Σ,Θ, y0) (5.15)
where, QOY ⊆ I is a set of Y -states, QOZ ⊆ I×Θ is a set of Z-states, ~OY Z : QOY ×Θ→
QOZ and ~OZY : QOZ × Σ → QOY are partial transition functions such that for any
z ∈ QOZ , y ∈ QOY , θ ∈ Θ and σ ∈ Σ, the following conditions hold
C1. ~OZY (z, σ) = y ⇔ ~ZY (z, σ) = y;
C2. ~OY Z(y, θ) = z ⇒ ~Y Z(y, θ) = z;
C3. ∀y ∈ QOY , ∃θ ∈ Θ : ~OY Z(y, θ)!.
Σ is the set of events of G, Θ is the set of admissible sensing decisions, and y0 = {x0}
is the initial Y -state. For brevity, we only consider the accessible part of a BDO.
The three conditions in the above definition are interpreted as follows. Condition
C1 says that the transition function ~OZY in O is identical to ~ZY . Therefore, for any
z ∈ QOZ , ~OZY (z, σ) is defined for any possible observation σ ∈ Θ(z) by the definition of
~ZY . This is due to the fact that we cannot decide which monitored event will occur
once we make a sensing decision. Conditions C2 says that for the transition function
~OY Z , we have either ~OY Z(y, θ) = ~Y Z(y, θ) or it is undefined. Condition C3 requires
that for any Y -state y ∈ QOY , there exists at least one θ ∈ Θ such that ~OY Z(y, θ) is
defined. This is because a sensor activation policy is defined for all strings in L(G)
and we must make a sensing decision at all accessible Y -states.
Definition 5.4.2. Given a BDO O, we say that a sensor activation policy Ω is
allowed by O if
∀s ∈ L(G) : ~OY Z(IYΩ (s),Ω(s))! (5.16)
With a slight abuse of notation, we write that Ω ∈ O whenever Ω is allowed by O.
138
Note that, given a BDO O, the set of sensor activation policies allowed by O may
not be a singleton, since for each Y -state there may be multiple sensing decisions
to choose from. Moreover, the domain of a sensor activation policy in a BDO need
not be finite since different sensing decisions may be chosen on different visits to
the same Y -state. We say that a BDO O is deterministic if, for any y ∈QOY , there
exists only one θ ∈Θ such that ~OY Z(y, θ)!. It is clear that a deterministic BDO O
allows a unique sensor activation policy; we denote it by ΩO. More specifically, ΩO =
(AO, LO), where AO = (XA, δA,Σo ∪ Σs, x0,A), is defined by: XA = QOY , x0,A = y0
and for any x1, x2 ∈ XA, we have fA(x1, σ) = x2 ⇔ ~OZY (~OY Z(x1, θx1), σ) = x2 and
L(x1) = Θ(~OY Z(x1, θx1)), where θx1 is the unique sensing decision defined at x1 in
O. Note that, in general we may need infinite memory to realize a sensor activation
policy. Therefore, a deterministic BDO can only represent a sensor activation policy
that has at most 2X states. However, we will show later that this memory is always
sufficient for the purpose of synthesis.
Example 5.4.2. Consider again the system G in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.2(a) provides
an example of a deterministic BDO. For the initial Y -state y0 = {1}, by making
sensing decision θ = {o, σ1}, we will reach Z-state z = ~Y Z(y0, θ) = ({1, 2}, {o, σ1}).
From z, only monitored events o and σ1 can be observed. If σ1 is observed, then the
next Y -state is y1 = ~ZY (z, σ1) = {4}. We can verify that the sensor activation policy
Ω defined in Example 5.4.1 is allowed by O1; moreover, it is the only one allowed by
O1 since this BDO is deterministic. Similarly, the BDO O2 shown in Figure 5.2(b)
is also deterministic. However, the BDO shown in Figure 5.3 is not a deterministic
BDO, since there are two sensing decisions {o, σ1} and {o, σ2} defined at Y -state {1}.
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Examples of BDOs that represent two incomparable minimal solutions;
[blue] rectangular states and [yellow] oval states represent, respectively,
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Figure 5.3: Example of MPO
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5.4.3 Generalized MPO and its Properties
We return to the sensor action problem for IS-based properties formulation in
Section 5.3. By condition (i) in Problem 1, we must find an Ω such that ∀s ∈ L(G) :
ϕ(EGΩ (s)) = 1. However, for any BDO, we know that ∀s ∈ L(G) : I(IZΩ (s)) = EGΩ (s)
and IZΩ (s) is indeed the Z-state reached by the run RΩ(s) in the BDO. Therefore, if
we construct a BDO O such that
∀z ∈ QOZ : ϕ(I(z)) = 1 (5.17)
and such that O is “as large as possible”, then the resulting structure will contain
all sensor activation policies that satisfy ϕ. The property of such a BDO being as
large as possible is actually well defined: if O1 and O2 are two BDOs that both
satisfy Equation (5.17), then their union, in the sense of graph merger, is a BDO that
satisfies Equation (5.17). For example, the BDOs O1 and O2 shown in Figure 5.2(a)
and Figure 5.2(b), respectively, both satisfy Equation (5.17). Their union, which is a
sub-graph of the BDO in Figure 5.3, is also a BDO satisfying Equation (5.17). This
observation leads to the definition of the most permissive observer.
Definition 5.4.3. (Most Permissive Observer). Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0) be the system
and let ϕ : 2X → {0, 1} be the IS-based property under consideration. The Most
Permissive Observer for ϕ is the BDO
MPOϕ = (QMPOY , QMPOZ , ~MPOY Z , ~MPOZY ,Σ,Θ, y0)
defined as the largest BDO such that ∀z ∈ QMPOZ : ϕ(I(z)) = 1.
The following theorem reveals the correctness of the MPO defined above, namely,
the MPO embeds all sensor activation policies satisfying ϕ in its structure.
Theorem V.1. Ω |=G ϕ if and only if Ω ∈MPOϕ.
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Proof. (⇐) Suppose that Ω is allowed by the MPO. Then we know that for any
s ∈ L(G) we have IZΩ (s) ∈ QMPOZ by definition. Since ∀z ∈ QMPOZ : ϕ(I(z)) = 1, by
Equation (5.12), we know that ∀s ∈ L(G) : ϕ(EGΩ (s)) = 1. Therefore, Ω |=G ϕ.
(⇒) Suppose that Ω |=G ϕ. Then there exists a BDO O such that: 1) Ω ∈ O;
and 2) ∀z ∈ QOZ : ϕ(I(z)) = 1. Specifically, O is obtained by: QOY = {y ∈ Y : ∃s ∈
L(G) s.t. y = IYΩ (s)}, QOZ = {z ∈ Z : ∃s ∈ L(G) s.t. z = IZΩ (s)} and ∀y ∈ QOY ,∀θ ∈
Θ : [~OY Z(y, θ)!] ⇔ [∃s ∈ L(G) : y = IYΩ (s) ∧ θ = Ω(s)]. Now let us assume that Ω is
not allowed by the MPO. Then we know that ∃s ∈ L(G) : ~MPOY Z (IYΩ (s),Ω(s)) is not
defined. However, this implies that the union of O andMPOϕ is strictly larger than
MPOϕ, since Ω(s) is defined at IYΩ (s) in O but not in MPOϕ. This contradicts to
the fact the MPO is the largest BDO satisfying Equation (5.17).
Algorithm 1 provides a procedure for the construction of the MPO. The steps of
Algorithm 1 follow direction from the definition of the MPO. First, we search through
the state space of Y -states and Z-states until a Z-state that violates the IS-based
property ϕ is encountered. This step is done by Procedure DoDFS, which is simply
a depth-first search. However, this may lead to the situation where there is a Y -state
that has no successors. Recall that this situation is illegal by the definition of the
BDO. Therefore, we need to go back to prune such a Y -state and the corresponding
Z-states that lead to this state, until the structure converge. This step is done by
the while loop, which will stop in a finite number of steps. The worst-case time
complexity of the construction of the MPO is exponential in both |X| and |Σs|.
Example 5.4.3. We return to system G in Figure 5.1 and IS-based property ϕ defined
by Equation (5.9). The corresponding MPO is shown in Figure 5.3. At initial Y -state
{1}, if we make sensing decision {o}, then Y -state {3, 6} will be reached upon the
occurrence of monitored event o (see the dashed lines). However, at state {3, 6}, no
matter what sensing decision we make, a Z-state that contains both state 3 and 6
will be reached, which violates the IS-based property ϕ. Therefore, we need to go back
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Algorithm 8: The construction of the MPO
Data: G and ϕ
Result: MPOϕ
1 QMPOY ← y0 = {x0} and QMPOZ ← ∅;
2 DoDFS(y0,MPOϕ, ϕ);
3 while ∃y ∈ QMPOY : 6 ∃θ ∈ Θ s.t. ~MPOY Z (y, θ)! do
4 QMPOY ← QMPOY \ {y};
5 remove all Z-states z ∈ QMPOZ such that ~MPOZY (z, σ) = y for some σ ∈ Σ;
6 take the accessible part of MPOϕ;
procedure DoDFS(y,MPOϕ, ϕ);
7 for θ ∈ Θ do
8 z ← ~Y Z(y, θ);
9 if ϕ(I(z)) = 1 then
10 add transition y
θ−→ z to ~MPOY Z ;
11 if z 6∈ QMPOZ then
12 QMPOZ ← QMPOZ ∪ {z};
13 for σ ∈ Σ s.t. ~ZY (z, σ)! do
14 y′ ← ~ZY (z, σ);
15 add transition z
σ−→ y′ to ~MPOZY ;
16 if y′ 6∈ QMPOY then
17 QMPOY ← QMPOY ∪ {y′};
18 DoDFS(y′,MPOϕ, ϕ);
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to prune Y -state {3, 6} and its predecessor Z-state ({1, 2, 4, 5}, {o}). This is why we
cannot make sensing decision {o} at the initial state.
Remark 5.4.1. In Figure 5.3, we can also make sensing decision {o, σ1, σ2} at the initial
Y -state. However, σ2 cannot be observed before the next sensing decision is issued,
which will occur when either o or σ1 is observed. Therefore, σ2 is a “redundant” event
in the sensing decision, since it has no effect on future states in the MPO. In this
chapter, we adopt the following convention. We remove all redundant events from
sensing decisions in the MPO when solving the minimal sensor activation problem.
Similarly, we include all redundant events to the sensing decisions in the MPO when
solving the maximal sensor activation problem. Clearly, these conventions will not
affect the properties of the MPO.
5.5 Synthesis of Optimal Sensor Activation Policies
In this section, we show how to synthesize from the MPO an optimal sensor
activation policy Ω that solves Problem 5. Specifically, we require that Ω satisfy
the minimality criterion (ii) of Problem 5 (or the maximality criterion for the dual
version of Problem 5). Moreover, we shall also require that Ω be defined over a finite
domain, so that it can be effectively implemented. As was mentioned earlier, a sensor
activation policy allowed by the MPO need not be finitely realizable, since we can
select different sensing decisions upon different visits to the same Y -state. Therefore,
we define a special class of sensor activation policies that are represented by subgraphs
of the MPO and thus have finite realizations.
Definition 5.5.1. (IS-based Sensor Activation Policy). A sensor activation policy Ω
is said to be Information-State-based (or IS-based) if
∀s, t ∈ L(G) : IYΩ (s) = IYΩ (t)⇒ Ω(s) = Ω(t) (5.18)
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Clearly, if Ω is IS-based, then Ω can always be represented by a deterministic
BDO that is a subgraph of the MPO.
Definition 5.5.2. (Greedy Optimal Sensor Activation Policy). Suppose that Ω is a
sensor activation policy such that Ω |=G ϕ. We say that Ω is greedy minimal if
∀s ∈ L(G),∀θ ∈ Θ : ~MPOY Z (IYΩ (s), θ)!⇒ θ 6⊂ Ω(s) (5.19)
The notion of greedy maximality is defined analogously.
The following theorem says that a greedy minimal (respectively, maximal) solution
is a minimal (respectively, maximal) solution.
Theorem V.1. Let Ω be a sensor activation policy such that Ω |=G ϕ. Then Ω is
minimal (respectively, maximal) if it is greedy minimal (respectively, greedy maximal).
Proof. We prove minimality by contradiction; maximality can be proved analogously.
Suppose that Ω is greedy minimal and assume that it is not minimal. This implies
that there exists another Ω′ such that Ω′ < Ω and Ω′ |=G ϕ. Then we know that
there exists a string t ∈ L(G) such that: 1) Ω′(t) ⊂ Ω(t); and 2) ∀t′ ∈ {t} \ {t} :
Ω′(t′) = Ω(t′). Then we know that IYΩ′(t) = IYΩ (t) and we call this Y -state y. Since
Ω′ |=G ϕ, by Theorem V.1, we know that Ω′ is also allowed by the MPO, which means
that ~MPOY Z (y,Ω′(s))!. However, by the fact that Ω is greedy minimal, we know that
[∀θ ∈ Θ : ~MPOY Z (y, θ)!]θ 6⊂ Ω(s). This contradicts Ω′(t) ⊂ Ω(t).
By Theorem V.1, it is clear that if we synthesize an IS-based greedy optimal
sensor activation policy, then we will have obtained a solution to Problem 5, which
was our objective. (Of course, not all solutions to Problem 5 need be IS-based or
greedy.) An IS-based greedy optimal sensor activation policy can be obtained by a
depth-first search over the state space of the MPO that picks one greedy optimal
sensing decision at each Y -state and then picks all observations for each Z-state.
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The resulting structure will be a deterministic BDO that represents the solution. We
illustrate this synthesis procedure by an example.
Example 5.5.1. We return to the MPO shown in Figure 5.3. To synthesize a min-
imal sensor activation policy for ϕ, we can pick decision {o, σ1}, which is greedy
minimal, at the initial Y -state. Then, upon the occurrence of monitored event σ1,
the new Y -state {4} is reached. At that state, we pick the unique greedy minimal
decision {o}, and so forth. These choices result in deterministic BDO O1 shown
in Figure 5.2(a) that allows the unique sensor activation policy ΩO1, which is prov-
ably minimal. We see that ΩO1 is, in fact, the sensor activation policy Ω defined by
Equation (5.4.1).
Remark 5.5.1. In the synthesis step in the previous example, we could have select-
ed sensing decision {o, σ2} at the initial Y -state, which yields the minimal solution
shown in Figure 5.2(b). Interestingly, we see that the intersection of the two valid
decisions {o, σ1} and {o, σ2}, i.e, {o} is not a valid decision, since {o} is not defined
at Y -state {1} in the MPO. This illustrates the earlier claim that Problem 1 may
not have an infimal (respectively, supremal) solution in general, but instead several
incomparable minimal (respectively maximal) solutions. This phenomenon is similar
to the supervisory control problem under partial observation studied in Chapters II
and III, in which supremal solutions do not exist in general and only locally maximal
solutions exist.
5.6 Applications of the Generalized MPO
5.6.1 Application to Control and Diagnosis
Observability and diagnosability are two key properties of interest in control and
diagnosis of DES. It is shown in [102] that the problem of sensor activation for observ-
ability can be formulated as a state-disambiguation problem. Similarly, it is shown
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in [22] that the problem of sensor activation for K-diagnosability can be formulated as
a state-disambiguation problem. Therefore, as was discussed in Remark 5.3.1, both of
these sensor activation problems can be solved by the generalized MPO approach that
we have presented. In fact, the most permissive observer for K-diagnosability [16,22]
is a special case of the MPO defined in this chapter. On the other hand, the no-
tion of an MPO for the property of observability has never been considered in the
literature. The generalized MPO therefore provides a new approach for solving sen-
sor activation for enforcement of observability. The reader is referred to [22, 102] to
see how observability and K-diagnosability can be formulated as IS-based properties.
Another property of interest in sensor activation is detectability [89]; it relates to
state reconstruction. By using the same approach that is used for the reformulation
of K-diagnosability in [22], we can show that strong K-detectability can also be for-
mulated as an IS-based property and thereby our solution procedure also applies to
that property.
5.6.2 Application to Fault Prediction
As a specific example of how the methodology presented in this chapter can be used
to solve problems that have not yet been addressed in the literature, we consider the
problem of sensor activation for the enforcement of predictability, a notion introduced
in [29]. Let ed ∈ Σ be the fault event to be predicted. Recall that Ψ(ed) := {sed ∈
L(G) : s ∈ Σ∗} is the set of strings that end with ed and we write ed ∈ s if s∩Ψ(ed) 6=
∅. We recall the definition of predictability from [29].
Definition 5.6.1. (Predictability). A live language L(G) is said to be predictable
w.r.t. ed ∈ Σ and Ω if
(∀s ∈ Ψ(ed))(∃t ∈ {s} : ed /∈ t)(∀u ∈ L(G) : ed /∈ u ∧ PΩ(u) = PΩ(t))
(∃n ∈ N)(∀v ∈ L(G)/u)[|v| ≥ n⇒ ed ∈ v] (5.20)
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The above definition requires that the fault event ed should be predicted unam-
biguously before its the occurrence. Note that the liveness assumption here is w.l.o.g.,
since we can always add unobservable self-loops at terminal states in G.
To proceed further, we assume that state space of G is partitioned into two disjoint
sets X = XY ∪̇XN , such that
• ∀s ∈ L(G) : δ(x0, s) ∈ XY ⇒ ed ∈ s; and
• ∀s ∈ L(G) : δ(x0, s) ∈ XN ⇒ ed 6∈ s.
That is, XY is the set of faulty states and XN is the set of non-faulty states. This
assumption is also w.l.o.g., since we can always refine the state space of G by taking
the parallel composition of G with an automaton with two states that captures the
occurrence of ed. Next, similarly to the notions of boundary strings and indicator
strings in [47], we define the two following sets:
• Boundary states, ∂X = {x ∈ X : δ(q, ed)!}; and
• Non-indicator states, NX ={x∈XN : ∀n∈N,∃s∈L(G, x) s.t. |s| > n∧ ed 6∈ s}.
A boundary state is a state from which the fault event can occur and a non-indicator
state is a state from which an arbitrary long non-faulty string can occur. Note that
∂X and NX need not be disjoint in general.
With the above notions, we define the IS-based property ϕpre : 2
X → {0, 1} by:
∀i ∈ 2X : [ϕpre(i)=0]⇔ [∃x, x′ ∈ i : x ∈ ∂X ∧ x′ ∈ NX ] (5.21)
The following result says that predictability is equivalent to the IS-based property
ϕpre.
Theorem V.1. Let ϕpre be the IS-based property defined by Equation (5.21). For
any sensor activation policy Ω, L(G) is predictable w.r.t. ed and Ω if and only if
Ω |=G ϕpre.
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Proof. (⇒) By contrapositive. Suppose that Ω 6|=G ϕpre. We know that ∃s, t∈L(G) :
PΩ(s) =PΩ(t) ∧ δ(x0, s)∈∂Q ∧ δ(x0, t)∈NQ. Considering the above s and t, we also
know that (∀v ∈ {s})(∃u ∈ {t})[PΩ(v) =PΩ(u)]. By definition, δ(x0, t)∈NQ implies
that ∀u ∈ {t} : δ(x0, u)∈NQ. Then we have (∃sed ∈ Ψ(ed))(∀v ∈ {s} : ed 6∈ v)(∃u ∈
L(G) : ed 6∈ u ∧ PΩ(v) = PΩ(u))(∀n ∈ N)(∃w ∈ L(G)/u)[|w| ≥ n ∧ ed 6∈ w]. Thus,
L(G) is not predictable.
(⇐) By contrapositive. Suppose that L(G) is not predictable. By Definition 5.6.1,
we know that (∃sed ∈ Ψ(ed))(∀t ∈ {s} : ed 6∈ t)(∃u ∈ L(G) : ed 6∈ u ∧ PΩ(u) =
PΩ(t))(∀n ∈ N)(∃v ∈ L(G)/u)[|v| ≥ n ∧ ed 6∈ v]. For the above s, let us consider the
string α ∈ {s} such that ed 6∈ α and αed ∈ {s}, i.e., α is the longest non-faulty prefix
of s. By definition, we know that δ(x0, α) ∈ ∂Q. Also, we know that ∃u ∈ L(G)
such that PΩ(u) = PΩ(α) and δ(x0, α) ∈ NQ. This implies that ∃α ∈ L(G),∃x, x′ ∈
EGΩ (α) : x ∈ ∂Q ∧ x′ ∈ NQ. Therefore, Ω 6|=G ϕpre.
The above theorem implies that to synthesize a minimal sensor activation policy
for the purpose of prediction, it suffices to solve Problem 5 by taking ϕpre into account.
We illustrate this result by the following example.
Example 5.6.1. Let us return to the system G in Figure 5.1. Suppose that f is the
fault event that we want to predict. G already satisfies the state partition assumption
X = XY ∪̇XN , where XN = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and XY = {7}. Also, we know that state
3 is the only boundary state and states 1, 4, 5 and 6 are non-indicator states. For
example, from state 6, the arbitrary long non-faulty behavior en, n ∈ N, can occur.
However, states 2 and 3 are not non-indicator states, since from either of these two
states, we know for sure that the fault event will occur in a finite number of steps.
Therefore, we have ∂X = {3} and NX = {1, 4, 5, 6}. In fact, we see that the IS-based
property defined by Equation (5.9) that we considered in the previous examples is
indeed the IS-based property ϕpre for this example. Therefore, the solutions O1 and
O2 shown in Figure 5.2 that we obtained previously are two (incomparable) minimal
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sensor activation policies that guarantee predictability.
5.6.3 Application to Cyber-Security
As was discussed earlier in Remark 5.3.2, in some cases, the system may also
be monitored by an external observer that is potentially malicious. Therefore, for
security purposes, one may want the information mapping not to release some crucial
information to this external observer. We recall an important security property called
opacity.
Definition 5.6.2. Secret XS ⊆ X is current-state opaque w.r.t. G and Ω if ∀s ∈
L(G) : EGΩ (s) 6⊆ XS.
In the above definition, the secret of the system is defined in terms of the current-
state estimator. Some other notions of opacity, e.g., initial-state opacity and language-
based opacity, have also been studied in the literature. However, since all of these
notions can be mapped to one another (see [107]), the study of current-state opacity
here is without essential loss of generality. Current-state opacity is clearly an IS-
based property. Therefore, the most permissive dynamic mask studied in [15] is also a
special case of the generalized MPO and the problem of synthesizing a maximal sensor
activation policy (or dynamic mask) can also be solved by the approach presented in
this chapter.
Moreover, the same approach can be applied to other user defined properties. For
example, consider the IS-based property ϕ : 2X → {0, 1} defined by
∀i ∈ 2X : ϕ(i) = 0⇔ |i| = 1 (5.22)
This property is related to 1-anonymity studied in the computer security literature
[84,90]. Intuitively, it requires that the observer should never determine the current-
state of the system precisely. We can also synthesize a sensor activation policy for it
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by applying the generalized MPO approach.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a new approach to the problem of synthesizing
an optimal sensor activation policy that guarantees some observation property in
problems of control, diagnosis, prediction, or other types in the context of partially-
observed discrete event systems. To this end, we defined a novel information structure
called the generalized Most Permissive Observer that is applicable to a wide class of
properties called information-state-based properties. The generalized MPO embeds
all valid sensor activation policies in its structure. We presented an algorithm for the
construction of the MPO and a procedure for synthesizing an optimal sensor activation
policy based on the MPO. Our approach generalizes the previous works on the MPO,
which pertain to specific properties such as opacity or K-diagnosability. Our approach
is applicable to a wide class of user-defined properties. In particular, we showed how
the problem of optimal sensor activation for the purpose of fault prediction, not
previously considered in the literature, can be solved by the generalized MPO.
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CHAPTER VI
Sensor Activation in Decentralized Decision
Making
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the problem of decentralized decision making in
DES that operates under dynamic observations. In this context, the system is mon-
itored by a set of agents that act as a team to make global decisions. Each agent
makes observations online through its sensors; these sensors can be turned on/off
online dynamically during the evolution of the system according to a sensor activa-
tion policy that depends on the agent’s observations. Due to energy, bandwidth, or
security constraints, sensors activations are “costly”. Therefore, in order to reduce
sensor-related costs, it is of interest to minimize, in some technical sense, the sensor
activations of each agent while maintaining some desired observational property.
However, for the decentralized sensor activation problem, there are very few results
in the literature. In [101], the problem of dynamic sensor activation for decentralized
diagnosis is studied. Specifically, a “window-based partition” approach is proposed in
order to obtain a solution. The main drawback of this approach is that the solution
obtained is only optimal with respect to a finite (restricted) solution space and may
not be language-based optimal in general. In other words, by enlarging the solution
152
space by refining the state space of the system model, better solutions could be
obtained in principle. Similarly, in [104], the problem of dynamic sensor activation
for decentralized control is also studied, where the solution obtained is again optimal
w.r.t. a finite solution space. To the best of our knowledge, the problem of language-
based sensor optimization for decentralized diagnosis or control has remained an open
problem, as is mentioned in the recent survey [82].
One important reason for the lack of results for the decentralized sensor activation
problem is that decentralized multi-player decision problems are conceptually much
more difficult to solve than their corresponding centralized versions. In general, these
types of problems have been discussed in the framework of team decision theory [32].
In the DES literature, it is well-known that many problems that are decidable in the
centralized setting become undecidable (e.g., the problem of synthesizing safe and
non-blocking supervisors [98]) or open (e.g., the problem of synthesizing maximally
permissive safe supervisors [59]) in the decentralized case, even when only two agents
are involved.
In this chapter, we propose a new approach to tackle the problem of dynamic
sensor activation for the purpose of decentralized decision-making. The main contri-
butions of this chapter are as follows. First, we formulate a general class of decentral-
ized decision-making problems called the decentralized state disambiguation problem.
We propose the notion of decentralized distinguishability, which covers coobservabil-
ity, K-codiagnosability and coprognosability. Second, to solve the dynamic sensor
activation problem, we adopt a person-by-person approach (see, e.g., [100] and the
references therein) to decompose the decentralized minimization problem to two con-
secutive centralized minimization problems. We first minimize the sensor activation
policy for Agent 1 by keeping the policy of Agent 2 fixed. Then, we fix Agent 1’s
sensor activation policy to the one obtained and solve the same minimization prob-
lem but for Agent 2. Essentially, we solve two centralized constrained minimization
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problems, since we need to take the other agent’s information into account when we
minimize the decisions of an agent. A novel approach is also proposed to reduce
each centralized constrained minimization problem to a problem that we solved in
Chapter V.. Moreover, we prove that the solution obtained by our procedure is min-
imal with respect to the system language (i.e., over an infinite set in general), in
contrast to the works reviewed above where minimality was with respect to a finite
solution space. As special cases of the proposed framework, language-based sensor
optimizations for decentralized diagnosis and decentralized control, which were pre-
viously open, are solved. Finally, we show that the proposed framework is applicable
to both the disjunctive architecture and the conjunctive architecture.
In general, a person-by-person approach in team decision problems may not ter-
minate in a finite number of steps, since we may need to iterate between the two
constrained minimization problems. However, we show that for the problem under
consideration in this chapter, such iterations are not required due to a certain type
of monotonicity that arises. Moreover, we prove that the solution obtained by our
procedure is minimal w.r.t. the system language (i.e., over an infinite set in general),
in contrast to the works reviewed above where minimality was with respect to a finite
solution space. In the DES literature, the person-by-person approach has also been
applied to the decentralized control problem [59] and to the decentralized commu-
nication problem [7, 66, 75]. However, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been
applied so far to decentralized sensor activation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 we formulate
the decentralized state disambiguation problem and the decentralized minimization
problem that we solve in this chapter. In Section 6.3, shows how to solve the central-
ized constrained minimization problem by reducing it to a fully centralized problem.
In Section 6.4, we present our algorithm for synthesizing a minimal decentralized
solution. In Section 6.5, we show how specific problems, e.g., sensor activation for
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decentralized diagnosis/control/prognosis can be solved by the proposed framework.
We also extend our results to the conjunctive architecture in Section 6.6. Finally, we
conclude this chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 Problem Formulation and Solution Overview
6.2.1 Decentralized Distinguishability
In the decentralized decision-making problem, at each instant, each local agent
sends highly compressed information, i.e., a local decision, to the coordinator based
on its local (dynamic) observation. Then the coordinator makes a global decision
based on the information received from each local agent. Let I be the index set of
local agents. For each agent i ∈ I, we denote by Ωi its sensor activation policy and
by Σo,i the set of events that can be monitored in Ωi. For the sake of simplicity, we
develop all results hereafter for the case of two agents, i.e., I = {1, 2}. The principle
can be extended to an arbitrary number of agents. We define the pair of sensor
activation policies as Ω̄ = [Ω1,Ω2].
In order to formulate the decentralized decision-making problem, we need to spec-
ify the following three ingredients:
• What requirement the global decision has to fulfill?
• What information each local agent can send to the coordinator?
• What rule the coordinator uses to calculate a global decision based on the local
decisions?
Hereafter, we refer to the first ingredient as the specification of the decentralized
decision-making problem. The last two ingredients are referred to as the architecture
of the decentralized decision-making problem.
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Several different specifications have been studied separately in the literature for
decentralized decision-making problems, e.g., to diagnose every occurrence of fault
events [24,62], to predict every occurrence of fault events [47] or to control the system
[69,128]. In this chapter, we do not study a specific specification. Instead, we define
a general class of specifications called decentralized state disambiguation. We show
will later in Section 6.5 that many existing decentralized decision-making problems
are special cases of the decentralized disambiguation problem. Formally, we define a
specification as a pair of state sets
T = XTA ×XTB ⊆ X ×X (6.1)
Intuitively, specification T is used to capture the following requirement. State set XTA
represents the set of states at which the global system must take some desired action
associated to T and state set XTB represents the set of states at which the global
system should not take such an action. Then the system must be able to distinguish
between states in XTA and states in X
T
B (under certain decentralized architecture,
which will be specified later) when a state in XTA is reached; otherwise, the desired
action associated to T cannot be taken safely.
Regarding the architecture of the decentralized decision-making problem, here we
consider the following mechanism, which is widely used in the literature for many
different problems [24, 47, 62, 69, 128]. We assume that communication between each
agent and the coordinator is costly and only a binary decision is allowed for each
agent at each instant. That is, each local agent can only send to the coordinator a
highly compressed decision “1” or “0”, which correspond to “take the action” and
“do not take the action”, respectively. Then, the coordinator has two possible fusion
rules to obtain a global decision from local decisions:
- the disjunctive rule: issues “1” globally, if and only if, one local agent issues “1”.
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- the conjunctive rule: issues “1” globally, if and only if, all local agents issue “1”.
Hereafter, we will develop the main results based on the disjunctive rule. We will
discuss how to extend our results to the conjunctive case in Section 6.6.
In general, the system may have multiple distinct objectives, i.e., it needs to
distinguish different states pairs for different purposes. For the sake of generality, we
consider m specifications and denote by T = {T1, . . . , Tm} the set of specifications,




B ⊆ X × X,Tk ∈ T. Also, for the sake of generality, for each
Tk ∈ T, we define ITk ⊆ I as the non-empty set of agents that can contribute to the
decision associated to Tk. If ITk is a singleton, then the global decision will be “1”
if the unique agent in ITk issues “1”. However, in the case that |ITk | > 1, since we
consider the disjunctive architecture, the global decision will be “1” if one agent in
ITk issues “1”. Therefore, an agent must be able to distinguish any states pair in Tk
unambiguously when it issues “1”; otherwise a wrong global decision may be made.
This observation leads to the following definition of decentralized distinguishability.
Definition 6.2.1. (Decentralized Distinguishability). Let G be the system, T =
{T1, . . . , Tm} be a set of specifications and Ω̄ = [Ω1,Ω2] be a pair of sensor activation





Intuitively, the above definition says the following. For any specification Tk ∈ T,
for any string that goes to a state in XTkA , i.e., a state at which we must take the
action associated to Tk, there must exist at least one local agent in ITk that knows
for sure that we can take such an action. Note that, in our setting, only XTkB are the
set of states at which we cannot take the action associated to Tk. In other words,
there is no harm in taking the action if the system is in X \ (XTkA ∪ X
Tk
B ). This is
why we require EGΩi(s) ∩ X
Tk
B = ∅ rather than EGΩi(s) ⊆ X
Tk
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Figure 6.1: Examples of sensor activation policies and observers
in Section 6.5 that K-codiagnosability, coobservability and coprognosability are all
instances of decentralized distinguishability. Note that, if XTkA ∩ X
Tk
B 6= ∅ for some
Tk ∈ T, then G will not be decentralized distinguishable for any sensor activation
policies Ω̄. This phenomenon may occur in the fault prognosis problem as we will
discuss later in Section 6.5.3.
Example 6.2.1. We consider the system G in Figure 6.1(a) and Σs,1 = {o, a},Σs,2 =
{o, b} and Σo,1 = Σo,2 = ∅ are two sets of observable events. We assume that the
observations are static, i.e., Ω1 = ΩΣs,1 and Ω2 = ΩΣs,2. Let us consider the following










B = {5, 7} × {1, 2, 4, 6}
and IT1 = IT2 = {1, 2}. We can verify that G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t.
{T1, T2} and [ΩΣs,1 ,ΩΣs,2 ]. For example, for specification T1 and string of1a such that
δ(of1a) = 6 ∈ XT1A , we have 1 ∈ IT1 and EGΩΣs,1 (of1a)∩X
T1
B = {6}∩{1, 2, 3, 5, 7} = ∅.
However, if we add another specification T3 = {4} × {1, 2} to {T1, T2}, then G will
not be decentralized distinguishable. For example, for δ(of1) = 4 ∈ XT3A , we have
EGΩΣs,1 (of1) ∩X
T3
B = {2, 4} ∩ {1, 2} 6= ∅ and EGΩΣs,2 (of1) ∩X
T3
B = {2, 4, 6} ∩ {1, 2} 6= ∅,
i.e., none of the agents can distinguish specification T3.
Remark 6.2.1. The state disambiguation problem and its sensor activation have been
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studied in the literature in the centralized setting; see, e.g., [22, 81, 102]. Compared
to its centralized counterpart, the decentralized disambiguation problem has the fol-
lowing important difference. In the centralized setting, specification XA × XB and
specification XB ×XA are equivalent in the sense that if the system can distinguish
state x1 from state x2, the it can also distinguish x2 from x1. However, it is not the
case in the decentralized setting and we cannot swap XA and XB arbitrarily. One
can easily verify that G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. XA × XB does not
necessarily imply that it is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. XB ×XA. Moreover,
our procedure for solving the sensor activation problem in the decentralized setting
is completely different from those in the centralized case.
6.2.2 Problem Formulation and Solution Overview
Let T be the set of specifications. Then the goal of the sensor activation problem is
to find an optimal pair of sensor activation policies Ω̄ = [Ω1,Ω2] such that the system
is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄ and T. In this chapter, we consider the logical
optimal criterion that is widely used in the literature [82, 101, 104]. Specifically, for
any Ω̄ = [Ω1,Ω2] and Ω̄
′ = [Ω′1,Ω
′
2], the inclusion Ω̄
′ ⊆ Ω̄ means that
∀i ∈ I : Ω′i ⊆ Ωi (6.3)
and the strict inclusion Ω̄′ ⊂ Ω̄ means that
[Ω̄′ ⊆ Ω̄] ∧ [∃i ∈ I : Ω′i ⊂ Ωi] (6.4)
We are now ready to formulate the problem of minimal sensor activation for
decentralized state disambiguation.
Problem 6. Let G be the system and T = {T1, . . . , Tm} be a set of specifications.
For each agent i ∈ {1, 2}, let Σo,i ⊆ Σ be the set of observable events. Find sensor
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activation policies Ω̄∗ = [Ω∗1,Ω
∗
2] such that:
C1. G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄∗ and T.
C2. Ω̄∗ is minimal, i.e., there does not exist another Ω̄′ ⊂ Ω̄∗ that satisfies (C1).
Remark 6.2.2. In [101, 104], “sub-optimal” solutions to two special cases of Problem
1, the decentralized control problem and the decentralized diagnosis problem, are
provided, in the sense that the solutions found therein are minimal among all solutions
over given finite restricted solution spaces. In principle, the solutions found in [101,
104] could be improved by employing finer partitions and repeating the optimization
procedure. In this chapter, we are aiming for a language-based minimal solution, in
the sense that the notion of strict inclusion of sensor activation policies is defined in
terms of the strings in L(G) (see Equations (5.4) and (6.4)). In other words, we do not
impose, a priori, any constraints on the solution space of each Ωi. Hence, no better
solution can be obtained by refining the state space of G and repeating the solution
procedure. To the best of our knowledge, such a language-based optimal solution to
the decentralized sensor activation problem has never been reported in the literature.
Moreover, Problem 1 is more general than the problems studied in [101,104].
Before we formally tackle Problem 6, let us first provide a brief overview of our so-
lution approach. We adopt the person-by-person approach that has been widely used
in decentralized optimization problems. Specifically, we decompose the decentralized
minimization problem to a set of centralized constrained minimization problems and
for each such problem, we only attempt to minimize one agent’s sensor activation
policy while the other one is fixed. However, the following questions arise. First,
by taking the person-by-person approach, iterations involving minimization for each
agent may be required in general, and such iterations may not terminate in a finite
number of steps. We will show that in our particular problem such iterations are not
required. This is due of the so-called monotonicity property that arises in dynamic
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sensor activation problems. The second question of interest is how to minimize the
sensor activation policy of one agent when the policy of the other agent is fixed. This
problem is different from the fully centralized minimization problem, since we should
not only consider the information of the agent whose sensor activation policy we are
minimizing, but we must also take into account the information available to the other
agent, whose sensor activation policy is fixed. Therefore, the true information state
for this minimization problem consist of (i) the knowledge of the agent whose sen-
sor activation policy is being minimized; and (ii) this agent’s inference of the other
agent’s potential knowledge of the system based on that agent’s own information. To
resolve this information dependency, we develop a novel approach by which we encode
the second agent’s knowledge into the system model. This is discussed in the next
section.
6.3 Constrained Minimization Problem
In this section, we tackle problem of minimizing the sensor activation policy for one
agent when the sensor activation policy of the other one is fixed. This problem is also
referred to as the centralized constrained minimization problem herafter. Throughout
this section, i ∈ {1, 2} denotes the agent whose sensor activation policy is being
minimized while j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i denotes the other agent whose sensor activation
policy is fixed.
6.3.1 Constrained Minimization Problem
Problem 7. (Centralized Constrained Minimization Problem). Let G be the system
and T = {T1, . . . , Tm} be a set of specifications. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j be two agents.
Suppose that the sensor activation policy Ωj for Agent j is fixed. Find a sensor
activation policy Ωi for Agent i such that:
C1. G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. [Ω1,Ω2] and T.
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C2. For any Ω′i satisfying (C1), we have Ω
′
i 6⊂ Ωi.
The above problem is different from both the centralized and decentralized min-
imization problems. In the centralized minimization problem, where only one agent
is involved, to maintain distinguishability, we need to require that
∀Tk ∈ T,∀s ∈ L(G) : (EGΩ (s)× EGΩ (s)) ∩ Tk = ∅
where Ω is the centralized sensor activation policy. In other words, the agent should
always be able to distinguish states in XTkA from states in X
Tk
B for any Tk ∈ T.
However, in the decentralized disambiguation problem, it is possible that there exists
a string s ∈ L(G), δ(s) ∈ XTkA such that EGΩi(s) ∩ X
Tk
B 6= ∅, but EGΩj(s) ∩ X
Tk
B = ∅,
where j ∈ ITk . Therefore, Agent j may “help” Agent i to resolve the ambiguity. In
other words, to solve the constrained minimization problem for one agent, we must
take the other agent’s sensor activation policy into account.
6.3.2 Problem Reduction
Recall that, in Chapter IV, we have solved a general class of fully centralized
sensor activation problems. Therefore, if we can reduce Problem 7 to Problem 5,
then it means that Problem 7 can also be solved effectively and the solution will be
finitely realizable. We now show that such a reduction is possible by using automata
V and Ṽ, which are defined next.
Let G be the system and Ωj be the fixed sensor activation policy, where Ωj =






0,R). We define a new automaton
V = (XV , δV ,ΣV , x0,V ) (6.5)
where
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• XV ⊆ X ×XjR ×X ×X
j
R is the set of states;
• ΣV = (Σ ∪ {ε})× (Σ ∪ {ε}) is the set of events;
• x0,V = (x0, xj0,R, x0, x
j
0,R) is the initial state;
The transition function δV : XV × ΣV → XV is defined by: for any (x1, xR1 , x2, xR2 )
and σ ∈ Σ, the following transitions are defined:
• If σ ∈ Lj(xR1 ) and σ ∈ Lj(xR2 ), then
δV ((x1, x
R
1 , x2, x
R









• If σ ∈ Lj(xR1 ) and σ /∈ Lj(xR2 ), then
δV ((x1, x
R
1 , x2, x
R
2 ), (ε, σ)) = (x1, x
R





• If σ /∈ Lj(xR1 ) and σ ∈ Lj(xR2 ), then
δV ((x1, x
R
1 , x2, x
R




1 , σ), x2, x
R
2 )
• If σ /∈ Lj(xR1 ) and σ /∈ Lj(xR2 ), then
δV ((x1, x
R
1 , x2, x
R









1 , x2, x
R
2 ), (ε, σ)) = (x1, x
R





The above construction follows the well-known M-machine (or twin-plant) con-
struction that was originally used for the verification of (co)observability [33, 67, 99];
but we generalize it to the dynamic observation setting. Essentially, V tracks a
pair of strings that look the same for Agent j under Ωj. Specifically, the first two
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components are used to track a string in the original system and the last two com-
ponents are used to track a string that looks the same as the first string. Since we
are considering the dynamic observation setting, we also need to track states in the
sensor activation policy in order to determine the set of monitored events; this is
why the second (respectively, fourth) component always moves together with the first
(respectively, third) component. Therefore, for any (s1, s2) ∈ L(V), we have that
PΩj(s1) = PΩj(s2). Similarly, for any t, w ∈ L(G) such that PΩj(t) = PΩj(w), there
exists (s1, s2) ∈ L(V) such that s1 = t and s2 = w, i.e., state (δ(t), δjR(t), δ(w), δ
j
R(w))
is reachable in V.
Next, we modify V as follows. For each transition in V,
• if the event is in the form of (σ, σ) or (σ, ε), then we replace the event by σ;
• if the event is in the form of (ε, σ), then we replace the event by ε.
We denote by Ṽ = (QṼ , δṼ ,ΣṼ , x0,Ṽ ) the modified automaton. Similar modification
was also used in [127, 131] in the static observation setting for different purpose.
Intuitively, Ṽ only keeps the first component of the event of each transition in V ,
since this part corresponds to the transition in the real system. Note that Ṽ is a
non-deterministic automaton, since ε-transition is allowed. Therefore, δṼ (s) is the set
of states that can be reached from x0,Ṽ via s.
The modified automaton Ṽ has the following properties. First, we have that
L(Ṽ) = L(G). Clearly, L(Ṽ) ⊆ L(G) since a transition in Ṽ is defined only when
the corresponding transition in G is defined. Also, for any string s ∈ L(G), we know
that (s, s) ∈ L(V), which implies that s ∈ L(Ṽ). Second, for any s ∈ L(Ṽ) = L(G),
we know that




R(t))∈XṼ : (s, t) ∈ L(V )} (6.6)
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Figure 6.2: Automaton Ṽ.
Therefore, for any string s ∈ L(G) = L(Ṽ), if (x1, xR1 , x2, xR2 ) ∈ δṼ (s), then it implies
that δ(s) = x1 and state x2 cannot be distinguished from x1 under Ωj. For any
q ∈ 2XṼ , we denote by I1(q) = {x1 ∈ X : (x1, xR1 , x2, xR2 ) ∈ q} the set of states in the
first component of q. Then, for any sensor activation policy Ω, by Equation (6.6), we
have EGΩ (s) = I1(EṼΩ (s)) for any s ∈ L(G).
Example 6.3.1. Let us still consider the system G shown in Figure 6.1(a). Suppose
that the fixed Ωj is the sensor activation policy Ω2 shown in Figure 6.1(d), i.e., Ωj
always monitors o and b. Then automaton Ṽ constructed from G and Ωj is shown
in Figure 6.2. Clearly, we see that L(Ṽ) = L(G). For string of1a ∈ L(Ṽ) =
L(G), we have that δṼ (of1a) = {(6, 1, 2, 1), (6, 1, 4, 1), (6, 1, 6, 1)} and I1(E ṼΩj(of1a)) =
I1({(2, 1, 2, 1), (4, 1, 2, 1), (6, 1, 2, 1), (2, 1, 4, 1), (4, 1, 4, 1), (2, 1, 6, 1), (4, 1, 6, 1),
(6, 1, 6, 1)}) = {2, 4, 6} = EGΩj(of1a).
Now, let us show how to use Ṽ to reduce the constraint minimization problem,
i.e., Problem 7, to a fully centralized minimization problem, i.e., Problem 5. First, we
define the distinguishability function DF : 2XṼ → {0, 1} as follows: for each q ∈ 2XṼ ,
DF (q)=
 1, if ∀Tk ∈ T : (c-i) or (c-ii) holds0, otherwise (6.7)
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where conditions (c-i) and (c-ii) are defined by:
(c-i) i ∈ ITk and (I1(q)× I1(q)) ∩ Tk = ∅.
(c-ii) j ∈ ITk and ∀x1 ∈ I1(q) ∩X
Tk
A ,∀(x1, xR1 , x2, xR2 ) ∈ q : (x1, x2) /∈ Tk.
Let us explain the intuition of the above two conditions in function DF . Suppose
that Ωi is the sensor activation policy to be synthesized for Agent i. Let s ∈ L(G) be a
string such that δ(s) ∈ XTkA , i.e., the coordinator must take the action associated to Tk
when s is executed. Then EṼΩi(s) is the state estimate w.r.t. the state space of Ṽ under
Ωi. Essentially, function DF evaluates whether or not decentralized distinguishability
is fulfilled by checking whether or not q := EṼΩi(s) satisfies conditions (c-i) and (c-ii),
which can be interpreted as follows.
- If (c-i) holds, then we know that Agent i can contribute to the global decision
associated to Tk, since i ∈ ITk . Moreover, it can contribute the right decision




(s)) ∩ Tk = ∅. Therefore, the disambiguation requirement is fulfilled
even without looking at Agent j.
- If (c-i) does not hold, then we know that either Agent i cannot contribute to to
the global decision associated to Tk or Agent i cannot make a right decision due to
states ambiguity, i.e., ∃x1, x2 ∈ EGΩi(s) = I1(E
Ṽ
Ωi
(s)) : (x1, x2) ∈ Tk. In order to issue
the right global decision, Agent j must be able to help Agent i to distinguish those
ambiguous strings, i.e., condition (c-ii) needs to hold. First, Agent j should be able
to contribute to the global decision associated to Tk, i.e., j ∈ ITk . Then, for any
string t that looks the same as s for Agent i and leads to a state in XTkA , there should
not exist another string w that looks the same as t for Agent j and leads to a state in
XTkB . Recall that Ṽ is constructed by tracking all states that cannot be distinguished
from x1 by Agent j. Therefore, Agent i can infer which states Agent j cannot
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distinguish by using Ṽ. Specifically, if for any (x1, x
R
1 , x2, x
R
2 ) ∈ q : (x1, x2) /∈ Tk,
then we know that there is no such a string w that can confuse Agent j for some
string t, i.e., Agent j can make a right decision associated to Tk.
Finally, we would like to remark that, although specification T is defined over the
state space of G, the distinguishability function DF is defined over the state space
of Ṽ, i.e., we need to solve Problem 3 for the modified system Ṽ. However, this is
not a problem, since the first component of a state Ṽ exactly carries the same state
information in G, i.e., I1(EṼΩi(s)) = E
G
Ωi
(s) for any Ωi. Moreover, since L(Ṽ) = L(G),
we know that Ṽ and G have the same observable behavior under any sensor activation
policy. Therefore, we can first use Ṽ to synthesize a sensor activation policy and then
use it to monitor G.
We summarize the above discussions by the following theorem.
Theorem VI.1. Let G be the system and T = {T1, . . . , Tm} be a set of specifica-
tions. Let Ṽ be the automaton constructed based on Ωj. Then, G is decentralized
distinguishable w.r.t. [Ω1,Ω2] and T if and only if
∀s ∈ L(G) : DF (E ṼΩi(s)) = 1 (6.8)
Proof. (⇐) By contraposition. Suppose that L(G) is not decentralized distinguish-






Let us consider the following three cases for ITk .
Case 1: ITk = {i}.
Let us consider (c-i), since (c-ii) is violated directly. By Equation (6.9), since δ(s) ∈
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XTkA ∩ EGΩi(s) and X
Tk








Therefore, (c-i) is also violated and DF (EṼΩi(s)) = 0.
Case 2: ITk = {j}.
Let us consider (c-ii), since (c-i) is violated directly. We still consider string s in




A . Since EGΩj(s)∩X
Tk
B 6=
∅, we know that there exists a string t ∈ L(G) such that PΩj(s) = PΩj(t) and
δ(t) ∈ XTkB . This implies that (δ(s), δ(t)) ∈ Tk. Since PΩj(s) = PΩj(t), by the
construction of Ṽ, we know that (δ(s), δjR(s), δ(t), δ
j
R(t)) ∈ δṼ (s) ⊆ EṼΩi(s). Therefore,
we know that (c-ii) is also violated and DF (EṼΩi(s)) = 0.
Case 3: ITk = {1, 2}.
For string s in Equation (6.9), since EGΩi(s)∩X
Tk
B 6=∅, by the same argument in Case 1,
we know that (c-i) does not hold. Also, since EGΩj(s)∩X
Tk
B 6= ∅, by the same argument
in Case 2, we know that (c-ii) also does not hold. Therefore, DF (EṼΩi(s)) = 1.
Overall, for each case, ∃s ∈ L(G) : DF (EṼΩi(s)) = 1, which completes the contra-
positive proof.
(⇒) Still by contrapositive. Suppose that ∃s ∈ L(G) : DF (EṼΩi(s)) = 0. Then
we know that, there exists Tk ∈T such that none of (c-i) and (c-ii) holds for EṼΩi(s).
Next, we still consider the following three cases for ITk .
Case 1: ITk = {i}.







Tk 6= ∅. This implies that ∃w ∈ L(G) such that δ(w) ∈ XTkA , PΩi(s) = PΩi(w) and
EGΩi(w) ∩X
Tk
B = EGΩi(s) ∩X
Tk
B 6= ∅. Therefore, for Tk ∈ T, we have (∃w∈L(G) :δ(t)∈
XTkA )[EGΩi(w) ∩X
Tk
B 6=∅], i.e., G is not decentralized distinguishable.
Case 2: ITk = {j}.
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1 , x2, x
R
2 )∈EṼΩi(s) : (x1, x2) ∈ Tk
Since (x1, x
R
1 , x2, x
R
2 ) ∈ EṼΩi(s), we know that there exists a string t ∈ L(Ṽ) = L(G),
such that PΩi(s) = PΩi(t) and (x1, x
R
1 , x2, x
R
2 ) ∈ δṼ (t), which further implies that
x1 = δ(t) and there exists w ∈ L(G) such that x2 = δ(w) and PΩj(t) = PΩj(w).
Therefore, {x1, x2} ⊆ EGΩj(t) = E
G
Ωj
(w). Since (x1, x2) ∈ Tk, we know that x1 ∈ XTkA





i.e., G is not decentralized distinguishable.
Case 3: ITk = {1, 2}.
Since (c-ii) does not hold, by the same argument in Case 2, we know that there exists




B 6=∅. Since (c-i) does
not hold, by the same argument in Case 1, we know that EGΩi(s) ∩ X
Tk
B 6= ∅. Since
PΩi(s) = PΩi(t), we have EGΩi(t) ∩X
Tk
B 6=∅. Therefore, we know that





i.e., G is not decentralized distinguishable.
Overall, G is not decentralized distinguishable for each case. This completes the
contrapositive proof.
In the above development, the essence of using Ṽ is that we can encode Agen-
t j’s information, i.e., Ωj, into the system model in order to reduce the constrained
minimization problem for Agent i to a fully centralized minimization problem. That
is, Ṽ is a non-deterministic refinement of G that carries both the original state in-
formation in G and some useful information of Ωj. Once Ṽ is constructed, we will
not use Ωj anymore, since all useful information, i.e., which pairs of states Agent j
cannot distinguish, has been encoded in Ṽ. Finally, using Theorem VI.1, we have the
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following result.
Theorem VI.2. Problem 7 can be effectively solved.
Proof. By Theorem VI.1, it is clear that Problem 7 is a special case of Problem 5 by
considering system Ṽ and setting ϕ to be DF : 2XṼ → {0, 1}. Since Problem 5 can
be effectively solved, Problem 7 can also be effectively solved.
Example 6.3.2. We return to the system G in Figure 6.1(a) with Σs,1 = {o, a} and
Σs,2 = {o, b}. We still consider specifications T = {T1, T2} defined in Example 6.2.1.
We assume that sensor activation policy Ω2 shown in Figure 6.1(d) is fixed for Agent 2
and the corresponding automaton Ṽ has been shown in Figure 6.2. Now, we want to
synthesize sensor activation policy Ω1 such that G is decentralized distinguishable. By
defining function DF for Ṽ and applying the synthesis algorithm in [112], we obtain
a minimal sensor activation policy Ω∗1 shown in Figure 6.3(a).
For example, for specification T1, we consider string of1a such that δ(of1a) =
6 ∈ XTkA . Then we have q = E ṼΩ∗1(of1a) = {(6, 1, 6, 1)}, i.e., I1(q) = {6}. There-
fore, condition (c-i) holds for q and we have DF (q) = 1. For specification T2, let
us consider string f2b such that δ(f2b) = 5 ∈ XT2A . Then we have q = E ṼΩ∗1(f2b) =
{(1, 1, 1, 1), (3, 1, 1, 1, ), (1, 1, 3, 1), (3, 1, 3, 1), (5, 1, 5, 1), (7, 1, 7, 1)}, i.e., I1(q) = {1, 3, 5, 7}.
For this case, condition (c-i) does not hold for q since 1 ∈ I1(q) ∩XT2B . However, for
5 ∈ I1(q) ∩XT2A = {5, 7}, (5, 1, 5, 1) is the only state in q whose first component is 5
and (5, 5) /∈ T2. Similarly, for 7 ∈ I1(q)∩XT2A , (7, 1, 7, 1) is the only state in q whose
first component is 7 and (7, 7) /∈ T2. Therefore, condition (c-ii) holds and we still
have DF (q) = 1.
6.4 Synthesis Algorithm
In this section, we first present an algorithm that solves the decentralized sensor





1 Ω∗1 ← ΩΣo,1∪Σs,1 and Ω∗2 ← ΩΣo,2∪Σs,2
2 for i ∈ {1, 2} do
3 j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}
4 Fix Ω∗j . Construct automaton Ṽ w.r.t. Ω
∗
j and define function DF .
5 Obtain minimal Ω′i by solving Problem 5 w.r.t. system Ṽ and function
DF .
6 Ω∗i ← Ω′i.
7 Ω̄∗ ← [Ω∗1,Ω∗2]
correctness of the algorithm.
Our synthesis algorithm is formally presented in Algorithm D-MIN-ACT. Essen-
tially, Algorithm D-MIN-ACT solves two centralized constrained minimization prob-
lems. First, we set Agent 2’s sensor activation policy to be ΩΣo,2 ∪Σs,2, i.e., the most
conservative one, and solve the constrained minimization problem for Agent 1. Then
we fix the obtained sensor activation policy for Agent 1 and solve the constrained
minimization problem for Agent 2. However, the following question arises: “After the
above procedure, do we need to fix Agent 2’s new sensor activation policy and go back
to minimize Agent 1’s sensor activation policy again?” In other words, we need to
answer whether or not iterations between two centralized constrained minimization
problems are required in order to obtain a decentralized minimal solution. Here-
after, we show that such iterations are not necessary for our problem and Algorithm
D-MIN-ACT indeed yields a decentralized minimal solution in the above two steps.
This is because of the following monotonicity property.
Theorem VI.1. (Monotonicity Property). Let G be the system, T be a set of spec-
ifications and Ω̄ = [Ω1,Ω2] and Ω̄
′ = [Ω′1,Ω
′
2] be two sensor activation policies such
that Ω̄′ ⊆ Ω̄. Then G decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄′ and T implies that G is
decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄ and T.
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Proof. By contradition. Assume that G is not decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄,
i.e., ∃Tk ∈ T,∃s ∈ L(G) : δ(s)∈XTkA such that ∀i∈{1, 2} : EGΩi(s) ∩X
Tk
B 6= ∅. Since




s ∈ L(G). Therefore, for the same Tk and s, we also have that ∀i∈{1, 2} : EGΩ′i(s) ∩
XTkB 6= ∅. However, this contradicts the fact that G is decentralized distinguishable
w.r.t. Ω̄′. Therefore, G must be decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄.
We are now ready to prove the correctness of Algorithm D-MIN-ACT.
Theorem VI.2. Let Ω̄∗ be the output of Algorithm D-MIN-ACT. Then Ω̄∗ solves
Problem 6.
Proof. It is clear that G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄∗ and T, since decen-
tralized distinguishability is guaranteed in each centralized constrained minimization
problem. It remains to show that Ω̄∗ is minimal; we proceed by contradiction. Let
us assume that there exists another sensor activation policy Ω̄′ = [Ω′1,Ω
′
2] such that
G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄′ and T; and (ii) Ω̄′ ⊂ Ω̄∗. The second
condition means that ∃i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j such that (iii) Ω′i ⊂ Ω∗i ; and (iv) Ω′j ⊆ Ω∗j .
Suppose that i = 1 and j = 2. Then we know that Ω∗1 is obtained by fixing Agent
2’s sensor activation policy to be ΩΣo,2∪Σs,2 , where Ω
′
2 ⊆ Ω∗2 ⊆ ΩΣo,2∪Σs,2 . By Theo-
rem VI.1, we know that G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. [Ω′1,Ω
′
2] implies that
G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. [Ω′1,ΩΣo,2∪Σs,2 ]. However, since Ω
′
1 ⊂ Ω∗1, this
contradicts to the fact that Ω∗1 is a solution to Problem 7. Similarly, suppose that i=2
and j = 1. Then we know that Ω∗2 is obtained by fixing Agent 1’s sensor activation
policy to be Ω∗1, where Ω
′
1 ⊆ Ω∗1. By Theorem VI.1, we know that G is decentralized
distinguishable w.r.t. [Ω′1,Ω
′
2] implies that G is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t.
[Ω∗1,Ω
′
2]. However, since Ω
′
2 ⊂ Ω∗2, it again contradicts the fact that Ω∗2 is a solution
to Problem 7.
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Figure 6.3: Decentralized minimal solutions
Example 6.4.1. Again, consider the system G in Figure 6.1(a) and specifications
T = {T1, T2} defined in Example 6.2.1. Let Σs,1 = {o, a} and Σs,2 = {s, b}, re-
spectively, be the set of observable events for Agent 1 and Agent 2. Initially, we set
Ω2 = ΩΣs,2 and solve the constrained minimization problem for Agent 1; this has been
solved in Example 6.3.2 and we obtained Ω∗1 shown in Figure 6.3(a). Next, we fix
Ω∗1 for Agent 1 and solve the constrained minimization problem for Agent 2. Then
we obtain the sensor activation policy Ω∗2 as shown in Figure 6.3(b). We see that Ω
∗
2
turns all sensors off after b is observed, since once b occurs, Agent 2 will know for sure
that the system is in state 5 or 7 and there is no need to monitor any event. There-
fore, [Ω∗1,Ω
∗
2] is a minimal pair of sensor activation policies that ensure decentralized
distinguishability.
Remark 6.4.1. In general, the minimal solution to Problem 6 is not unique due to
the following reasons. First, for each centralized constraint minimization problem in-
volved in Algorithm D-MIN-ACT, the minimal solution is not unique in general [112].
There may exist two incomparable centralized minimal solutions to Problem 2 or 3.
Second, the decentralized minimal solution obtained by Algorithm D-MIN-ACT also
depends on the order of the centralized constraint minimization problems. In general,
fixing Agent 1 first and fixing Agent 2 first may result in different minimal solutions.
However, in any case, solution Ω̄∗ returned by Algorithm D-MIN-ACT is guaranteed
to be minimal in the sense that other minimal solutions must be incomparable with
Ω̄∗.
Remark 6.4.2. We conclude this section by discussing the complexity of synthesis
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algorithm. Suppose that we first fix Agent 2. Initially, Ω2 = ΩΣs,2∪Σo,2 and its
automaton only contains a single state. To solve the constraint optimization problem
when Ω2 is fixed, first, we need to construct Ṽ, which is polynomial in the size of G and
Ω2. However, since an observer-like constructed is exploited, the algorithm in [112]
requires exponential complexity w.r.t the size of the system, i.e., Ṽ, and the size of the
solution Ω∗1 is also exponential in the size of Ṽ. Again, constructing Ṽ when Agent 1
is fixed only requires polynomial complexity w.r.t. Ω∗1, but synthesizing Ω
∗
2 requires
exponential complexity again. Therefore, the overall complexity is doubly-exponential
w.r.t. the size of G. Such a doubly-exponential complexity arises in many synthesis
problems where two incomparable observations are involved; see, e.g., [26, 59].
6.5 Application of the Decentralized State Disambiguation
Problem
In this section, we show that the notions of K-codiagnosability, coobservability
and coprognosability are instances of decentralized distinguishability. Therefore, the
proposed framework is applicable for solving the dynamic sensor activation problems
for the purposes of decentralized fault diagnosis, decentralized control and decentral-
ized fault prognosis.
6.5.1 Decentralized Fault Diagnosis
In the decentralized fault diagnosis problem, the local agents need to work as a
team such that any fault be diagnosed within a bounded number of steps. Formally,
we denote by ΣF ⊆ Σuo the set of fault events. We assume that ΣF is partitioned
into m fault types : ΣF = ΣF1∪̇ . . . ∪̇ΣFm ; we denote by Π the partition and by
F = {1, . . . ,m} the index set of the fault types. For any k ∈ F , we define Ψ(EFk) =
{sf ∈ L(G) : f ∈ EFk} to be the set of strings that end with a fault event of type
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k. We write EFk ∈ s, if {s} ∩ Ψ(EFk) 6= ∅. The notion of K-codiagnosability was
proposed in the literature to capture whether or not any fault can be diagnosed within
K steps [24, 62].
Definition 6.5.1. (K-Codiagnosability). Let K ∈ N. We say that live language
L(G) is K-codiagnosable w.r.t. Ω̄, ΣF and Π if
(∀k ∈ F)(∀s ∈ Ψ(ΣFk))(∀t ∈ L(G)/s : |t| ≥ K) (6.10)
(∃i ∈ {1, 2})(∀w ∈ L(G))[PΩi(w)=PΩi(st)⇒ ΣFk ∈ w].
To show that K-codiagnosability can be formulated as decentralized distinguisha-
bility, following similar constructions in [22, 111], we first refine the state space of G
by defining a new automaton G̃ = (X̃,Σ, δ̃, x̃0), where X̃ ⊆ X × {−1, 0, 1 . . . , K}m,
x̃0 = (x0,−1, . . . ,−1) and the partial transition function δ̃ : X̃ × Σ → X̃ is defined
by: for any (x, n1, . . . , nm) ∈ X̃ and σ ∈ Σ, we have
δ̃((x, n1, . . . , nm), σ) = (δ(x, σ), n1 + ∆1, . . . , nm + ∆m)
where for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ∆i is defined by
∆i =
 0, if [ni = K] or [ni = −1 ∧ σ 6∈ ΣFi ]1 if [0 ≤ ni < K] or [ni = −1 ∧ σ ∈ ΣFi ]
Intuitively, G̃ simply unfolds G by “counting” the number of steps since each type
of fault has occurred. Since L(G̃) = L(G), we can synthesize a sensor activation
policy for G based on G̃. For any state x̃ = (x, n1, . . . , nm) ∈ G̃, we denote by [x̃]i
its (i+ 1)th component, i.e., ni.
Based on G̃, we define a set of specifications Tdiag = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm} as follows:
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for each Tk ∈ T, we have
XTkA = {x∈X̃ : [x]k=K} and X
Tk
B = {x∈X̃ : [x]k=−1}
The following result reveals that, to enforce K-codiagnosability, it suffices to enforce
decentralized distinguishability for Tdiag.
Theorem VI.1. A live language L(G) is K-codiagnosable w.r.t. Ω̄, ΣF and Π, if
and only if, G̃ is decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄ and Tdiag.
Proof. (⇒) By contraposition. Suppose that G̃ is not decentralized distinguishable.
Then we know that there exist k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a string s ∈ L(G) such that
x := δ̃(s) ∈ XTkA and for each i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists xi ∈ EG̃Ωi(s) such that xi ∈ X
Tk
B .
Then we know that, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists a string si ∈ L(G) such that
δ̃(si) = xi and PΩi(s) = PΩi(si). By the definition of Tk, x ∈ X
Tk
A implies that
[x]k = K. According to the construction of G̃, δ̃(s) = x implies that we can write
s = uv such that u ∈ Ψ(ΣFk) and |v| ≥ K. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, since xi ∈ X
Tk
B , we
know that [xi]k = −1, which implies that ΣFk /∈ si. Overall, we know that
(∃k∈F)(∃u∈Ψ(ΣFk))(∃v∈L(G)/u : |v|≥K)
(∀i∈{1, 2})(∃si∈L(G))[PΩi(uv)=PΩi(si)∧ΣFi 6∈si] (6.11)
i.e., L(G) is not K-codiagnosable.
(⇒) Still by contraposition. Suppose that G̃ is not K-codiagnosable, i.e., Equa-
tion (6.11) holds. Let x := δ̃(uv), x1 := δ̃(s1) and x2 := δ̃(s2). Then, according to
the definition of G̃, we know that [x]k = K, [x1]k = [x2]k = −1, which implies that
x ∈ XTkA and x1, x2 ∈ X
Tk
B . Moreover, since for each i = 1, 2, PΩi(uv) = PΩi(si), we
know that xi ∈ EG̃Ωi(si) = E
G̃
Ωi
(uv), i.e., EG̃Ωi(uv) ∩ X
Tk
B 6= ∅. Overall, we know that
(∃Tk ∈ T)(∃uv ∈ L(G̃) : δ̃(uv) ∈XTkA )(∀i ∈ {1, 2})[EG̃Ωi(uv) ∩ X
Tk
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Figure 6.4: Augmented system G̃
decentralized distinguishable w.r.t. Tdiag.
Example 6.5.1. Let us consider again system G shown in Figure 6.1(a). Suppose
that ΣF = ΣF1∪̇ΣF2 = {f1}∪̇{f2}. Let us consider K = 1. Then the refined au-
tomaton G̃ is shown in Figure 6.4. For example, state x = (6, 1,−1) means that:
(i) the system is at state 6 in G; (ii) f1 has occurred for more than one step (since
[x]1 = K); and (iii) f2 has not occurred (since [x]2 = −1). Then Tdiag = {T1, T2} is
defined by T1 = {(6, 1,−1)}×{(1,−1,−1), (2,−1,−1), (3,−1, 0), (5,−1, 1), (7,−1, 1)}
and T2 = {(5,−1, 1), (7,−1, 1)} × {(1,−1,−1), (2,−1,−1), (4, 0,−1), (6, 1,−1)}. S-
ince G̃ and G are isomorphic for this specific example, we see that Tdiag is indeed the
same specification T defined in Example 6.2.1. Therefore, the solution we obtained in
Example 6.4.1 has solved the sensor activation problem for 1-codiagnosability.
6.5.2 Decentralized Supervisory Control
Another important decentralized decision-making problem is the decentralized
supervisory control problem [69, 128]. In this problem, each local agent i ∈ I can
disable events in Σc,i ⊆ Σ dynamically based on its local observation Ωi. We define
Σc = ∪i∈IΣc,i as the set of all controllable events and for each σ ∈ Σc, we define
Ic(σ) = {i ∈ I : σ ∈ Σc,i} as the set of agents that can disable σ. The control
objective is to make sure that the closed-loop system achieves a desired language
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L(H) ⊆ L(G). The key property regarding the decentralized information in this
problem is the notion of coobservability ; it together with the notion of controllability
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for exactly achieving a given specifi-
cation language. We recall its definition from [69].
Definition 6.5.2. (Coobservability). We say that L(G) is coobservable w.r.t. L(H),
Σc,1,Σc,2 and Ω̄ if
(∀s ∈ L(H))(∀σ ∈ Σc : sσ ∈ L(G) \ L(H))(∃i ∈ Ic(σk))[P−1Ωi (PΩi(s)){σ} ∩ L(H) = ∅]
Hereafter, we assume w.o.l.g. thatH = (XH ,Σ, δH , x0,H) is a strict sub-automaton
of G. Now, suppose that Σc = {σ1, . . . , σm} is the set of controllable events. We define
a set of specifications Tcont = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm} as follows: for each Tk ∈ T, we have
XTkA ={x ∈ XH : δ(q, σk)! ∧ δH(q, σk)¬!}
XTkB ={x ∈ XH : δH(q, σk)!}
with ITk = Ic(σk), where “¬!” means “is not defined”.
Intuitively, for each controllable event σk ∈ Σc, XTkA is the set of states at which
σk must be disabled for safety purposes, while X
Tk
A is the set of states at which σk
must be enabled to achieve L(H). The following result reveals that coobservability
is also a special case of decentralized distinguishability with Tcont.
Theorem VI.2. Let G be the system and H be the specification automaton. Then
L(G) is coobservable w.r.t. L(H), Σc,1,Σc,2 and Ω̄, if and only if, G is decentralized
distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄ and Tcont.
Proof. (⇒) By contraposition. Suppose that G is not decentralized distinguishable.
Then we know that there exist Tk ∈ T, s ∈ L(G) : δ(s) ∈ XTkA such that for each




σk ∈ Σc be the controllable event associated to Tk. Then δ(s) ∈ XTkA implies that
s ∈ L(H), sσk ∈ L(G) \ L(H) and δ(ti) ∈ XTkB implies that tiσk ∈ L(H). Moreover,
ITk = Ic(σk). Overall, we know that ∃s ∈ L(H), σk ∈ Σc such that sσk ∈ L(G)\L(H)
and for each i ∈ Ic(σk), tiσk ∈ P−1Ωi (PΩi(s)){σk} ∩ L(H) 6= ∅, i.e., L(G) is not
coobservable.
(⇔) By contraposition. Suppose that L(G) is not coobservable. Then we know
that ∃s ∈ L(H), σk ∈ Σc : sσk ∈ L(G) \ L(H) such that for each i ∈ Ic(σk), there
exists ti ∈ L(G) such that tiσk ∈ L(H) and PΩi(s) = PΩi(ti). For the above s and
ti, we know that δ(s) ∈ XTkA and δ(ti) ∈ X
Tk
B . Therefore, for s and σk, we know that
for each i ∈ ITk = Ic(σk), δ(ti) ∈ EGΩi(ti) ∩ X
Tk
B = EGΩi(s) ∩ X
Tk
B 6= ∅, i.e., G is not
decentralized distinguishable.
6.5.3 Decentralized Fault Prediction
In some safety-critical systems, we may not only want to diagnose any fault after
its occurrence, but also want to predict any fault before it occurs [29]. In [47], the no-
tion of coprognosability was proposed to capture whether or not any fault occurrence
can be predicted in a decentralized system. The definition is reviewed as follows.
Definition 6.5.3. (Coprognosability). We say that language L(G) is coprognosable
w.r.t. Ω̄ and ΣF if
(∀s ∈ Ψ(ΣF ))(∃t ∈ {s} : ΣF 6∈ t)(∃i ∈ {1, 2})(∀u ∈ P−1Ωi (PΩi(t)) : ΣF /∈ u)
(∃K ∈ N)(∀v ∈ L(G)/u)[|v| ≥ K ⇒ ΣF ∈ uv]
Still, we assume that the state space of G is partitioned as X = XN ∪̇XF such
that ∀s ∈ L(G) : δ(s) ∈ XN ⇔ ΣF 6∈ s; and ∀s ∈ L(G) : δ(s) ∈ XF ⇔ ΣF ∈ s. And
we still denote by NX and ∂X the set of non-indicator states and the set of boundary
states, respectively.
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With these notions, we define a simple specification Tpre := {T1}, where XT1A =
∂X and X
T1
B = NX with IT1 = I. The following result reveals that, to enforce
coprognosability, it suffices to enforce decentralized distinguishability with Tpre.
Theorem VI.3. L(G) is coprognosable w.r.t. Ω̄ and ΣF , if and only if, G is decen-
tralized distinguishable w.r.t. Ω̄ and Tpre.
Proof. (⇒) By contraposition. Suppose that G is not decentralized distinguishable.
Then we know that there exists s ∈ L(G) such that x := δ(s) ∈ ∂X and for each
i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists xi ∈ EGΩi(s) such that xi ∈ NX , i.e., there exists a string
si ∈ L(G) such that ΣF /∈ si, δ(si) = xi and PΩi(s) = PΩi(si). Since x ∈ ∂X , we
know that ∃f ∈ ΣF : sf ∈ Ψ(ΣF ). Let t ∈ {s} be an arbitrary prefix of s such that
ΣF /∈ t. Then for each i ∈ {1, 2}, since PΩi(s) = PΩi(si), we know that
∀t ∈ {s}, ∃ti ∈ {si} : PΩi(t) = PΩi(ti) ∧ ΣF /∈ ti (6.12)
Moreover, since xi ∈ NX which is reachable from δ(ti), we know that, for any K ∈ N,
there exists a string wi such that tiwi ∈ L(G), ΣF /∈ tiwi and |wi| ≥ K. Overall, we
know that
(∃sf ∈ Ψ(ΣF ))(∀t ∈ {sf} : ΣF 6∈ t)(∀i ∈ {1, 2})(∃ti ∈ P−1Ωi (PΩi(t)) : ΣF /∈ ti) (6.13)
(∀K ∈ N)(∃wi ∈ L(G)/ti)[|wi| ≥ K ∧ ΣF 6∈ tiwi]
i.e., G is not coprognosable w.r.t. Ω̄ and ΣF .
(⇐) Suppose that G is not coprognosable, i.e., Equation (6.13) holds. Let sf be
a string satisfying Equation (6.13). Let t a prefix of s such that ΣF /∈ t and tf ′ ∈ {s}
for some f ′ ∈ ΣF . Then we know that x := δ(t) ∈ ∂X . According to Equation (6.13)
, we know that, for each agent i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists a string ti ∈ L(G) such
that 1) ΣF /∈ ti; and 2) (∀K ∈ N)(∃wi ∈ L(G)/ti)[|wi| ≥ K ∧ ΣF 6∈ tiwi]; and 3)
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PΩi(ti) = PΩi(t). The first two conditions imply that xi := δ(ti) ∈ NX . Moreover, the
last condition implies that {x, xi} ⊆ EGΩi(t). Overall, we know that (∃t∈L(G) : δ(t)∈
∂X)(∀i∈{1, 2})[EGΩi(t) ∩NX = ∅], i.e., G is not decentralized distinguishable.
Remark 6.5.1. Note that ∂X and NX need not be disjoint. By the above theorem, the
system will not be coprognosable under any sensor activation policies if ∂X ∩NX 6= ∅.
6.6 Extension to the Conjunctive Architecture
In Section 6.5, we have shown that K-codiagnosability, coobservability and co-
prognosability are special cases of decentralized distinguishability. As we mentioned
earlier, all results in this chapter are developed based on the disjunctive architecture,
i.e., the coordinator issues “1” globally, if and only if, one local agent issues “1”.
Alternatively, one may also use the conjunctive rule to obtain a global decision, i.e.,
the coordinator issues “0” globally, if and only if, one local agent issues “0”. In this
case, suppose that a string leading to a state in XTkB is executed and a global decision
“0” has to be made. Then, a local agent must know that the system is not in XTkA
unambiguously when it issues “0”; otherwise a wrong global decision may be made
at some state in XTkA . Therefore, we need to require that




By comparing the above requirement with decentralized distinguishability, which is
defined in terms of the disjunctive architecture, we see that this requirement is indeed
the same as decentralized distinguishability by swapping XTkA and X
Tk
B . Therefore,
there is no need to define a conjunctive version of decentralized distinguishability; it
is just a matter of how the specification Tk is defined.
For example, in [128], the notion of D&A-coobservability was proposed as a com-
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plement of coobservability1. We recall its definition.
Definition 6.6.1. (D&A-Coobservability). We say that L(G) is D&A-coobservable
w.r.t. L(H), Σc,1,Σc,2 and Ω̄ if
(∀s ∈ L(H))(∀σ ∈ Σc : sσ ∈ L(H))(∃i ∈ Ic(σk))[P−1Ωi (PΩi(s)){σ} ∩ L(G) ⊆ L(H)]
Intuitively, D&A-coobservability requires that for any string for which σ has to
be enabled, there exists at least one agent that knows for sure that σ should not be
disabled. We can also formulate D&A-coobservability as an instance of decentralized




A ={x∈ XH : δH(q, σk)!}
X
TCJk
B ={x ∈ XH : δ(q, σk)! ∧ δH(q, σk)¬!}
with ITk = Ic(σk). The proof of the correctness of TCJcont is omitted since it is similar
to the proof of Theorem VI.2.
Similarly, one can also show that conjunctive K-codiagnosability [105, 108] and
conjunctive coprognosability [40,126] are instances of decentralized distinguishabiity;
we just need to define new specifications TCJdiag and TCJpre by swapping each X
Tk
A and
XTkB in Tdiag and Tpre, respectively.
1Here, “D&A” stands for “Disjunctive & Anti-permissive”. Also, coobservability in Defini-
tion 6.5.2 is referred to as C&P-coobservability, where “C&A” standards for “Conjunctive & Permis-
sive”. The reason why C&P-coobservability corresponds to decentralized distinguishability in the
disjunctive architecture is that, [69] considers the conjunction of enablements, while Tcont captures
the disjunction of disablements; they are essentially equivalent.
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6.7 Conclusion
We presented a novel approach for solving the problem of decentralized sensor
activation for a class of properties. We proposed the notion of decentralized distin-
guishability, which covers coobservability, K-codiagnosability and coprognosability.
To enforce decentralized distinguishability, we first adopted a person-by-person ap-
proach to decompose the decentralized minimization problem to two consecutive cen-
tralized constrained minimization problems. Then, a novel approach was proposed
to reduce each centralized constrained minimization problem to a fully centralized
sensor activation that is solved effectively in the literature. Finally, we showed that
the decentralized solution obtained by our methodology is language-based minimal.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we developed novel approaches for solving the control prob-
lem and the sensor activation problem for the purpose of property enforcement in
Cyber-Physical Systems that are modeled as Discrete Event Systems. The results
developed in this dissertation provide new theoretical foundations and computational
algorithms for synthesizing higher-level control logic in cyber-physical systems that
is provably correct in terms of a set of qualitative requirements. Moreover, the novel
approaches developed can also significantly reduce the system integration, verification
and validation cycle (and therefore time-to-market) for important classes of societal
systems.
More specifically, for the supervisory control problem, a uniform framework for
supervisory control under partial observation was developed. The uniform framework
is based on the newly proposed structures called All Enforcement Structure (AES) and
Non-blocking All Enforcement Structure (NB-AES). Based on the AES and the NB-
AES, algorithms for synthesizing maximally-permissive non-blocking supervisors for
the enforcement of a large class of properties were proposed. The proposed framework
not only handles the enforcement of many important properties in the DES literature
in a uniform manner, but it also can handle the issue of non-blockingness. As a special
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case of the general framework, the problem of synthesizing a maximally-permissive
safe and non-blocking supervisor, that had remained open for more than 25 years,
was solved. An algorithm was also proposed to solve the range control problem for
the case of prefix-closed specifications. This results in a safe and locally maximal
supervisor that provably contains a given desired behavior.
For the dynamic sensor activation problem, a uniform framework for synthesiz-
ing sensor activation policies for a wide class of properties was also developed. A
generalized version of the Most Permissive Observer (MPO) was defined to solve the
synthesis problem. Based on the MPO, we presented an algorithm for the synthesis
of optimal sensor activation policies under a logical performance objective. We al-
so investigated the problem of minimizing sensor activations for decentralized fault
diagnosis. A person-by-person approach together with the centralized uniform frame-
work were used to solve decentralized minimization problem. This provided the first
algorithm that solves the language-based sensor optimization for decentralized DES.
7.2 Future Work
The framework developed in this dissertation opens several future research direc-
tions. First, in Chapter II, the non-blockingness condition considered requires that
the system is always able to reach a marked state. However, this does not guarantee
that a marked state is eventually reached. One interesting future direction is to con-
sider a stronger version of non-blockingness, which requires that a marked state can
always eventually be reached. In some applications, different markings may represent
different types of targets and one may be interested in synthesizing a supervisor such
that different marked states can be reached in a certain order. This problem has
been studied in the fully-observed setting in the context of multitasking superviso-
ry control [63]. Generalizing the multitasking supervisory control framework to the
partially-observed setting is also an interesting future direction.
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In the range control problem studied in Chapter IV, we only considered prefix-
closed safety specifications, i.e., the issue of non-blockingness is not considered. One
important future direction is to generalize the results in Chapter IV to include the
non-blockingness requirement, given any IS-based property. Also, in Chapters II, III
and IV, we only investigated the centralized supervisory control problem. One future
direction is to study the supervisor synthesis problem in the decentralized setting
[69,128]. It has been shown in [95,98] that the problem of synthesizing a decentralized
non-blocking supervisor is undecidable. However, to the best of our knowledge, how
to synthesize a locally maximal decentralized supervisor is still an open problem.
Investigating the decidability of this problem is an interesting future direction.
In this dissertation, only qualitative requirements were considered in the control
synthesis problem. It would be of interest to develop theoretical foundations and
computational algorithms for synthesizing higher-level control logic in cyber-physical
systems that is provably correct in terms of a set of qualitative requirements (in the
form of safety and liveness properties) and, at the same time, satisfies a set of quan-
titative energy or resource constraints imposed on the system. More specifically, one
interesting future direction is to investigate how to guarantee that the accumulated
cost of any execution of the controlled system is non-negative. This essentially re-
quires to solve an energy game over the AES or the MPO structure. Another future
direction is to investigate how to minimize the average cost in addition to the accu-
mulated cost. For this direction, we may need to solve a mean-payoff game over the
AES or the MPO structure.
Also, in this dissertation, the supervisor synthesis problem and the sensor acti-
vation policy synthesis problem were addressed separately. One interesting future
direction is to investigate the joint synthesis of supervisory control strategies and
sensor activation strategies and associated design trade-offs. To this end, we may
need to define a new transition structure that combines the AES and the MPO. The
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development of this new structure would allow the study the dependency between the
control strategy and the sensing strategy in this joint synthesis problem.
Regarding the decentralized sensor activation problem investigated in Chapter VI,
we only considered so-called “non-conditional” decision fusion architectures. We may
also wish to extend the results in Chapter VI to the conditional architectures de-
fined in [105, 130], the inference architecture of [45, 46], and the intersection-based
architecture recently investigated in [115].
Finally, to further mitigate the computational challenges associated with the
growth of the number of states in the system, it would be of interest to use symbolic
methods to improve the scalability of the approaches developed in this dissertation.
In this regard, it wold be of interest to investigate how to symbolically represent the
BTS/MPO structures and their associated operators. Symbolic methods have been
recently applied to the basic supervisor synthesis problem in the theory of superviso-
ry control; see [28, 39, 55–57, 65]. However, to the best of our knowledge, all existing
works focus on the full observation case. The case of partially-observed systems has
not been addressed yet; neither has the problem of synthesizing sensor activation
policies.
It is our thesis that the novel methodologies developed in this dissertation provide
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